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QUESTION 
At 9:05 AM 7Sept 00, Whether by omission or not, Courts denial 
of Appellants witness and Continuance Motion, Under URCP(45)e 
and, Ut. Jud Code §78-24-5(Def. of Subpoenas), did deny Rights; 
hearing of Appellants! full case, Under Ut. Const. Art. I, 
sec 7, given the "Mitigating Circumstances" herein; Finalized 
in denial of Motion for New Trial : ( URCP (59a(l) ). 
(*)note: Full case defined as 1. Breach of contract, and/or, 
Deception(fraud) as in Appellants "Affidavit with Answer to 
The Complaint (llFebOO) 
note "Rights" are defined as : in a timely way of process, 
to have aider o"rder(Quash timely, or Obey) followed 
The 
pretrial, under URCP(45)c with the/a- subpoenas. 
"order" of orderly process of the Trial Court. ( 
assuming, the court of origin was on the subpoenas) 
Authority: 17Am Jur 2d Contempt §42 
Case: 20010172-SC Page 2 of 20 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutes / constitution P a ? e s 
URCP(45)e( Just Causes ) 1,14,15; 
URCP(59)(a)l(New TRial) 4; 
§21-7-3(J. Code Impec. Lit ) 19; 
§78-24-5( Subpoenas Def.) 1/15; 
§76-6-404 (Theft) 17; 
Article I, sec 7(Due Process) l>19i 
Authorities: 
62Am Jur 2d §20-22/§157, 158 (Defects) 15; 
62Am Jur 2d §161-163 (Process; Waiver) 14; 
17Am Jur 2d §42 (Contempt) 15; 
5Am Jur 2d §783 (Appeals Error) 19; 
Cases: 
None 
(*)note: These are all reproduced into the addendum of Brief 
C a s e : 20010172-SC Page 3 of 
SUMMARY OF CASE 
This document clarifies to the Ut. Supreme Court the basic 
mitigating factors involved in the "loss" or a witnessf and 
the denial of a Continuance Motion at 9AM(Pretestimony) that 
Appellant believes hindered his case being fully heard; 
The Mitigating factor is the Appellants own affidavit, filed 
with his "Answer" to the original complaint 11Feb00 which 
outlined to the Carbon County Sheriff Dept the facts under 
which his suspicions existed of deception ( maybe fraud) of 
a depositef and bill at the .Appellees' "company", Tire King, 
of Price Ut; These allegation via the witness, the owner 
of Tire King were never in court (testimonies ) but the Contract 
Breach was; The Trial Court may have prematurely decided the 
the case of Contract breach(the "what" ) without hearing mit-
igating factors, without addressing, hearing or considering the 
basic "why" of the breach (the deception going on simultaneously 
at the "company" on money and the bill); 
The Mitigating factors of the"loss" of a witness at trial are 
the contempt of "Orderliness" of process and order both of which 
the trial court basically forgave( but not in any record) under 
which discretion of these decision might be reversed. 
C a s e : 2 0 0 1 0 1 7 2 - S C Page 4 of 20 
JURISDICTION OF APPEAL 
Appellants timely Notice was filed under Title 114(c) ( of 
Ut. R. App. P. ) and ordered to the Supreme Court of UTah on 
its own motion under Ut. R. App. P § 78-2-2(3) (j ) ; 
The original appeal filedf was after Trial Court finality of 
orders, and the Motion of Continuance within, both part of the 
motion for New Trial under URCP(59)(a)l (discretion) timely 
made and denied; The Final Judgement and ORder was then struck 
by the Trial Court for these others. 
Case: 20010172-SC Page 5 of 20 
BRIEF SUMMARY 
The Appellant acting on his own behalf request the Utah Supreme 
Court to review this case and the actions of trial and court 
The Seventh Jud. District Court of carbon County, The Honorable 
Judge Bryce K Bryner; Wherein other party(Scqurt) were abusing 
process and subpoenas definiton(witness ANSWERynot courts) under 
§78-24-5/6 Ut Jud. Codes; At 9Am 7 Sept 00;QH^h a t Trial. 
The Trial had one basic day, and optional (day2) for small amount 
of credits (work incomplete I presume) to Appellant which could 
not compensate him, under that order that day2, for n°t 
hearing the "affidavit" in his answer with his witness(the Tire 
King owner, and Plainitff) and this brief gives basically the 
mitigating factors of the (A) loss of the witness, and (B) loss 
of Appellants motion for Continuance, and, (C) of the breach of 
contract defense; i<©) affidavit for which the witnesses^ there 
were not privy to priv^ dte', (owner to Petitioner) agreements. 
The factors arc the testimonies of the owner because of the fact 
established in the case and trial, that most agreement details, 
or contractual elements were "verbal" between owner and Petition 
-er from May 1999 through Septemeber 1999; The Appellants Notice 
of Appeal Attachments fairly outline mitigating pretrial events. 
C a s e : 20010172-SC Page 6 of 20 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
GENERAL TRIAL OUTCOME 
Memorandum Decision for this case was issued 1lOct00 and the 
Amended Memorandum decision issued on 25Oct00 (day2 incl) and 
monies on the complaint, minus any work not done ( if taken in 
day2 for all Appellants Pleading ) awarded to Plainitffs, ( 23 
54.05$ ); Appellant~(Defendant) did not have to pay attorney 
costs, and his deposite ( 2500.00$) was included (from the 
original complaint money asked, or, 4854.05$ ); The Court did 
not (apparantly )believe Defendants "11 reasons" given for the 
breach of contract (or, why Defendant took his car from the 
lot of Tire King 15Sept99 )
 Qr accept the Defendant; breach of 
contract, as presented. The "Bill" a subject of great questioning 
in trial was Ex(2) Addendum # ah • However the "bill11 was un-
signed by "Defendant"; Defendant' claimed it was incomplete by 
fact of not having a witness, owner of Tire King, the "company", 
to question about contractual(agreements) detaij. therein;Whereas, 
the " Plaintiffs"( Appellee (s) )claimed "I approved,- each and 
every item" therein. Trial had two(2) Tire King witnesses ( a 
office manager, and the mechanic(Greg) ). Defendant gave his 
(VHS TAPE ONLY 
own testimony ( fll) reasons why he took the car when he did) . 
Case: 20010172-SC Page 7 of 20 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
GENERAL MITIGATING FACTOR TO TRIAL 
Appellants o w n discovery document and the "Appellees. Answer, 
timely made pretrial, ( 06Mar00f 27Mar00) contains, along 
with Appellants own Answer, and affidavit(attached) to the 
complaint, from 7Feb00, the only other record at trial, & 
the testimony at trial; Altering this, Appellant ; believes 
is the details of those documents when explored under oath, 
and at the testimony of the owner of Tire King, the "plaintiff 
" in the action; Transmission sublet, ""invoice bill' total; 
(All in Addendum #8 ) 
The purpose therein"is to adjust the total "bill" which the case 
money is entriely built on, which the Appellant did not sign, 
nor, approve. Extra ( 1700.00$) is fabricated into this "bill". 
From the document of record, the Appellee \("Plainitff" ) answer 
to Appellants discovery(above), it was clear to court, but not 
explored, are verbal agreements with the Tire King owner which 
along with "Complaint" Answer and "affidavit" get the the breach 
of contract motive ( the "why") which is not in the courts own 
M^norandum Decision of 11Oct00; Based on amounts from the ("bill11, 
deceptions in the breach of contract pleading not^heatd. 
Case: 20010172-SC Page 8 of 20 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
GENERAL MITIGATING FACTOR OF THE WITNESS 
The Plaintiff was issued (amendable; By adding from face "To 
appear at own trial11 below) but voidable/waivablej wrife fe§ 
make the pleading, iir affidavit, filed .24Nov99 (SherriJE Dept) to 
evidence deception; on monies (deposite/ bill)-! ( all in the 
affidavit, Addendum #_9 ); Petitioner left lot 15Sept99; The 
subpoenas had court-place, Jurisdiction, trial case# for order; 
Failure on obtaining sublet shgwji^by invoicg (from TRI rebuiler) 
Addendum # Be to exist(not given in discovery) is proven by the 
Tire King, nonaction upon it to finish invoice by 15Sept99 or let 
Defendant go home; If-Jtfembrandum Decision(Addendum'#4)rwpre 
correct(«asto bfeach, andicompletion work * invoice would be 
paid and completely document finished* unpaid to Oet.l.)ttien. 
10Au99memo(Adden(3 ,#8a)wasan invitation to sublet the trans. 
work till work done (which it would be 10Aug to 14 Sept;- Lied) 
The "contractual arrangements" if any on these were vague, the-
subpoenas(witness) .. must produce this *™ 15Sept9* agreement 
from Tire King to TRI (not an 10ct99 receipt-only ) before 
the court; If none, then how can they make one up illegally 
after 15Sept99 when Petitioner had gone? (767.23$ involved); ) 
Case: 20010172-SC Page 9 of 20 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
GENERAL MITIGATING FACTOR OF THE WITNESS 
Plainitffs ^Ex 2/ Addendum # 8h ) the bill has not only the 
transmission showing , but other unresolved items that can be 
credited back to Petitioner from the Trial courts analysis of 
what happeded from May 99 to 15Sept 99; The Trial court said 
they were goig to be "fair" and the Judge said "he took copious 
notes" to do so; Owner made and serviced all these items or 
agreements to Petitioner ( verbally): 
Transmission: No contractual agreement if work breached by 
(767 23$ Tire King; No Tri &TK' Pre-lBSept99 agreement. 
* (there is an Oct 1 agreement/receipt only) 
Labor in May 99 ( item (7) from "bill": Taken wrongly May from 
(720 00$ — Deposite $$ (no records) 
Item (1) Blazer Repair: Breach( of ) warranty ad] due(receipts)= 
(48.00$ 500.00$ 
Item(11) Labor on Engine:Breach of Warranty ( Judge mis spoke the 
situation in Memorandum Decision. ) 
(268.80$ 
Once these conflicting agreements are settled the trial will be 
truthfull and just. 
Case: 20010172-SC Page 10 of 20 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
The question of the Breach: > the Trial court as said during 
its own Memorandum Decision "Removal of car(by Defendant) 
prevents prevented Plaintiff from completing some minor re-
pairs"; Just the opposite of the contention: In the answer to 
the complaint: "The Plaintiffs • failed to provide all and 
adequate goods and services (the breach of contracts) 
What really happened at Tire King? Aug 15-Sept15No work done. 
Appellant -claims^ Transmission.work terminated(Sublet)&Instal. 
Trial established: An unauthorized visit by Tire King to Pet.' 
The witnesses(Trial):. could either not rememberr or were unsure 
or misrepresented the facts;(Money asked for; claimed:No PAY; 
(15Aug99); Breach occured; Pet. work terminated OAffidavit. ) 
If there was no records at Tire King as to dates things were 
done, and what was done and how much, then how can their words 
be the ultimate last truth? Discovery of DEfendant [addendum^ 8 
) shows NO records exist (at all); The only one left is the owner 
himself who coordinated these events, and knew; Verbal agrements 
as said in the Plaintiff Response "oral agreements existed"; In 
the document (Addendum # H ) Plaintiff's " Response to Defendant 
Robert Flynns Memorandum in Support of Motion To Dismisss " is 
Case: 20010172-SC Ph<3& 11 of 20 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
The words: " ongoing agreements, continuing instruction and 
agreements, etc "; 
Based upon what is known then the whatof the breach depends on 
records (nonexistent at Tire King apparantly), testimonies of 
witnesses (owner), or the Defendant; The Defendants testimony 
„ VHS T A P E M 
( 11 reason s) were given, but the owner would not come to the 
court; The event happened (affidavit stmt^ -Point(1) ). 
The "why" of the breach, the misuses of monies,, again depends for 
proofs on records (nonexistent at Tire King apparantly), the 
testimonies of witnesses (owner who made the agreements, not the 
workers who did the work as in Trial #1), or the Defendant. 
The Defendant's "affidavit" represents his testimonies, but the 
foudantion with the owner testimony is critical, along with the 
step by step chronology, and the trial of what happened to the 
deposite monies(from May99, step by step, under oath. ) 
It should be sufficient to decide this case, apparantly the words 
of the Plainitff against the words of the Defendant, and the 
records; there must be some physical records at Tire King or, 
Case: 20010172-SC Page 12 of 20 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
the "Bill" as presented in Ex(2) alone is not enough to support 
a complete decision in favor of the Plaintiffs yet the Trial 
Court without the owner saw it that way; At least the 
adjusted amounts from page (9) infra., can be resolved in another 
trial with all major party contract makers present, fairly; 
The case as heard then could potentialy be reversed up to that 
amounts: 2206.03$ and any work not done from day2 of trial 
#1, not yet given to Petitioner; 
(*)note: from page 8 
On the transmission arrangements, separately taken, Breach of 
Contract can be established' * Comparisons of _the_"3" contracts 
(the forms available):' "No contract (taking out) trans; 10Aug99* 
memo invoice from TR'I( '13 Aug);-Sublet, atacf:M:hfe receipt Add. 8f, 
eg any Agreements" Petitioner wrote to Tire King ( A u9 10 99) 
for sublet options to occur on the transmission have to go both 
ways ie FLYNN TO TIRE KING, and TIRE KING TO TRI; yet nothing 
in the period from 3Aug99 to 15Sept99 exists ( at least in 
Discovery) to obligate Flynn to pay Tire King unless Tire King 
made an offical agreement ( Petitioner was never notified of 
such)- T i r e K i n <? t o T R i made after Defendant left is illegal; 
Case: 20010172-SC Tage 13 of 20 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
DISCOVERY MITIGATING FACTORS 
Based on filing, 6Mar00 of discovery by Petitioner, and the 
Answer 27Mar00 Appellant received: 
item: TRI(rebuild ) receipt/note 
item: requested all sublet, and invoiced agreements 
from, 2May99 to OctOO; 
No invoice or sublet on transmission ever turned over to me or 
court. Court should have believed(in decision) none exists! 
ANALYSIS *:Nonaction on invoice voids sublet by 15SEPT 99-
Since the note($ 8c * says "Invoice sent 13Auglf this would help 
explain the sublet between TRI and Tire King reciprocal to my 
permission ( 10 Aug99 note);1 However, there was a problem in 
that Tire King never paid this until after Appellant left on 
15Sept99 (paid Octl); The sublet agreement is that Tire King will 
then be responsible, install, and warrant, and "pay" the bill, 
I will pay them when all complete. Owner must be there to explain. 
If a true sublet existed from Tire King to TRi between Augl^' 
and SeptJi "it c a n b e explored in Trial #2 " At tha time, if 
payment made to Tire King and no commitment exists they can 
keep money^1 still owe TRI); The invoice needs to be seen. If 
its a contract or wha*fe? Legally invoice goes to Fryhn 1,5Sept 
V ^Nonaction 13Aug—to—15Sept(of any kind proves work over(breach)) 
Case: 20010172-SC Page 14 of 20 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE MITIGATING FACTORS 
The limited transcript(Addendum #1) shows that whatever happened 
at 9:05AM is not officially on the record; The attachment for 
Petitioners Notice of Appeal shows THE "mitigating" events ie 
the Appeal's analysis of "error"; Was there any prejudice and how 
much ? ; Addendum^ 6 (p. Motion, for New Trial) defines that the 
decision of the trial court therein; The "continuance" denied for 
apparantly l)fime, and 2)maybe cause ignoring mitigating factory-
). 
Issue time; 
The Orderliness of Process( on subpoenas)issued 18Feb00 shows the 
Respondent(s) failed to respond , at all; time was then a factor 
in Appellants side because this "waives" objection (under auth. 
:62Am Jur 2d/ §161-163 Addendum#E). 
Time was also a factor in that 6-8 months for quash,objection or 
other corrective process; Attorney said he "did NOT want to help" 
. There was information in writ to respond at least in time; 
Therefore by 6Mar00 (tvim& expires to object at next step) Pet-
itioner had the legal right to expect: compliance . 
Issue of Causes: 
URCP(45)e requires a just cause. However, attorney represented 
"plaintiff" <ftddeendum#6/#li)
 a t 9 A M ; to'avoid, or not^ help; 
Case: 20010172-SC Page. 15 of 20 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE MITIGATING FACTORS 
Based on the Authorities(Addendum #A)Not-aIl continuaces are in 
discretion if they affect Due Process; Since by 6Mar99 Appellees 
nonaction of subpoenast_Appellant can assume:compliance (Addendum 
Eff.§161)» Time was the reason(Addendum #5/6) so when the adder! 
mitigating factor, contempt of orderliness of process is there, 
something should have been done by court; Court knew affidavit1, 
pleading( fraud/deception to be heard) existed. 
legally also the appearing is mitigating under all the URCP(45) 
rules *§162 T h e subpoenas v^ as goDd («*til 9:05AM by nonaction) & 
court had power to fix its own document, by party no saying any-
thing( Addendum #C). By ^addendum #6) "plaintiff4 wanted11 to avoid 
helping novice Appellant. Appellant objected first; 
Note: rf they, had responded (timely) it would j>!=LJiiyi^ L- of, court 
order issued eventually( 8 months left) helping Appellant;"—-
The issue was raised again(tiew Trial) and denied and the issue 
fairness in time, is. new Due Pr:oq_^ ss; The subpoeans ,was irreg-
in its order,, not prohibited however to use (process ie cas~e# 
, court, etc. in olade of literal time; (the word is specify); 
But the court can disregard. The issue is timeliness (or lack of 
it) to others by Appellees; 'Wanton disregard for process to maKe 
sure no correction;, cure, or court order is made. 
C a s e : 2 0 0 1 0 1 7 2 - S C Page 16 of 20 
LEGAL ARGUEMENT 
MITIGATING LEGAL POINT(CONTRACTS) 
The minor analysis below shows there were three (A ,13, C) contracts 
at work at various point of the arrangement at Tire King which 
the Appellant holds were breached; The Trial court did not see -
or point to these in its Memorandum Decision. 
contract(A): All work from May on(15Sept99 Petitioner towed his 
vehicle home for the breach, and as stated in his 
"Affidavit"; worry about the deception/fraud option) 
contract(B):
 MfemQ i s s u e d t o T i r e King 1 0 A U9 9 9'- Therein is the 
(? on memo) . . . I_-I.I_.I_ • • _. a. u *. 
owners option to sublet transmission but he must 
1)decide in time, and 2) give me something in 
writing as I gave him. (He never responded) Work 
totally prematurely terminated a few days after, 
at the point of the "unauthorized visits" to get 
money beyond the 2500$ depositef and to say "that 
Greg(mechc ) had never been paid for work 
contract(C): Ungiven(collateral) Tire King to TRI(rebuiler) or, 
"sublet" agreements (Trial assumes it exist before 
15Sept99. No proof-(discovery says it does NOt 
exist(or, Discovery was lying); Appellant feels 
"illegally " set into motion Oct 1(after P. was 
Case: 20010172-SC Page 17 of 20 
LEGAL ARGUEMENT 
MITIGATING LEGAL POINT(CONTRACTS) 
under his assumed breaGh ofagreements.. 
other party was setting into motion the charges 
under §76-6-404(felony) on 27Sept99; 
(Code: Addendum #J; Letter Addendum # 8g) 
Appellants' legal position(breach of contract of Trial !, and 
the added Pleading not heard in Trial 1 is the deception and 
fraud possibility, under that sublet for the transmission. 
Addendum 8f shows that on Oct 1 a supposed "contractal" arrange 
-ment was paid off; and this obligates Appellant-(Defendant) to 
all problems thereafter, against what a "sublet11 is; The invoice 
in that same reference was apparantly sent 13Aug99, Appellant 
was expected to pay it, and told by TRI 16„ or 17Aug 99. Company 
Tire King however never saidv 
(*) note: 
The invoice, as well as "sublet11 as were all documents of receipt 
-ed works were request in Appelants "Discovery" ( 06MAr99 and 
only the receipt from Oct was given, and no sublet* The owner( 
and testimony) on all invoices, sublets, bill needed in Trial #2 
Case: 20010172-SC Page 18 of 20 
LEGAL ARGUEMENT 
MITIGATING LEGAL POINT(CONTRACTS) 
Appellant believes legally the reciprocal TRI invoice is not 
a contractual agreements, just a receipt 
Appellant believes legally that some of f ical legal Tires 'King to 
TRI sublet, contract must be deliver to court, or else the memo 
from 10Aug99 cant be honored, its too late (Defendant left on 
15Sept99, and if nothing was given over to complete this memo. 
its not enforcible; Defendant wants a sublet while he is there 
at Tire King, and can take advantages of its terms etc., to get 
all work done by Tire King, checked out mechanically, and paid 
by Tire King; If Defendant PaYs what proof is there that Tire 
King(given the animosities existing now) will be obligated in 
any legally to pay TRI for work. (They would say FLYNN took his 
car over there, made arrangements, and we just put it in) They 
cant have it both ways. 
SUMMARY CONTRACTS. 
Legally Tire King should have immediately turned over the invoice 
either paid(copy of) or not to Defendant when they got it. To 
keep it, not give it over even in discovery is unfair. 
Case: 20010172-SC Page 19 of 20 
LEGAL ARGUEMENT 
DUE PROCESS 
Under: Art(*) s e c 7/ of the Ut. Constitution, a right to a 
fair and complete hearing of ones case must be given before 
money of the party can be taken; Herein the complete affidavit. 
The Appellant believes that (using Authority: 5Am Jur 2d, ex. 
§782, §783 Appeal and Error ) sufficient "discretionary" room 
existed at all major turning points of this Trial #1 ie from 
the situation witness and subpoenas, to "bend" ( not conform to 
aider, or URCP(45) in any level)J holding this subpoenas beyond 
reasonable "next just step" (waiver option), and not quashing 
when plenty of time existed to do so before trial (Under URCP( 
45) this must be "timely " )); and "appearing" (making the 
court respond and adjudicate in one moment(no record kept) ) 
to prevent "help" to the novice, pro se "Defendant", takes too 
much advantage of the situation to be fair ; Later finalized. 
Referring to Addendum #A: 
While the original Motion for Continuance, 9AM 7 Sept Q0 was in 
the discretion of the Trial"Court ( could be 50-50 if the 
roles of contempt of order were included)' after, in The Motion 
for New Trial ( based on §2~/3 Am Jur 2d) ma\foe mandatory to 
grant to hear the full pleadings, and consider the contempt. 
Case: 20010172-SC Page 20 of 20 
CONCLUSION 
Aaeellant believes that substantial loss of his case heard 
did occur in this Trial #1 that unwarranted omission in the right 
to have his Continuace (under URCP(4 ) just cause) against the 
Contempt of Orderliness of process under URCP(45)(e) and that 
legally any of these omissions could be reversed in the 
discretion of the court; and asks the Utah Supreme court to 
vacate that Trial #1 for a more completely heard Trial. 
Appellant also asks the Supreme court to make a decision on 
Appellant' £ Affidavit of Impecuniosity herein but objected to 
and filed timely. 
Executed this 20th day 
of May 2001, and submitted 
this 29day of May, 2001. Signed: jQ(J^d fekLvi^f. 7^ 
Appellant Pro Se 
Robert Fiynn III 
1265 N Carbonville Rd #24 
Price Ut. 84501 
Appellant (Pro Se) 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Tire Kir>^  , Inc. , 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v 
Robert Fiynn III, 
Defendant and Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case: 20010172-SC 
This transmittal certifies that the Appellant in the 
above case has timely (May 29 2001) submitted his 
Brief as required by rules, and served the opposing 
counsel. 
Dated this 24th day of May 
2001. 
Appellant Pro Se: 
A 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: 
I Robert Flynn, Appellant in the case 20010172-SC certify 
that on the dates and time below that I did serve 
the people as shown by mail, postage paid, with copies 
as shown 
copies method name 
May 25, 2001 9 coPY 
1 orig. 
Mail Ut. supreme Court 
Appellate Clerk Off. 
450 So State, 5th floor 
PO BOX 140210 
SLC Ut. 84114-0210 
May 25, 2001 2 coPy Mail Keith Chiara 
Attorney 
98N 400E 
PO BOX 955 
Price Ut. 84501 
Executed this 25th day of 
May 2001 
Appellant Pro se 
Robert Flynn III 
1265 N Carbonville Rd #24 
Price Ut. 84501 
Case: 20010172-SC ADDENDUM 
#1 : Transcript (1st 10 Min)* 
#2: Notice of Appeal/Attachment date: 14Feb01 
#3: Appeal Court Order date: 26Feb01 
#4: Memorandum Decision date: 11Oct00 
#5: Ruling. Motion New Trial/ & Motion date: 8Feb01 
date: 1 7 N O V 0 0 
#6: Objection. Motion for New Trial date: 22Nov00 
#7 Answer. P. Discovery date: 27Mar00/ 
#8: P. discovery date: 06Mar00/ (8)a-(8)h documents 
#9: Answer to Complaint date: 11Feb00 
#10: Complaint date: 7Feb00 
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Robert Flynn III 
1265 No Carbonville Rd #24 
Price lit 84501 
Petitioner 
Case: 20010172-SC 
Docket (000700120 ) 
To: Official Shorthand Transcriber 
Seventh Judicial District Court of Carbon County 
Re: Request for a limited transcript 
Tire King v Robert Flynn (Docket above) 
Dear Transcriber: 
You are hereby requ^ited for the above Supreme Court Case ( # 
20010172-SC ) to prepare, certify and transmit to Petitioner( 
above) the following selected item only for the purposes of 
determining the record on Petitioners Subpoenas Rulings during 
his trial ( case 000700120) September 7 2000 
item 
transcribed copies of testimonies or hearing on the 
Subpoenas at or from 9AM September 7 2000 for the 
case, and next sequential 10 minutes only. 
You are hereby asked to acknowledge receipt of this request into 
the indexing records as needed, and send a copy to Petitioner 
at the above address. (By May 8 2001) 
This letter certifies that I have made this request, and paid for 
the request, and mailed copies to the Respondents named. 
Executed this 1st day of MAy, 2001. 
Petitioner and Defendant 
cc.. Clerk of Trial Court 
Clerk of The Utah Supreme Court 
Attorney of Respondent. 
CQUJ0172-SC 
Ij^FLYSH V TIRE KING 
/Billing Statement / Appellate Court Notification 
Sixth and Seventh Districts 
• 'WS KS Please Return this Statement With Payment Amount Due 
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CaseN^ u: TI*z KING V FLYNN 
CaseNt ?ber: (0007001 ?n 
J u d 8 e ; - p..r:YCE K BRYNER 
Hearing /pe(s): ,srTPPRMT?-CQWR^eAgE ABOVE 
Requests by: PRTTTTOWPP 
Original .ztl i _ Copies 
Address: 1265 NO CARDuNvn.r.K pn #24 PRTCE QA&Q1 
Clerk: Tricia Atwood 
Date Transcript is needed: 
MAY 8 01 
Mail Transcript x 
* I will pick it up 
Date(s) of Hearing: 7SEPT00 
Court Location: Price 
(Circle One) Original &(1 Copy 
ADD: i VHS TAPE " 
Phone & i * i: 
X 
435-650-1639CELL 
Case on A „ t»al? Y N Supi emc Court Case # ABOVE Appellate #_ 
Date Recoi d 
a=audio 
v=vidco 
r=repoi tei 
lape 
counter 
beginning 
Tape 
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ending 
Estimated # 
of Pages 
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l^iSll-^^vl3!i^,'l?i^ll!{^^;:F•^i^l^lJVM^T,^TJ^mr^^ 
02-441519304 
Albertsons 
(ISSUING AGENT) 
AGENT 468615 DATE 050401 
024415193045 LOCATION 000396 QgMittf* 
82-40/1021 
PAY EXACTLY 
NOT GOOD OVER $500 
PAY TO THE 
ORDER OF 
** PAY EXACTLY FIFTY DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ****************** 
PURC 
Reportei: 
Transcribe . Joe Lid 
Appeal cast : only: 
Dale Acknc vledgniei 
DateNotic » Filing ""^  ,.
 l 0 ^ o n i l 0 0 i : UOO 2UU I 5 IR 3QL, 5H" 
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AUTHORIZED 
Ooflrt^P " A C i 1 Juncton Colorado 
PRIVATE PARTY 
Estimatec # of Pages: 
Date Deposit Received and 
Receipt # 
Actual # of Pages: 
a d d : : n e VHS TAPE 
PER SCHEDULE 
Date Amount Outstanding Paid: 
Date Refund Check Issued: 
10 
1 5 . 0 0 $ 
Estimated Cost 
! Deposit Amount Requested: 
Deposit Amount Received: 
Actual End Cost: 
Plus Postage: 
Total Amount Due: 
Amount Outstanding: 
$ 3 5 . 0 0 
$ 35.00 I* 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
* M O H 
-v-//r/'/7t;y 
35.00 
1 il5 TAPE : 15.00 for supreme court if they need it 
50.00 
MAY 4 2001 /£^^L=^PETI?IONEK 
Remit payment to 7* District Court, 149 E. 100 S., Price, UT 84501 
*CASHIER: Duplicate receipt is to be fonvarded to the designated Clerk and a copy sent to Brent Bowcutt 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGS 
I the undersigned certify that on this 1st day of May 2001 
that I mailed and served a correct copy of this request for 
limited transcription to the named parties prepaid: 
Clerk of The Utah Supreme Court 
Office of the Clerk of The supreme Court 
450 South State 
PO BOX 140210 
Salt Lake City Ut. 84114-0210 
Counsel of Record 
Keith Chiara attorney 
98 N 400E 
PO BOX 955 
Price Ut 84501 
Executed 01 MAY 2001 Petitioner and Defendant 
Case: 20010172-SC 
fll2$ P^r^ Ut-, 
r FILED 
TIRE KING I N C . , 
Plaintiff/ 
Appellee, 
VS. 
R O B E R T III"'""!. in I m II1 II il  
Defendant/ 
Appellant. 
APPEAL 
MOTION 
STAY. 
biE^lfflMIISWlCT COURTS 
CASK h • 0012. 
JUI;.;K liRYCE L. BR1NER 
The Defendant Robert Flynn comes now before the Utah Court of 
Appeal , from, the Seventh Judicial District Court of Carboi 1 
County, Utah in the above entitled case to argue 1 Review, ai id 
2 . Ruling on whether the denial of his *'rirt otion for Continua i I : ' = ' ' 
on September 7 2000 by the District Court was a violation of his 
other rights of Due Process, under the Constitution of Utah 
Article I, Section(7). The Defendant asks the Appeal Court to 
waive any bond in this appeal, as no Fi rial Judgement i n tl le 
Ci vi1 Case i- * r - -" 
At issue before vfu.- appeal court is whethei the motion for tl: le 
Continuance, by the Defendant was timely considering all of the 
mitigating circumstances ( m . ) as made to the Seventh 
Judicial District Court, and whether the rights in granting the 
motion out-wei gh rights of Pla inti f fs, t .o .: 1 < ••- for such 
The Seventh j^d-jiai jiw,ii„: \ ,,.i v.~ ^..^l ...,«.., , lm. 
denia,; oi the Defendant's Motion of September 7 ,.:000 is given :U 
( I ) , ana fact, of the general case at (II), and the othei 
m i t i g •-"! * 'i ?(if- t . •< n r* P» Q ^ f f o p f 1 r»n f h a, i" "*r\r\l i n n ^ p •"• p M O t" i *^ ° 
( 1 1 • j 
E x e c u t e d t h i s 1 4 t h d a y of F e b r u a r y , 2001 PENDANT PRO SE 
R<U^JT S>. jJ#7l~ 
I„ THE SEVENTH J UDICIAI • DISTRICT 
COURT MERIT ANALYSIS OF MOTION 
BY DEFENDANT FOR NEW TRIAI , 
November .i t JJIUMV Mot I..>*J * <>I N-- -. . •-. .-i- ! '- • ed t • 
the Defendant Me Seventh Judicial District Court of Utah 
Carbon County based upon the Defendant *s C a i Court 
CI dini '" • 
That he was denied a fair trial because the Court 
refused on the day of trial to continue the tri: ] 
to allow the Defendant to subpoena a witness 
a v t.ness for which an initial subpoena was issued 
2. Luc , . ;s aiscretionary powers over tl lis 
muLiun hao and ruled against that motion[ 
which was ' : .- • h«? Defendants mi rid, ] because 
was NOT time.: i;.-; the "ouri r a:.: v--;; 1 nreiudi,- ! he 
Plaintiffs . 
The Seventh District Court of Carbon County issued its ruling on 
that motion on February 8 2001 citing reason (2) without bracket 
saying further it was not abuse of discretion of the court, and 
d i d not deprive hi on of Due Process. 
The issues were then clear] y: "timeliness11 and "prejud i ce" were 
too great a factor in the courts mind compared to the right of 
the Defendant to have a witness. However, without this witness 
the Defense was to present NO case in that trial September 7, 
2000; The Defendant motion was presented at 9:05 AM at the 
start of trial before testimony as court record will show and \*i.«.; 
as timely as possible considering the witness he subpoened did 
not appear as expected and the Defendant had no prior knowing of 
this fa^ t- ™- Plaint- -i f f ^  d •;,i NOT REPORT the ^ r r, i* i-^  m Mri 
The r i-jrr of having his witness to present his < ase within 
Process is not in an of itself a "prejudice"; Ji was only
 rt 
question of a dely in trial to allow Due Process to work. Tl. 
Constitutional Rights are somewhat higher rights than inconven-
iences, and both parties were inconvenienced in time and 
whereas also the presumption of Defendant innor^-r-o "r*^ + 
born in mind compared to just time and inconviences. 
II. GENERAL FACTS OF THIS CASE 
BEFORE THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN CARBON COUNTY. 
The facts of this case are that an original civil dispute 
between the two parties emerged and agreements as friends 
were abondoned leading to the need of a Judge, and a 
complaint was filed by the Plaintiffs on February 07 2000; 
Since the complaint contained both civil and "apparant" 
criminal allegations the Defendant bitterly opposed the 
entry of this document into Court; As the "criminal parts" 
made by Plaintiffs were known to be meritlessf false, and 
injurious to the Defendant, and had been officially dropped 
by both Sheriff and DA of Carbon County before that. 
Defendant filed a timely response, and Subpoeona for the one 
witness who could clear this matter up, the Plaintiff himself 
by February 18 2000; The documents served were accepted by all 
parties without any formal, or informal "objections" as well 
as by the Court involved, however, unknown to Defendant during 
the entire period from February 18 2000 until trial, on 
September 7 2000 that a date omission in the said Subpoena would 
invalidate the Subpoena; The Plaintiffs while having a valid 
"excuse" to "object" to Subpoena chose to hold the document 
until moment of trial to announce their noncompliance. 
At 9:05AM, September 7 2000 the Defendant on learning of these 
facts chose to stand up for his equal rights to oppose this 
to the judge by objection, or motion, and ask for some remedy 
guch as time, or continuance etc., while the Plaintiff attorney 
"apologized" for any role in the matter he had, and the motion 
was denied. The trial completed with other objections by the 
Defendant for the situation of not having his witness, and a 
Memorandum of Decision was filed, and then reversed on November 
29, 2000 because Defendant made an additional motion on a timely 
basis for a Stay and New Trial"; Which was subsequently denied 
on BFebruary 8, 2001. The basis was the error, or not, on the 
Motion For Continuance by the Defendant the day of trial which is 
the most timely, or humanly possible moment possible given the 
way the Subpoena was handled by Plaintiffs. 
This issue then is now being brought before the Utah Appelate 
Court system. Thie* Final Order and Judgement have not yet been 
issued by the Court, and a 8 day period in currently in effect 
for "objection" to its form and content by Judge Bryner. Hence, 
the request for waiving "bond" might be appropriate until this 
matter is settled. 
III. THE DEFENSES1MITIGATING FACTORS IN THE 
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE SEPTEMBER 7 2000 
The Subpoena involved was issued and served on Plaintiffs on 
February 18f 2000 and filed with the court in Carbon County, 
however, the Defendant had unknowly left out the time and date 
portion, hence giving the Plaintiff himself, a witness, the 
right of "excuse" to not comply with the subpoena; An issue 
that was brought for the Court's attentions for the first time 
that morning of trial, September 7 2000. This being the sole 
issue then before the Court when the "Motion For Continuance" 
was presented at 9:05 AM.[By Defendant] 
The Plaintiff Attorney "apologized" to the court for whatever 
role he had in not reporting the known [to Plaintiffs] error 
to the Court for correction, or further order; It was not 
known why this course of action was taken by Plaintiffs but the 
presumption is (was) that that attorney was caught between two 
responsibilities 1 To his client who did not want to testify 
necessarily, and 2 Any responsibility;
 :as an officer of the 
Court, to resolve the subpoena; In these regards: 
The motion for continuance was brought by Defendant to protect * 
his rights in as much the same way the Plaintiff attorney was try 
-ing to protect the right of his client; The Court allowed one 
side to prevail in this protection issue, but not the other/ 
however the Defendant had presumptions of innocence and Due 
Process on his side as he was charged with the "complaint" and 
there were other cross issues the Defendant needed to expose to 
complete his "answer" and contention therein in the Civil Case. 
Thus the "mitigating" factor brought to bear on the Defendants 
Motion for Continunace was the degree of, and harshness of the 
loss he would suffer in fights compared to those of time and 
inconveniences to the court or Plaintiffs. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I the undersigned, certify that on the 14th day of February 
that I mailed a correct copy of the forgoing APPEAL first 
class, postage prepaid to the following 
Mr Keith Chiara 
Chiara Law Offices 
98 N 400E 
Price Utah 84501 
Seventh Judicial District Court 
of Carbon County 
Carbon County Court Complex 
149 E 100S 
P r i c e Ut 84501 
C a s e 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 2 0 DEFENDANT PROSE 
ll±£*X P i ^ p ~ ~ &F 
1265 N Carbonville Rd, 
#24 
Price Ut 84501 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Tire King Inc. , 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Robert Flynn III, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Ufah
 Court of Appeals 
FEB 2 6 2001 
Pautette Stagg 
Cleric of the Court 
FILED 
Trial Coiirt 
ORJDER 
FEB 2 3 —' 
tfo. 000700120 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
This matter is before the court on its own motion to 
transfer the appeal pursuant to Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is transferred to the 
Utah Supreme Court because it is taken from an order, judgment or 
decree of a district court in a civil case, not involving 
domestic relations, and is not within the original appellate 
jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (h) (1996) . See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3) (j) (1996) . 
Dated this /_[$ day of February, 2001. 
FOR THE COURT: 
wuAAJldcr* . „ ^y<^>,. r 
Paulette Stagg, ^ / 
Clerk of the Court 
#3 fv^vi t ^ i 
«iWart%tt «#L Pranclj 
gippzlbdt (ftxrori <AittmmBir*to 
Pat K^- |Sartlf0ttmte6r 
A p r V n , 2001 
Robert Flynn III 
1265 N Carbonville Rd #24 
Price UT 84501 
RE: Tire King v. Flynn 
Dear Counsel: 
Supreme GLtmxt tti ptalf 
450 gouty ^iais Street 
P.®. ^0x140210 
^al i £ a L Cltg, paif 84114-0210 
<Appsllaie Clerk*' <©ffto 
m^Uplfmte (801) 578-3900 
«3fax (801) 578-3909 
® P P (801) 578-3940 
jSuprsme (Emtrt Jlecepium 238-7987 
(fljjfef justice 
(Mjrtstttt*
 <Jffit^  Putlfam 
Justice 
^aiilpfcr p . Currant 
Jltdjael 3 . pJtlkuts 
3Jusiic* 
Supreme Court No. 20010172-SC 
The record index (#000700120) on this appeal was filed in this court 
The record remains on file with the trial court for your use in 
preparing your brief. The purpose of this letter, therefore, is to 
set the briefing schedule. 
Pursuant to Rules 13 and 2 6, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
appellant!s brief must be served and filed on or beford. May 29i 
This due date takes into consideration the three days mai'lin.g 
provision of Rule 22(d). 
the.v 
2001 
/ 
r 
* n 
Parties are advised to refer to Rules 24, 26 and 27, Utah R. App. 
or content and format requirements. 
P., 
All parties are specifically advised that the typeface requirements 
of Rule 27(b), Utah R. App. P., will be strictly enforced and 
noncomplying briefs will be rejected. A proportionally spaced 
typeface must be 13-point or larger for text and footnotes. A 
monospaced typeface may not contain more than ten characters per inch 
for both text and footnotes. 
Please be reminded that in civil cases where the record, excluding 
any transcripts, totals 300 pages or more, all parties must file with 
the clerk of the trial court, within 10 days after briefing is 
completed, a joint or separate designation of those papers referred 
to in their respective briefs. Only those designated papers, and 
those papers identified in Rule 11(d)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, will be transmitted to this court by the clerk 
of the trial court. 
Sincerely, 
Ardis Brown 
Deputy Clerk 
cc:KEITH H. CHIARA 
FILED 
OCT ] 1 200Q 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FORSEVENTH DlSTRIcTcnHRTQ 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH S 
TIRE KING INC., 
VS. 
ROBERT FLYNN,. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 000700120 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
This matter came on regularly for trial on September 7, 2000. The court heard the sworn 
testimony of the parties and their witnesses, received exhibits into evidence, heard the arguments 
of counsel, took the matter under advisement, and now issues this memorandum decision. 
Plaintiff seeks judgment against the defendant for $2,354.05 for parts, labor, and services 
provided to defendant's 1964 Chrysler and two other vehicles, together with accrued interest, 
attorney fees, and costs. The defendant contends that the defendant breached the agreement to 
repair the Chrysler by performing work that was not authorized. 
From the evidence presented the court finds: 
1. On May 26, 1999, the defendant signed a work order (Ex. #1) that described repairs that 
were to be made by plaintiff to defendant's 1964 Chrysler. 
2. On September 20, 2000, plaintiff prepared an invoice detailing the work that was 
performed on the defendant's Chrysler as well as some work performed at defendant's request on 
a Blazer and a Buick. The total cost was $4854.05. The Defendant received a credit for $2,500 
previously paid as a deposit, leaving a balance due of $2,354.05. 
3. After plaintiff examined the Chrysler engine, it was determined that it should be taken to 
Clegg Automotive in Orem for engine work that is normally farmed out by plaintiff. The 
•£H- (AWuJL'^  0 55 
defendant personally transported the engine to Orem and thereby consented to the engine being 
removed from the car and the work by Clegg being performed. The plaintiff paid the bill to 
Clegg Automotive in the amount of $736.33, and charged the defendant for that expense and 
listed it on Ex. #2. 
4. The defendant never complained to the plaintiff that the work being performed was not 
authorized. 
5. After the engine was returned from Clegg Automotive for a second time and was 
reinstalled, the car was started but the transmission linkage would not operate properly and the 
transmission remained in reverse. Mr. Greg Franklin, a mechanic with plaintiff, testified that the 
defendant told him to remove the transmission. However, the defendant testified that he was not 
present when the transmission was removed and that he did not authorize the transmission to be 
removed from the car, and he contends he should not be charged $240 for its removal and 
installation. In any event, the transmission was then taken to TRI for repairs by the defendant 
and Mr. Franklin accompanied him. 
The court finds that the defendant authorized the transmission to be removed. Moreover, on 
August 10, 1999, at the bottom of Ex #3, the defendant ratified the removal by the instruction he 
wrote directing the plaintiff to "include transmission work on my bill until all work is done. 
OK?" Ex.#3 was written by the defendant after the transmission had been removed from the car. 
6. The court finds that on September 11, 1999, the defendant justifiably removed the 
Chrysler from the plaintiffs premises because it had not been worked on for about three weeks. 
The court finds however, that the removal of the car prevented the plaintiff from completing 
some minor repairs on the car, to wit: fine tuning the transmission and the engine, state 
inspection, and completing work on the brakes. The court finds that the total amount on Ex. 2 
included the cost of performing that final work. Because it was not performed, the bill is to be 
0 56 
reduced by the value of the work not completed. The court was not presented with any evidence 
from which it could determine the reasonable value of the work that has not yet been performed. 
For that reason, the court will conduct a hearing on October 25, 2000, at 1:30 p.m. for the 
purpose of taking testimony on the value of the work not completed. 
The court declines to make an award of attorney fees in this case for the reason that the 
court finds the defense presented by the defendant was brought in good faith. The defendant 
presented eleven reasons why the plaintiff should not be awarded the relief requested in the 
complaint. The fact that the court has rejected those reasons does not mean the defense was not 
asserted in good faith. 
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the plaintiff should be awarded judgment in the 
amount of $2354.05, less the value of the work not completed. 
Once the hearing is completed on October 25th, counsel for the plaintiff is directed to 
prepare appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment consistent with this 
memorandum decision, L/1 
DATED this /l day of October, 2000. 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 000700120 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail ROBERT FLYNN 
DEFENDANT 
1265 North Carbonville Rd 
Price, UT 84501 
Mail KEITH CHIARA 
ATTORNEY 
P.O. BOX 955 
PRICE UT 84501 
Dated this (\&\ day of /\,p j- 201*2. 
i ^^ /-rfD-ft A • ryvi 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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HLED 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR (. 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
F£B - 8 2001 
SEVENlTTDi^TRicr 
.COURT/CARRHM 
TIRE KING INC., 
VS. 
ROBERT FLYNN,. 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR STAY OF ORDER 
AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 000700120 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
Trial in this matter was held on September 7, 2000. The court took the case under 
advisement and issued its Amended Memorandum Decision on October 25, 2000. The plaintiff 
prepared proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a proposed Judgment and 
Order and mailed copies to the defendant. The defendant timely filed a pro se Motion for Stay of 
Order and Motion for New Trial, to which the plaintiff filed an Objection and the defendant filed 
a Response. A Notice to Submit for Decision has been filed and the court now issues this ruling. 
The defendant's motion claims: 
1. That he was denied a fair trial because the court refused on the day of trial to continue 
the trial to allow the defendant to subpoena a witness, thereby denying him his right to due 
process. 
2. That the damages awarded to the plaintiff are beyond the ability of the defendant to pay. 
I. Was the Defendant Denied a Fair Trial and Due Process? 
Under Rule 59 (a) (1) URCP, a new trial may be ordered if either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial by an irregularity in the proceedings of the court or an abuse of discretion by 
the court. The defendant claims that the court abused its discretion by refusing to allow the 
^Tift , fa<y 
defendant a continuance to subpoena a witness, Mr. Paul Pugliese. 
The court finds that the claim is without merit because the defendant's motion for a 
continuance was untimely. The defendant made the motion during the second day of trial on 
September 7, 2000. The defendant had previously served a subpoena on Mr. Pugliese on 
February 18, 2000, which was four months before the case was set for trial pursuant to a Ruling 
dated June 26, 2000. The defective subpoena therefore could not and did not specify a date and 
time for Mr. Pugliese to appear. The court finds that there was adequate time between the date of 
setting the trial (June 26, 2000) and the date of the trial (September 7, 2000) to issue a new 
subpoena with the proper date and time inserted. The defendant has presented no valid reason 
why a new subpoena could not have been timely served to obtain the presence of Mr. Pugliese. 
To have granted a continuance at that stage of the proceedings would have prejudiced the 
plaintiff by causing him to incur additional delay and would have caused him to incur additional 
attorney fees. The court therefore finds that the refusal of the court to grant a continuance was 
neither an irregularity in the proceedings nor was it an abuse of discretion that prevented the 
defendant from having a fair trial nor did it deprive him of due process of law. 
II. Defendant's Allegation That the Damages are Beyond his Ability to Pay 
The defendant alleges that H[T]he damages assessed to the Defendant are excessive beyond 
his ability to even pay." In support thereof he claims; (1) that he could not rebut the amount of 
the bill because he was deprived of the right to examine Mr. Paul Pugliese as a result of the court 
not allowing a continuance; and (2) unauthorized work was performed on defendant's 
automobile but could not be proved without the testimony of Mr. Pugliese. 
The court finds that this argument is essentially the same argument presented in the 
defendant's first claim, i.e., that the defendant was deprived of the right to examine a witness 
when the court refiised to grant a continuance. For the reasons set forth in Section I above, the 
court finds that the defendant's claim is without merit. 
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that there was no irregularity in the proceedings of 
the court which prevented the defendant from having a fair trial. Accordingly, the motion for a 
stay of proceedings and the motion for a new trial are denied. 
DATED this <£? day of February, 2001. 
djg^ 
ryce K. Bryner 
District Judge 
Rcbert Flynn 
1265N.Carbonville Rd #92/#24 
Price, Utah 84501 
Defendant(Pro Per) 
RLED 
NOV I 7 20C0 
JIVENTH^TRICT COURTS 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Tire King, Inc./ 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Robert Flynn, 
Defendant. 
MOTION 
MOTION 
Civil 
Judge: 
FOR STAY OF ORDER A N D 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
000700120 
Bryce K. Bryner 
The above case has come before the Courts and a Final Judgement 
is immanant; 
Comes now the Defendant acting in his own behalf and asks the 
Court for a STAY and MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL; Pending any further 
rulings and appeals. 
CIVIL 
Under Rule 59(1) : 
1. Defendant was not offered a fair trial because a Subpoena 
decision ruled on Defendant during trial did obstruct or 
other wise deny his right to his only named witness, the 
Plaintiff. Thus denial of some Due Process. 
a#Under discretions therein time should have been offered as 
needed to obtain such witness or corrections of subpoena 
a harmless error but one denying Due Process. 
j^This was unfair to the Defendant, undermines his ability to 
* present an ^assertive defense against the unfounded dollars 
demanded by Plaintiffs and monies for work not done. 
c.Opened the door to misrepresenting, in the Courts decision 
Memorandum, the Defendants very own words of his "Contention 
11
 ie the Defendant did not say " Plaintiff breached the 
agreement to repair the Chrysler by performing work that w< 
not^authorized lf; The Defendant own ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, sa} 
what ERe .Defendant did say. [Dated Feb 11, 2000] 
Plaintiffs failed to provide all and adequate services to 
the defendant, misuses of the 2500.00 given, and forfeiture 
of all agreements for said goods and Services" Testimony u^ o v 1 
also underlines this point of view not the Court interpre 
-tations. The Court Memorandum appear to concur. {£^ Tb 
c.l 
Whether such d o l l a r s is_ unauthori 7.&r\ i c n^t- > n ^ M a k U *~~ *-u~ 
Page 2 of 2 
CIVIL 
Under Rule 59 (5) 
2. The damages assessed to the Defendant are excessive beyond 
his ability to even pay. 
a. Without the right to assertive defense and his only 
witness, Defendant could not rebut the excessive dollars 
that were claimed in the bill and adjudged agaist same. 
b. While it was true that unauthorized work was done but not 
testified to by Plaintiff himself, dollars as to agreement 
and contracts were not legally proven by the Plaintiffs. 
[The actual Plaintiff was not in Court] 
Defendant did have as the Court says written agreements 
[Exhibits: #1] but no credits against excessive charges 
for unauthorized dollars shown in [Exhibit #8] were 
even considered in the Courts decisions (2500.00 was the 
limit imposed in May 1999 ) These points are all prov-
able only if the witness for the Defendant can be 
crossexamined. Monies for work not done is a different 
credit due Defendant. Dollars were not in any agreement 
(s) which Plaintiffs offered the court. 
Consequently, although a subpoena was turned over to the Clerk 
of the Court, and even served and paid for by the Defendant 
it was never officially filed by the Court and dates never 
established* which rightly or wrongly did serve, to deny the 
Defendant in the above case, his due process in full amounts as 
prescribed under the UTAH Constitution, Art. I Sec (7). 
Dated this 17th day of November, 2000. 
DEFENDANT' T 
a n 
AFFADAVIT 
I PORKPT T FT.VNN do swear on this day, Nov 17, 2000 
That in the above motions asked for that to the best of 
my ability turned over to the Court Clerk, on 02-17-00 
forms For Subpoena for Plaintiff in the above entitled 
case acting on my own behalf. 
AS far as I can say it was never offici&liyrfil£d on 
that day discovered Nov 2000/ o n inspecting record. 
SIGNED i?x ju^f 
2 ATTACHMENTS A. Receipt of service 
B. Clerks Receipt 
«t 0 74 
ATTACHMENT AFFADAVIT 
Carbon County Sheriff's Office 
240 West Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
(435) 636-3251 
***** C O U N T E R R E C E I P T ***** 
R e c e i p t No - 2 0 0 0 0 1 4 D a t e - 0 2 - 1 7 - 0 0 
y 
- $7.00 oVr Amount Paid (7 
Check No - CASH J 
Payment By - FLYNN, ROBERT 
Description - SUB 
Received By - KOBE, DEBORAH A 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the 17th day of 
November, 2000, that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
Motion to Stay with Motion for New Trial, first class 
postage prepaid to: . 
CHIARA LAW OFFICES 
KEITH CHIARA 
98 NORTH 400 EAST 
PRICE UTAH 84501 
"DEFENDANT(PRO PER) 
ATTACHMENT A F F A D A V I T 
>N&me Bar Number 
Robert Fly-im-
Address 
1265 No carbonvillo rd 
City, State ZIP 
.P r i ce fit 84501 
Telephone 
Attorney for the d e f e n d a n t ( P r o P e r ) 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
CARBON COUNTY 
T i r e k i n g c o r p , 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Robert Flynn 
Defendant. 
SUBPOENA 
Case No. Qffl7fiOfrQ 
TO: PAUL PUGLIESE OWNER TIRE KING 
YOU ARE COMMANDED: 
seventh district ^ . 
|kr] to appear in the Court at the place, date and time specified below to testify in 
the above case. 
[ ] to appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the taking of a deposition in the above case. 
W to produce o r permit inspection and copying of the following documents or objects at the place, date and time 
specified below (list documents or objects): 
1, Plaintiffs hill to defendant dated 9~2Q-99 
2. Datoc of payments of transmission to TRI, « • — 
%[ 777 E Main, P r i r p TJT] 
3 .The original verified agreement of defendant with 
T i r e King Inc (. Complaint, itern 5) .„
 t [ J to permit inspection 67 the following premises at the date and time specified below. 
PLACE DATE AND TIME 
^-_ Any organization not a party to this suit that is subpoenaed for the taking of a deposition shall designate one or more 
.officers, directors, or managing agents, or other person who consent to testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for each person 
^designated, the matters on which the person will testify. Rule 30(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
&»«><>' djr*M^ 
OR ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/ DEFENDANT 
•DATF-
0 77 
hi compliance with tf» Americans wtih DfeatfMes Act, 
individuals needing special accommodation* (inducing 
should call 1400-992-0172, st least THREE working 
ORIGINAL 
Keith H. Chiara #0621 
98 North 400 East 
P. O. Box 955 
Price, UT 84501 
Telephone: (435) 637-7011 
Facsimile: (435)636-0138 
Attorney for Rebel Bail Bonds 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIRE KING, INC., 
Plaintiff. 
Vs. 
ROBERT FLYNN, 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR STAY OF 
ORDER AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. 000700120 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
COMES Now Plaintiff, by and through its attorney of record, Keith H. Chiara, and objects 
to granting of Defendant's Motion for Stay of Order and his Motion for New Trial for the 
following reasons: 
1. Defendant moves for a new trial pursuant to URCP 59(1). It is assumed he means 
URCP 59(a)(1). Defendant claims he was not given a fair trial because he subpoenaed Paul 
Pugliese and Paul Pugliese did not appear. He attaches a copy of the subpoena to his motion. 
Defendant raised the issue of Paul Pugliese's failure to appear on Defendant's 
"subpoena" at the trial. A copy of the "subpoena" was produced and reviewed. The "subpoena" 
was incomplete in that it did not give a date for appearance and therefore was clearly deficient. 
FILED 
NOV 2 7 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
2. The subpoena was dated 2-17-00. The trial in this case was not even selected by the 
Court until June 26, 2000, more than four (4) months after the date of the "subpoena". 
Because no trial had been set and because the subpoena was not dated, Plaintiff treated 
the subpoena as a discovery tool, or a Subpoena Duces Tecum and provided Defendant with 
those items requested insofar as Plaintiff had them in its possession. 
3. At trial, the Court determined that the Defendant's subpoena did not require Mr. 
Pugliese to appear on the date of trial. It is not the Court's responsibility to guide the Defendant 
through the trial or to act as Defendant's attorney to protect Defendant from his own failings. 
4. In Defendant's Motion, under la, Defendant apparently suggests that, during the trial, 
when he was informed that he had not properly served Paul Pugliese with a subpoena, the Court 
should have recessed and allowed him time to subpoena Paul Pugliese. Plaintiffs complaint was 
filed on February 7, 2000. Between that date and the date of trial, on September 7, 2000, 
Defendant filed several different motions and other documents requiring Plaintiff to respond in 
writing to preserve its claims against Defendant. Defendant had plenty of time to seek the advice 
of legal counsel do research in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or any other thing he needed 
to do in preparation for trial. He had no right, at the time of trial, to expect the Court to recess the 
trial, or continue the proceedings until he had properly subpoenaed Paul Pugliese. He requested 
the Court allow him to do that, and the Court declined. He is not now entitled to a whole new 
trial because he alone failed to properly follow the rules of Court. He claims that he is being 
denied his right to due process. However, he is only looking at one side of the issue. If the Court 
were to grant his motion for a new trial at this time, solely because of the Defendant's own 
n 7Q 
failures, the Court would be denying Plaintiff due process. Certainly Plaintiff is as entitled to due 
process of law as is the Defendant. 
5. Under Defendant's paragraph lb, Defendant again claims that the actions of the Court 
were unfair to the Defendant, claiming that the Court's ruling undermines the Defendant's ability 
to present an assertive defense. The Court did no such thing. The Defendant was free to obtain 
competent legal counsel, and he was free to properly prepare. The Defendant alone undermined 
his own ability to present his defense. Interestingly, the Court greatly relaxed the rules for 
presenting evidence, and allowed the Defendant extremely great latitude in presenting his 
evidence and arguments, including when he presented his evidence and when he cross examined 
Plaintiffs witnesses. For Defendant to now accuse the Court of undermining Defendant's case is 
very unfair to the Court, and is not truthful. 
6. In Defendant's paragraph lc, it appears as though Defendant's objection to the Court's 
decision is merely that the Defendant views the evidence differently than the Court views it. The 
Court is entitled to view the evidence differently from what the Defendant claims the evidence to 
be, based upon all of the evidence presented before the Court, including evidence presented by 
the Plaintiff. Simply because the Court does not accept the Defendant's representations as to 
what the evidence is, does not mean that the Court is wrong and the Defendant is right, and the 
Defendant is entitled to have a whole new trial to repeat the same evidence the Court did not 
believe during the previous trial. In paragraph lc, the Defendant appears to merely be rearguing 
the same things that he argued to the Court during the trial. Having presented his evidence and 
0 
made his arguments once, if the Court does not accept his position, that does not mean that he is 
entitled to a new trial under URCP 59. 
7. Under paragraph 2 of Defendant's Motion, the Defendant claims he is seeking a new 
trial based upon URCP 59(a)(5). In this assertion however, Defendant apparently did not read the 
grounds for a new trial that are provided for under Rule 59(a)(5), because the Court did not 
award damages in this case, but awarded the amount due to Plaintiff pursuant to an agreement 
between the parties for the Plaintiff to provide parts, labor and services and for Defendant to pay 
for the parts, labor and services. No damages were awarded. Certainly, nothing was awarded to 
the Plaintiff "under the influence of passion or prejudice". If anything, the District Court Judge 
acted in a very reserved and calm manner, carefully listened to all of the evidence, allowed the 
Defendant great latitude in presenting his case and cross examining the Plaintiffs witnesses, took 
the matter under advisement, issued a Memorandum Decision, set a second hearing for October 
25, 2000, issued an Amended Memorandum Decision, and ordered judgment in behalf of the 
Plaintiff based upon the evidence presented at the trial and subsequent hearing. Interestingly, 
although the Defendant was fully informed of the hearing date for the second hearing, Defendant 
failed to appear. 
8. As with Defendant's paragraph 1, Defendant's paragraph 2 is more re-argument of his 
case than statement of legitimate grounds for granting his motion. All of the things that he states 
in his paragraph 2 were argued by him before the Court in the September trial and he had the 
opportunity to present any other arguments in the October 26th hearing. Defendant was not 
denied due process, nor was he treated unfairly, nor did the Court makes its decision based upon 
the influence of passion or prejudice. Defendant has filed this motion simply because he does not 
want to pay a legitimate debt that he owes to the Plaintiff. For that reason his motion should be 
denied and he should be required to pay Plaintiffs attorneys fees for having to respond to these 
motions for a stay of the order and for a new trial. 
PLAINTIFF PRAYS FOR AN ORDER OF THE COURT DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND FOR SETTING ASIDE THE 
JUDGMENT, SO PLAINTIFF CAN PROCEED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW, TO 
RECOVER THE DEBT OWED BY DEFENDANT TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
DATED this P^L day of November, 2000. 
Keith H. Chiara 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the J^^diaay of November, 2000, I personally mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Objection to Motion for Stay of Order and Motion for New Trial, postage prepaid to 
the following address: 
Robert Flynn 
1265 No. Carbonville Rd, 
#92/#24 
Price, Utah 84501 
Keith H. Chiara, #0621 
CHIARA LAW OFFICES 
98 North 400 East 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435)637-7011 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Tire King, Inc., a 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Robert Flynn, 
Defendant 
Utah Corporation, RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
Civil No.: 000700120 
Judge: Bryce K. Bryner 
In an effort to provide discovery to Defendant, whether he complies with the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure or not, Plaintiff responds to Defendant's March 6, 2000 request as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs attorney is providing copies of all papers relating to Defendant's obligation 
to Tire King presently available. However, some agreements and instructions from Defendant 
were not written, but were oral and still binding upon Defendant. Plaintiff is not obligated to 
deliver the original papers. 
2. See copies of papers supplied. 
3. See copies of papers supplied. Greg's time is basically included in the itemized 
statements. However, Greg wasn't the only mechanic that provided labor for Defendant's 
automobiles, and Greg was also working on other customers' automobiles. Tire King cannot 
provide time cards that can show the exact amount of time Greg spent only on the Defendant's 
automobiles and there is no business requirement for Tire King to keep records for such. 
Defendant is aware other mechanics, including Paul Pugliese, worked on his automobiles. 
Greg, as a mechanic, was never authorized to receive money from Defendant for his labor in lieu 
of Defendant's obligation to directly pay Tire King, and no money given by Defendant to Greg 
relieves Defendant of his obligation to pay Tire King. 
4. See copies of papers supplied. 
A. As to warranties, Defendant delivered the engine to Clegg Automotive and brought 
the repaired engine to Tire King to install. Although Tire King paid Clegg Automotive, any 
warranty was to be delivered to Defendant. Tire King repaired Clegg's work, but was not 
reimbursed by Clegg for its work. Obtaining reimbursement is the responsibility of Defendant, 
since Defendant is the party receiving any warranty given by Clegg. 
B. As to any warranty for the transmission, Defendant took his transmission to 
Transmission Rebuild. Paul paid Transmission Rebuild in behalf of Defendant and installed the 
transmission. Defendant was supposed to take the vehicle to Transmission Rebuild to have the 
transmission "fine-tuned" and receive his warranty. 
5. No "demand payment" letters were made to Defendant until counsel for Plaintiff sent 
a letter, dated September 27, 1999 and a second letter dated November 4, 1999 to the Defendant. 
Plaintiff then filed suit. No demand payment letters were sent prior to that time because Tire 
King was legally in possession of the Chrysler until Defendant illegally removed it from Tire 
King's possession. 
6. There aren't any agreements between Tire King and Clegg Automotive for recovery of 
warranty monies because Defendant is the party with the warranty. Defendant is obligated to pay 
Tire King for its work and Defendant should then seek recovery from Clegg Automotive. 
DATED this ^M day of March, 2000. 
fceith H. Chiara 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Tire King, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the ^ fch -day of March, 2000,1 mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY, 
first class, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mr. Robert Flynn 
1265 North Carbonville Road, #92 
Price, Utah 84501 
Secretary 
Civil/Tire King Response to Defendant's Request for Discovery.doc. 
A ?R 
HUBERT FLYNN 
DEFENDANT (PRO PER) 
1265 No. Carbonville Rd.#92 
Price Ut. 84501 jm eaooo 7 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIRE KING 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
ROBERT FLYNN, 
Defendant. 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
Case No. 000700120 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
^fendant Robert Flynn requests of the Plaintiff's in the above 
ititled case, 000700120 Discovery for the following items: 
The original papers made and signed by Robert Flynn at Tire 
King. To include the original work order shown to exist in 
Plaintiffs 28Feb00 Response [May 1999 "agreements1.1]. 
Associated to the "May agreements" all May 1999 through Oct-
ober 2000 debits, charges, sublet agreements and monies 
paid or received, parts and labor and dates applied for any 
and all work
 ancj including dates v h e n applied to 2500$Deposite. 
Associated to "May Agreements" all related time-card data 
for mechanic (Greg) in the above periods and monies paid. 
Associated to items(1 2 3 ) subsequent modifications and 
other written agreements for contract changes authorized 
by either Paul Pugliese, or his secretary, or Greg, 
including all warranty changes and agreements on engine, or 
transmission. 
All Demand of Payments made to Defendant from May 1999 to 
September 11, 1999 . 
Written agreements between Tire King, and Clegg Automotive 
Company of Orem (if they exist) for recovery of any warranty 
monies. 
THE TIME AND PLACE IS AT DISCRETION OF PLAINTIFF. 
Dated this fiC? day of Marck 2000. /li k^d^yx^y 
npFffMnftMT 
Original Copy 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the attached documents was 
sent to the following people for case 000700120 by 
methods and on the date specified 
method name 
MAIL Keith chiara 
ATTORNEY 
P.O. Box 995 
Price, Ut 84501 
Dated t h i s j>& day of fl^frj\ , 2 0 0 0 0 -
[XJJJ^AX '&IW*~S' 
Robert Flynn 
DEFENDANT 
(PRO PER) 
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To whom it may concern: 
Sometime During the week of Aug. 2nd through Aug. 6th, 
Robert Flynn and an employee of Tire King/Car Merica brought in 
a transmission down to my shop. (Transmission Rebuild Inc.) The 
transmission was out of an older Chrysler product and they could 
not get the torque converter stabbed onto the transmission input 
shaft. I installed the torque converter for Mr. Flynn and he 
told me about the project they were working on. Mr. Flynn told 
me that the lilEL transmission had been sitting for a long time, 
and he hoped that it still worked. I told him from my experince 
that when a transmission has set for an extended length of time 
that the seals would become brittle and condensation would form 
inside the transmission and would cause him problems later. I 
suggested that one of my transmission rebuilders inspect the 
internal parts and advise him what it needed. Mr. Flynn agreed, 
and told me to go ahead with the overhaul. 
The transmission had internal damage and Mr. Flynn was 
informed of the cost of the overhaul. Transmission Rebuild Inc. 
rebuilt the transmission and on Aug. 13th 1999 an employee from 
Tire King picked up the transmission from me. The invoice was 
billed to Tire King, Tire King was having some trouble with the 
shift linkage, so I sent one of 
my employees to see what he could do to help. My employee spent 
several hours of uncompensated time trying to fix the linkage 
problem. Mr. Flynn called down here several times to have my 
man go up to Tire King and work on his car. Finally my man told 
Mr. Flynn to bring the car back down to Transmisson n^"**** «.'**«*« 
the car is road ready so he would not have to lay on 
work on it. fr^O 
Auto hine 
1599 W e s t Center 
O r e m , Utah 84058 
(801) 225-7554 
A RNANCE CHARGE OF M/2 % par month 
(ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE 1&) mada on 
paat dua accounta. TWa to tha proparty haraln 
daacrlbad, and any additions or auballtutfona, 
ahall ramaln in tha aallar'a nama until paid in foil. 
Purchaaar agraaa to pay attorney's faa, court 
coata and al axpanaaa Involved In tha avant 
legal action la nacaaaary for tha collection of thla 
Involca. 
E T v C c . K \V>V" , 
RESS V 
CE OF UNIT 
PART NUMBER 
, | 
& 
*> 
I 
CHARGE 
SIZE 
« 
! 
COD 
PART 
PISTONS & PINS 
RINGS 
CAMSHAFT 
ROD BEARINGS 
MAIN BEARINGS 
CAMSHAFT BEARINGS 
CONNECTING RO0S 
T CHAIN 
T GEARS 
OIL PUMPS 
F S GASKETS 
HS GASKETS 
REAR MAIN SEALS 
VALVES-INTAKE | 
VALVES-EXHAUST | 
VALVE SEATS 
VALVE GUIDES 
VALVE SPRINGS 
SHIMS 
VALVE SEALS 
FREEZE PLUGS J 
CYL SLEEVE A 
PIN BUSHINGS 
ROD BOLTS/NUTS 
VALVE TAPPETS 
C S GASKETS 
ENGINE KIT / 
MISC PARTS 
TOTAL PARTS 
THORIZED BY 
CEIVEDBY 
UU n n V 
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 0 
ORDER NO K r W + V \ \ x l VS%A 
SALESMAN , „ < 
PHONE NO — ' PHONE 
WW1' ?- 7 S ^ T YES 
SERVICE 
j HOT TANK 
INSTALL CAM BEARINGS 
ALIGN BORE MAINS 
REBORE AND HONE 
SURFACE BLOCK 
PIN FIT AND ROD ALIGN 
RECONDITION RODS p r • 
MAGNAFLUX 
ZYGLO 
CLEAN PISTONS 
KNURL PISTONS j 
GRIND CRANKSHAFT J 
POLISH CRANKSHAFT 
RADIUS OIL HOLES 
BALANCE ASSEMBLY 
VALVE JOB 
SURFACE HEADS 
KNURL GUIDES 
INSTALL REPLACEMENT GUIDES 
CUT IN GUIDE 
INSTALL SLEEVE J 
SURFACE FLY WHEEL ] 
TURN DRUM OR ROTOR 
REBORE BIKE CYL 
GLASS BEAD 
THREAD OIL LINES 
PRESS PISTONS / 
FIT KING PINS 
R & R BLOCK & OIL PLUGS / 
DISASSEMBLE & ASSEMBLE ^ 
CUT IN SEATS 
LABOR 
MISC SERVICE 
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Have Paul(or ? ) get me the following for my C300 engine 
1. two heads 
2. manifold and 4--carb 
the heads are about 50-75$ wikth or without parts in them 
then fix them if needed as needed. 
attached is the place to have them shipped from. 
Robert Flynn 637-2755 
^ # 
0 32 
PAR [a&5 CES and ACC FW iir-* • : 
BODY WEPAIR PANELS, huge Inventory, 
obsolete, current, try us. Bin's Speed Shop, 
330-832-9403. Fax 330-632-2098, OH. 
1OT9MA 
CAR COVER CLOSEOUT. 100s below 
cost $50-$125,7 fabrics. Special orders at 
guaranteed iowest price. Custom tailored 
by world's largest manufacturer. 40,000 
patterns. 909-686-2752, Fax 909-686-
7245. E-mail; marK20compuserve.com, 
http'y/^ ^rwwt^ K |^,cofr) 
< 
0 I 
6L 
6&9SK 
CONVERTIBLE OWNERS: Convertible 
top pumps, $199.00; lift cylinders, $119.00; 
hose sets, $90.00. Hydraulic pumps 
reconditioned • call for price Information. 
Convertible top with plastic window & pads, 
$199.00 & up. Boots, well liners, window 
motors & used parts available. Satisfaction 
guaranteed on ail sales. MC, Visa & cash 
COD. Convertible Specialists, 8866 South 
Steed Terrace, Floral City, FL 34436, 800-
272-2394 or 352-637-5505. 9/99 MA 
CONVERTIBLE TOP maintenance 
products. Cleaner: $1225, Sealer $14.95. 
Koala International, PO Box 255, 
Uwchland, PA 19480,610-458-8395. 
12/99 WC 
PENDER SKIRTS AND outside sunvisors 
new, used, originals, reproductions, 
bubbles, cruisers, teardrops, metal and 
fiberglass. Big Jim's, Box 174, Whitney, TX 
76692, 254-694-5830, fax 254-694*6880. 
WmPfrflWrftfl 9fi9JB. 
HEADUNERS 1920'S-90'S CARS & 
TRUCKS, NEW IN BOXES $75 AND UP. 
VISA/MC. HEADUNER MART 408-978-
6103, 8/99 JL 
INTERIORS, any auto, lowest prices, free 
samples. See before you buy. Walston, 
37435 Porter, Box 2230, Lucerne Valley, 
CA 92356, phonetfax 760-248-7345. 
10/99 KD 
SPRINGS, NEW: most Chrysler, Dodge, 
Plymouth models/years; cofls from $45 pr.; 
leafs from $110 pair; shackles, u-bolts, 
bushings - rubber and poly; front end parts 
and ktoJBiQfir^cataiog available or see our 
.espo.com ESPO 
Springs* Things 800-953*01?, 717-672-
JL 
TEXAS ACRES. ONE OP 
LARGEST SUPPLIER OP USED PAF 
FOR CHRYLSER CORPORATE 
VEHICLES. 14100-667-2764, 254-698-
4665 OR FAX 264-698-4393. TEXAS 
KCRES, 1130 F.M.-2410, HARKEf 
EIGHTS, TX 7*6 # 
TRAN§fttSSJg$n^ 
for automatics from 1940 - 1965, and 
standard stfft frcm 4ft*3 • pr*r*nt We 
offer quality, dependable service ana have 
for more than 25 y*ar$. Northw*s: 
Transmission Parts. 800-327-1955. 
^_ WvY\J 
* 
Paste Y-14- August }999 
JOIN THE BUICK CLUB OF AMERICA.. 
and enjoy membership with other Bulck 
enthurasM. BC/ hrs over in,000 
memb rs %» ">rtc.v de. 3-nd < sell-
addressed stamped c.vc.ope t j the 
address below or call for more information 
about the Buick Club of America. Bulck 
Club of America, PO Box 401927T, 
Hespsria, CA 92340-1927. Phone: 760-
947-2485, Fax 760-947-2465. Visa. M/C. 
Discover. 4/2000 WC 
RANCHEROS, COURIERS, FALCON 
SEDAN DELIVERIES. JOIN THE CLUB 
FOR YOU. THE RANCHERO CLUB-OT, 
1339 BEVERLY RD., PORT VUE, PA 
15133. 12/99 CN 
ARIZONA SALVAGE YARD PARTING 32 
Corvairs. Very reasonable prices. Call 
Desert Valley 800-905-8024. 8/99 KD 
CORVAIR ARIZONA RUST FREE 
PARTS: WE PROUDLY OFFER FULLY 
ILLUSTRATED CATALOGS WITH OVER 
4000 USED PARTS. WE ARE 
COMMITTED TO CUSTOMER 
SATISFACTION. VISA AND M/C 
ALWAYS WELCOME. TO ORDER 
CATALOGS SEND $3 TO SOUTHWEST 
CORVAIR, 140 E. RAYMOND, PHOENIX, 
AZ 85040,602-268-5968. 9/99 JR 
DISCOUNT CORVAIR PARTS. Before you 
buy somewhere else, give us a call. We 
offer lowest prices on all Corvalr parts. 
New, used, repro and rebuilt Mechanical, 
interior, exterior, wiring, trim, books and 
more. Over 21 years of fast same day 
service. Credit cards welcome. Ask for your 
free newsletter of our giant catalog only $5 
or COD for $9. Corvalr Underground, PO 
Box 339, Dept OCT, Dundee, OR 97115, 
1-800-825-VA1R, www. 
corvalrunderground.com 9/99 JO 
1953-98 FREE BRAKE & SUSPENSION 
CATALOG for ail Corvettes, Camaros, GM 
trucks and SUVs. Call 800-237-9991, Fax 
813-347-4818, write to Vette Brakes & 
Products, Inc., 7490-30th Ave., North St. 
Petersburg, FL 33710, 
www.vettebrakes.com S ^ i B . 
•63 - '65 GM FIBERGLASS PARTS. Drum 
Sand Spindle $45. 72 • 73 seat belts, lots 
more. argoftwOaol.com. 305-253-1374. 
.."_ : 8/99 DM 
H3 CORVbTiE EfiaJttS ffjJ&K •X7.HI'* 
HORSEPOWER, 3 Duece motor $2,50C, 
*66 model Chevrolet engine blocks 396/325 
horsepower $700. '69 model square port 
r fcgjfr#,, r>i. 8&v7g$jQ4a. __ 9#9pM 
» C-rZrX FIND! All yo*»r Corvette nunuax 
and wte.ature * i t i or v >«€ u«-.. *» C M I 
_tCC*5p.2TMCp7t_PT 2>20pp_WC 
A-1 SEXI POOLED YOU! 1984-'96 
Corvette glass tops, original factory tops. 
New, $600. 516-799-8661. 
http://www.weruleatwhatwedo.com 
3/2000 JO 
ARIZONA CORVETTE PARTS 1966-92, 
PARTS020THSTREETAUTO.COM, 1-
800-999-4911. 10/99CN 
AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION rebuild kits 
and hard parts. ASC, PO Box 255, 
Uwchland, PA 19480, 610-458-8395. 
12/99WP 
CAR COVER CLOSEOUT. 100s below 
cost. $50-$125, 7 fabrics. Special orders at 
guaranteed lowest price. Custom tailored 
by world's largest manufacturer. 40,000 
patterns. 909-686-2752, Fax 909-686-
7245. E-mail: mark20compuserve.com. 
http://www.markH.com 8/99 SK 
/ 
fi29h 
1953-82 Corvette Ptrts 4 Acctssoritt, 
New, reproduction, rtmanufactured and 
NOS Corvette parts. Call for the catalog 
you need: 1953-62,196347 or 1968-12. 
Contemporary 
Th0 Aret't Only Cwvefte Junk Ktrtf 
Blow Out Prices 
WHOLESALE TO, 
We Stock What 
We Advertise! 
21*788-8683 
FUR INFORMATICS* 
WK.L Hfl EE rOR 0RDER8 ONLY 
l-BOQ-For-VitUhParta (H74M) 
Lr27M :iJi lojt f i i loed• Bristol,PA 19007 
5 **^^hUm^rarycorvttt»,<^m ^ ^ 
Sty You Saw It In Old Car Trader 
0 33 
4' 
FEBRUARY 18th, 2000 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN; 
THE WORK ON ROBERT FLYNN'S 
TRANSMISSION (CONTRACTED OUT 
THROUGH TRANSMISSION REBUILD), 
FOR 
HIS 1964 CHRY. WAS PAID IN FULL 
BY TIRE KING ON OCTOBER 1st, 1999. 
THANK YOU!! 
TIRE KING 
WE (TRANSMISSION REBUILD) 
RECEIVED PAYMENT IN FULL FOR 
THE WORK DONE ON THIS 
TRANSMISSION. 
TRANSMISSION REBUILD 
£K& t/Z*3 
- ^ F r e - v <1*&*?T 
*5 A... 
CHIARA LAW OFFICES 
98 North 400 East 
P. 0. Box 955 
Price, UT 84501 
Telephone: (435)637-7011 
Fax: (435)636-0138 
KEITH H. CHIARA 
SAMUEL P. CHIARA 
September 27, 1999 
Mr. Robert Flynn 
1265 No. Carbonville Rd. 
Price, Utah 84501 
RE: Removal of Automobile from Tire King 
Mr. Flynn: 
I have been asked to represent Tire King to recover all amounts still owed by you for 
labor, services and parts to Tire King. 
I assume that you are unaware that your removal of the repaired Chrysler from Tire 
King's possession is a violation of Utah Criminal Code, Section 76-6-404. 
To avoid civil or criminal legal action against yourself, either return the Chrysler to Tire 
King's possession until you pay the remainder of the bill, or simple pay Tire King the $2,354,05 
you still owe. 
If you do not act promptly, I will take whatever legal action is necessary to require you to 
pay your obligation and see that you obey the law. 
Sincerely, 
Keith H. Chiara 
Attorney at Law 
KCH/hp 
Letterheads/Letter to Robert Flynn re Tire King rtf 
CHIARA LAW OFFICES 
98 North 400 East 
P. 0. Box 955 
Price, UT 84501 
Telephone: (435)637-7011 
Fax: (435)636-0138 
KEITH H. CHIARA 
SAMUEL P. CHIARA 
November 4, 1999 
Mr. Robert Flynn 
1265 No. Carbonville Rd. 
Price, Utah 84501 
RE: Tire King and your letter in response 
Mr. Flynn: 
Perhaps you kept your car on Tire King's property "free of charge" as you claim. 
However, Tire King is not now charging you for parking there. You are being charged for parts 
and labor and Utah law makes it illegal for you to remove the automobile without the consent of 
Tire King and Paul Pugliese until you have paid the bill. 
You claim work listed on the bill sent to you was not approved by you, yet you were the 
one who personally delivered your transmission to Clegg. You authorized Paul to do the rest of 
the work on that bill, as well. 
I have given you time to pay. You have not complied. I have reviewed the facts with the 
County Attorney (without mentioning any names) and he agrees that the removal of the 
automobile from Tire King's lot is felony theft. 
Pay the bill immediately. Don't leave the state with that automobile and don't bother to 
send any letters. Simply go to Tire King and pay the bill or suffer the consequences. 
Keith H. Chiara 
Attorney at Law 
KCH/hp
 0 3 6 
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YOU ARE ENTITLED BY LAW TO THE RET J3* l OF ALL PARTS 
REPLACED EXCEPT THOSE WHICH ARE TOO HEAVY OR 
LARGE. AND THOSE REQUIRED TO BE SENT BACK TO THE 
MANUFACTURER^ 
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E O E FO  HE DESCRIBED SERVICE  E I  
INCLUDING REPLACEMENT OF NECESSARY PARTS. DEALER OR 
HIS EMPLOYEES MAY OPERATE VEHICLE FOR INSPECTION. 
TESTING OR DELIVERY AT MY RISK. WORK MAY BE SUBCON-
TRACTED AS NECESSARY AND AS EXPLAINED TO ME. IT IS 
UNDERSTOOD THAT THE FINAL INVOICED PRICE ON ESTIMATES 
EXCEEDING $20.00 WILL NOT EXCEED THE ESTIMATE BY $10.00 
OR 10% WHICHEVER IS LESS. WITHOUT MY APPROVAL. IN THE 
EVENT I DO NOT AUTHORIZE COMPLETION OF A JOB OR SER-
VICE ONCE WORK HAS COMMENCED. A CHARGE MAY BE IM-
POSED FOR DISASSEMBLY. REASSEMLY OR PARTIALLY COM-
PLETED WORK. 
CUSTOMER 
PARTS 
LABOR 
mz. S3" 
*/?sV. OS 
ROBERT FLYNN III. 
DEFENDANT 
1265 No Carbonville Rd. #92 
Price, Ut 84501 
u^ * till: KlCl .-J 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Tire King Inc. 
Plaintiff* 
vs. 
Robert Flynn 
1265 No Carbonville Rd. 
Price, Ut. 84501 
Defendant. 
#92 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
Civil No 000700120 
DEFENDANT complains of Plaintiff, and alleges as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff, doing goods and, services on the 
Defendant on or after March 1999 through September 1999, 
had failed to provide all and adequate services to 
Defendant, resulting in (l)Misues of $2500.00 given to 
Plaintiff on or about July 1999, (2)forfeitures of all 
agreement, for s^ icl goods and services. 
2. That in good faiths said monies were given by Defendant 
for any an all goods and services then or after. 
3. That no written agreements as claimed by Plaintiffs 
Complaints were in fact in force on or until Defendant 
recovered properly possessions of his properties. 
4. Defendant has explained in EXHIBIT A to Sheriff's 
question on or about November^gg about all such matters 
furnishing therein the $$ details of monies used or 
actually agreed, and erroneuous totals demanded by 
Plaintiff. 
DATED the 11th day of February, 2000 0 &€ 
>«/* * W J L * r r . 
Page 1 o£„ 2 / 
CARBON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
VOLUNTARY STA TEMENT FORM 
IE: ROBERT FIYNN DATE OF BIRTH: JUNE 26 1942 
'RESS1265 NO CARBONVIiLE RD ~W1 PHONF- 637-27^^ 
uoolement information from Robert Flynn for case 992078 as given to 
etective Vincent. 
ased on our discussions, I Robert Flynn, have given true statements as to 
he exact reasons under considerations, for removal of my vehicle ( C 300 
- 1964 ) from the premises of Tire King Muffler (Price) i 
2AS0Nt I saw the immenant possibility as of Sept i2 SATURDAY/SUNDAY 
of danger to leave my vehicle at TIRE KING because I realized 
•just before that time oi the deceptive and possibly fraudulent 
nature of the financial arrangements going on in regards to my 
car being worked on there. 
THE FRAUD ANE1 DECEPTIONS 
1* I realized- on or about August 15 1999 that monies I had given 
TTRE KING as deuosites from JUNK/JUI Y (2500,00$) was potentially 
not being paid properly to the* man(Greg) for his labor. Greg 
came to my home right1> or not, in August to explain this issue 
to me in his own way. I gave him an extra J 00.00$ at that tia>e 
but he was asking i oi other monies for his v^ ork. 
continued, page 2 
SS TO SIGNATURE SIGNAT 
Page 2 of 2 
I: VUSC'"" CARBON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM 
E: K' BERT Fi rNN DATE OF BIRTH: 
RESS: PHONE: 
FRAUD AND CECEF1 10. 
2. The end Dill (Dated bept 20 1999) is perhaps uecepti<v ou 
1
 TIRE KI\GS part. NOTGIVEN 10 ME 
a. Monies( 780.00 about ) was placed on the bill ft-ran.qmisgiin.' 
repairs) Lv TIKI: RTNG taking $6 away fr,,m (Wt*t>( lainr) 
b. < th'er totals (example CleggAAtio in 01 EM) were for wa) ranty 
billings *nly, not for me to pay (TIRE KING knew this) 
c. ( amounts ^a/fb ) were actually denied on /about Aug iQ 
payments told to TIRE KING then to allow c- mplete payments of 
all 1 IRE KING'S bills. Thus generating an issue of nonpayments 
for whirh my nar P,M1H H„ i^n.H ^cts hiduen Horn me by TK 
3. TIRE KING w-uld not Rive me receipts, bills, or statements 
of any accountability aga'nst my deposite of 2L>00.00 
3a Paul(owner) insisted this was based on trust between us two, 
3b Monies fQr the (2a) item were still in u\y bank( 2I0I\S PRICE) 
when the trust fell aoart as of AUGUST 1999 because of matter above 
becoming known to me otherwise as, hidden from me, iL/ecame worried 
and potentially endangered financially. Thus the actions that T^rnnk 
^ 10BEK1 FLYNKX 3S TO SIGNATURE SIGNATURE 
Keith H.Chiara, #0621 
CHIARA LAW OFFICES 
98 North 400 East 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435)637-7011 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
F I L E D 
FEB - 8 2000 
"SEVENTH DISTRICT 
COURT/CARBON 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Tire King, Inc., a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Robert Flynn 
1265 North Carbonville Rd., 
Price, Utah 84501, 
Defendant. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
Civil No.: Cbbn Dft VD^ 
Judge: fcru^.r tf 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and complains against Defendant as follows: 
1. The amount in controversy is less than $10,000.00. 
2. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation in good standing, with its principal place of business at 
Price, Carbon County, Utah. 
3. The Defendant is a resident of Carbon County, Utah. 
4. The agreement between the parties, the services, personal property and labor were 
provided by Plaintiff to Defendant in Carbon County, Utah. 
5. Defendant and Plaintiff entered an agreement for Plaintiff to provide services and auto 
parts for automobiles owned by Defendant in March, 1999 and ending in September, 1999. 
^ao c^^s 
6. Defendant presently owes a remaining balance of $2,354.05 to Plaintiff for parts, labor 
and services. 
7. Defendant removed his Chrysler from Plaintiffs place of business without paying the 
remaining balance or without the Plaintiffs consent, although by Utah State law, Plaintiff had a 
possessory lien on the automobile. 
8. Plaintiff has demanded payment and Defendant has refused to pay the same. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant in the amount of 
$2,354.05, together with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as allowed by law, together 
with costs and a reasonable attorney's fee as authorized by law. 
DATED this /? d^ of February, 2000. 
Keith H. Chiara 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF CARBON ) 
PAUL PUGLIESE, an authorized agent of Tire King, Inc., being first duly sworn upon his 
oath deposes and says that he has read the foregoing Verified Complaint, and understand the 
contents thereof, and the same is true of his own knowledge, information and belief. 
2 
w o 
Keith H. Chiara, #0621 
CHIARA LAW OFFICES 
98 North 400 East 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435)637-7011 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
FILED 
wo - |
 m 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Tire King, Inc., a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Robert Flynn, 
Defendant. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT 
ROBERT FLYNN'S MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Civil No.: 000700120 
Judge: Bryce K. Bryner 
Defendant has not filed a motion to dismiss, but Plaintiff feels obligated to respond to 
Defendant's memorandum to avoid the possibility the Defendant's pleadings will be treated as a 
motion that Plaintiff has failed to respond to. 
Plaintiff, by and through its attorney, Keith H. Chiara, responds to Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss as follows: 
1. Denied. Defendant signed the initial work order and submitted several written 
instructions to either Tire King's owner or secretary to perform certain labor or repairs or acquire 
parts for the various vehicles he brought to be repaired. 
2. Denied. Plaintiffs complaint is based upon an ongoing agreement, continuing 
#// 
instructions and agreements on continued or additional work requested by Defendant, and 
substantial work provided with Defendant's knowledge and approval. 
0 19 
3. Denied. Defendant signed a work order in May, 1999 and gave written instructions 
and verbal instructions authorizing work throughout the period of time referred to in the 
complaint. 
4. Defendant's 4th paragraph simply refers to his previous answers to allegations to yet be 
proven at trial and does not justify a dismissal without trial. 
5. Defendant's "Motion to Dismiss" and Memorandum in Support is a rehash of his 
defense to Plaintiffs Complaint. However, its filing forces Plaintiff to respond or face the 
possibility the Court will treat the memorandum as a Motion and grant the motion in the absence 
of a Response. 
The filing by defendant, both the act and substance is without merit and not brought in 
good faith as is Defendant's defense and answer, and Plaintiff is entitled to all costs and 
attorney's fees in bringing this action and responding to this "Motion to Dismiss" and 
Memorandum, as proved by U.C.A. 78-27-56. 
WHEREFORE Plaintiff requests that Defendant's "Motion to Dismiss" and 
Memorandum in support be dismissed and Plaintiff be awarded its costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED this 2 # day of ^jjlfadfo 2000. 
Keith H. Chiara 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Civil/Tire King Response to Defendant's Memorandum in Support.doc. 
2 0 20 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the _3g^>lay of ^&i>- . , 2000, mailed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT ROBERT FLYNN'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS, first class, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Mr. Robert Flyr.n 
1265 North Carbonville Road, #92 
Price, Utah 84501 
Secretary 
Civil/1 ire King Response 10 Defendant's Memorandum in Support doc 
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§ 2 CONTINUANCE 17 Am Jur 2d 
order ol the court,4 in the absence of a statute compelling some other disposi-
tion of such cases.6 Within the second group are (1) continuances granted 
with the consent of both parties,6 2) continuances granted by a court on its 
own motion,7 and (3) continuances granted on the application of one of the 
parties. The majority of cases considered in this discussion fall in the last-
mentioned class. 
§ 2. Power and duty of court. 
Independent of statute and as an incident to their authority to hear and 
determine causes, courts have power to grant continuances in the furtherance 
of justice.8 While the grounds for continuance9 are now largely provided by 
statutes,10 some of which are held to make the granting of a continuance man-
datory under certain circumstances,11 the inherent right of courts to determine 
the order of trials and to direct the method of their management in the ad-
ministration of justice gives way only to the clear mandate of a constitutional 
provision or legislative enactment,12 and a peremptory statute may be held 
binding on the court onlv insofar as its provisions do not represent an attempt 
to destroy the principle of separation of powers and encroach upon the court's 
discretionary powers.13 As thus limited, the constitutionality of such a statute 
4. Ferguson v Saho. 115 Conn 619. 162 A 
844, cert den 289 US 734, 77 L ed 1482, 53 
5 Ct 595. 
5. When a cause has been noted for trial 
pursuant to uniform rule for dismissal for want 
of prosecution, the trial court has no power 
to grant a continuance of the matter, except 
on application, notice, and hearing to all par-
ties, unless the same is by stipulation, and then 
only by an order made of record: a case so 
noted is automatically placed in the assign-
ment, and unless it is tried or continued by 
proper order of court during that term, it is to 
he dismissed. Talbot v Talbot (Iowa) 122 
NVV2d 456. 
6. Virginia Beach Bus Line v Campbell 
(CA4 NC) 73 F2d 97. cert den 294 US 727, 
79 L e d 1258, 55 S Ct 637. 
Practice Aids.—Stipulation for continuance. 
6 AM JUR P L & PR FORMS 6:571, 6:604-
6:606. 
7. Waite v State, 169 Neb 113, 98 NW2d 
688. 
As to power of court in such respect, see 
§ 2, infra. 
8 Ransom v Sipple Truck Lines, Inc. CDC 
Iowa) 52 F Supp 521: State ex rel. Buck v 
McCabe, 140 Ohio St 535, 24 Ohio Ops 552, 
45 NE2d 7b3. 
As to continuance or adjournment of a pro-
ceeding before an administrative agency, see 
2 Am Jur 2d, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 426. 
9. See generally $§ 5-12. infra. 
10. English v Dirkev. 128 Ind 174, 27 N'K 
•195: Hubler v Pullen, 9 Ind 273: MrCoimick 
v Rusch, 15 Iowa 127; Tassev v Church, 4 
Watts & S (Pa) 141. 
A statutory provision hat trial of any 
1 1 8 
criminal case except for a crime punishable 
by imprisonment for life may be postponed 
by the COUT\. OT the ease con^micd if )m\ice 
will be thereby promoted, does not preclude 
by implication a continuance in any event 
of cases in which the OiTence charged is pun-
ishable bv imprisonment for life. State v 
Slorah, 118 Me 203, 106 A 763. 4 ALR 1256. 
11. Hall v St. Paul Mercurv Tndem. Co. 
CLa App^ 86 So 2d 751: Mueller v Burch-
field, 359 Mo 876. 221- SW2d 87. 13 ALR2d 
153: Mora v Ferguson. 145 Tex 498. 199 
SW2d 759: Kine v State. 16" Tex Crim 556. 
273 SW2d 72. 49 ALR2d 1071: Hiukn'ns v 
Hall, 183 Va 577. 32 SE2d "15: R-,ei--» -n'er 
v Commonwealth. 159 Va 953, loo SE 164 
(counsel in state senateV 
A continuance tnav be a matter of right 
where the affidavit conforms to the statute 
and there is nothing to ir.duv.te w.mt of proper 
diligence or any reason to su>pert that the ap-
plication is for dclav. }Ivd«* v State, lb Tex 
445. 
12. Kiefer v Board of Countv Comrs. 7 Ohio 
Dec 3 1 , 4 Ohio NP 282. 
13. McConnell
 v State. 227 Ark 988. 302 
S\V2d 805: K>ger \ Koctpcr (Mo, 207 SW2d 
46 (concurring opinion"*. 
Construction of a sta!"te wh: h would de-
prive the court, of its. power <.o <vtonu'ue from 
the evidence whether cause fVr continuance 
exists in a given case would render it uncon-
stitutional Johnson v '] heixloron, 32 1 III 
513, 155 NE 181. 
A statute purporting to make the granting 
of a continuance niaiidafrv if a part \ "s at-
torney is sening as a n.»-mb< r of the Irgis 
lature is unconstitutional, siiu. . insofar as it 
attempts to d< privr the courts of the power 
to determine whether a continuance should 
be granted or denied, it is .m attempt by the 
CONTT^' ^VCE § 2 
has been upheld.1'1 Similarly, the express legislative nunu ui.n j ; i "u .^nn ot a 
statute for a continuance, based on the attendance of a party or his attorney 
upon the legislature, be deemed mandatory and not discretionary, has also been 
approved on the theory that by encouraging members of the legal profession 
to engage in legislative service without being forced to surrender part of their 
practice such a statute promotes the public interest and welfare, and is not 
invalid as enlarging the legislator's constitutional privileges and immunities.15 
In the absence of any statutory restriction, the court may order a continu-
ance upon its own motion,16 although its failure to do so is generally not a 
groi md for complaint.17 Futhermore, * • <M»t;nuance relating back may be 
legislature to destroy the principle of separa-
tion of powers and encroaches upon the pow-
ers of the courts. Booze v District Court of 
Lincoln County (Okla Crim) 365 P2d 589. 
Limiting the time of continuances allowed 
nonresidents to 90 days, while the time al-
lowed resident defendants rests solely in the 
discretion of the court, unconstitutionally de-
prives the nonresidents of the equal protec-
tion of the laws. State ex rel. Cronkhite 
v Belden, 193 Wis 145, 211 NW 916, 214 
NW 460, 57 ALR 1218, ovrld on other 
grounds Sorrenson v Stowers, 251 Wis 398, 
29 NW2d 512. 
14. The courts must uphold and support 
the legislative branch in its attempt to make 
certain of its ability to function properly by 
providing for all members to be present, un-
less the attempt, as shown by the legislative 
enactment, is a clear invasion of the judicial 
field, and a statute providing that all pending 
litigation should stand continued where the 
attorney representing either of the litigants 
is a member of the legislature, when motion 
to that effect is made by such member, is 
not only reasonable but necessary for the prop-
er functioning of the legislature. Brooks v 
Pan American Loan Co. (Fla) 65 So 2d 481. 
15. Mora v Ferguson, 145 Tex 498, 199 
SW2d 759. 
Statutory provision for mandatory continu-
ance upon application of a member of the 
legislature who is a party or attorney for a 
party to an action does not violate constitu-
tional provisions for the division of the powers 
of government. Government Services Ins. 
Underwriters v Jones (Tex) 368 SW2d 560. 
16. State ex rel. Clark v Bailey, 99 Mont 
484, 44 P2d 740; Curry v McCaiTerv, 47 
Mont 191, 131 P 673; Young v Patton, 9 
Or 195 (continuance to procure papers ma-
terial to meritorious defense). 
The trial court did not err in continuing the 
case on its own motion, to allow plaintiff an 
additional week in which to produce evidence, 
such action lying within the judicial discre-
tion of the court. Fleming v Jarrctt (Mun 
Ct App Dist Col) 102 A2d 303. 
Where a single witness was produced by 
each party, and there were no facts or cir-
cirnsiances in evidence to make the testimony 
°f one more credible than that of the other, 
the court could continue the case on its own 
motion, over the defendant's objection, in or-
der to give plaintiff the opporninity to call 
as witnesses certain persons named during the 
trial. Pierce Pub Co. v Hasselgren Studios, 
192 111 App 347 (abstract). 
A continuance on the court's own motion, 
to allow the state to produce additional tes-
timony, although objected to by the defend-
ant, was not an abuse of judicial discretion. 
Waite v State, 169 Neb 113, 98 NW2d 688. 
In an action for divorce, the court may, 
after hearing, decline to grant a divorce, and 
of its own motion continue the case with a 
view to possible reconciliation of the parents 
and the future welfare of the children, and 
may not be compelled by extraordinary writ 
to proceed to judgment. Foster v Redfield, 50 
Vt 285. 
17. Smith v Bi iln ian, 197 SC 35.\ r> SE2d 
635. 
There was no abuse of discretion in per-
mitting counsel for defendant to withdraw 
from the case on the day set for trial, and 
in proceeding with the trial without granting 
a continuance on the court's own motion to 
procure other counsel, where the defendant 
had ample notice of the intention of counsel 
to withdraw, where there did not appear to 
be a meritorious defense to the action, and 
where the court questioned the defendant, 
looking to his further representation, but was 
triven negative answers. Jones v Green, 74 
Cal App 2d 223, 168 P2d 418. 
No duty rests upon the court to grant a 
continuance sua sponte to allow an accused 
time to employ substitute counsel and pre-
pare his defense, where accused requested dis-
charge of his court-appointed attorney 5 days 
before trial and made no effort thereafter 
to secure the counsel, and court had warned 
accused that it would not appoint other 
counsel, the court having found that the 
attorney had worked diligently and there was 
no justifiable cause for his discharge. People 
v Robinson, 2 7 HI 2d 289, 189 NE2d 243. 
Where the record failed to disclose whether 
at the time of trial accused was or was not 
in such poor physical condition that a trial 
would operate to his substantial prejudice or 
endanger his life or health, the trial court 
did not err in proceeding with the trial with-
out ordering a continuance on its own ini-
tiative. Shctsky v State (Okla Crim) 290 
P2d 149. 
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entered, in sonic t m urnstances, to eilect the purpose oi justice.111 On the other 
hand, a court's arbitrary postponement of a trial, over the protests of an 
accused, may entitle the latter to a dismissal of the indictments against him, 
on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been denied 
him.19 And a court which may not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction may not 
accomplish the same result by granting an indefinite continuance.20 More-
over, public policy demands that in the interest of the prompt and efficient 
administration of justice a trial once entered upon should be proceeded with 
from day to dav until it is concluded, unless the exigencies of the cause 01 the 
publit interest nnpeiati\eh iequire a reasonable adjournment.1 
§ 3. Discretion of totnt. 
By statute, a continuance when requested upon certain spec ified grounds 
may be a matter of right.2 But in the absence of such a statutory provision 
or such a statutory construction, the rule is universally recognized that the 
granting or refusal of a continuance rests in the discretion of the court to which 
the application is made, and its ruling thereon, in the absence of an abuse of 
discretion, will be upheld on re\ic\\.3 On the other hand, and in line with the 
W h e r e the cour t , in effect, i m i t e d a mot ion 
for con t inuance to allow time for taking cer-
ta in deposi t ions, but no such motion was m a d e , 
t he re was no abuse of discretion in proceed-
ing to trial on the meri ts . Zapon Co. v Bry-
an t . 156 W a s h 161, 206 P 282. 
1 8 . S h e p p a r d v VnKon, 6 Hon i U S ) 260, 
12 L ed 430 
1 9 . See C R I M I N M L U V (1st ed 5 1 3 6 ) . 
2 0 . Leet v Un ion P R Co 25 Cal 2d 603 , 
155 P2d 42, 158 A L R 1008, cert den 325 
U S 866, 89 L ed 1906. 65 S Ct 1403. hold-
ing tha t a state cour t in which an act ion un-
de r the Federa l Employers* Liabil i ty A< t has 
been b rough t against a i ail m a d c o m p a n \ in 
respect of an acc ident in a n o t h e r state is wi th-
out discret ion to g r an t an indefinite cont inu-
ance , on the g round that pro longed absences 
of de fendan t ' s employees from their dut ies 
whi le tes t i f \ ing as witnesses in a distant state 
will impede the v\ar cflort 
1. T h e Plow Ci tv ( C A 3 Pa ) 122 F2d 816, 
cert den 315 U S 7 % , 8b L ed 1199 62 S Ct 
579 , ho ld ing tha t it was an abuse of judicial 
discret ion on the pa r t of ihe trial <*o\:rt to 
subject the tr ial of a case to no less than 
four a d j o u r n m e n t s , one fur 3 months and 
one for 5 mon ths , the reby consuinincr some 
9 m o n t h s in a trial which ouuh t not to h a \ e 
r equ i red 10 d a w , where none of the ad-
j o u r n m e n t s were r c q u c t e d bv counsel and wit-
nesses were avai lable for a speedy hear ing of 
the case. 
However , the ac tion of a t r u l jud'-e in l iv -
ing a divorce case en three <ur<csM\e Sa tur -
days was uphe ld , the reviewing court s t a t i n s 
tha t it was regre t tab le that the ra<" was tried 
on separa te Sa tu rdays , and that t r iaL, it pos-
sible, should be conduc ted in cont inuous se-
q u e n c e from da to day ; but that such n u t -
ters, u n d e r the law, were dis t inct ly wi thin 
the sound discret ion of the presiding juchre. 
a n d unless the u c o r d disclosed that the par-
170 
ty compla in ing was pre judiced thereby, a 
reviewing cour t would not d is turb the j u d g -
men t . Dursa v Dur sa ( A p p ) 78 O h i o L Abs 
498 , 150 N E 2 d 306. 
2 . § 2, supra . 
3 . A w i y v Alabama, 308 U S 444, 84 L ed 
377, 60 S C t 3 2 1 ; F rohwerk v U n i t e d States , 
249 U S 204, 63 L ed 5 6 1 . 39 S Ct 2 4 9 : H a r d y 
v Un i t ed States, 186 U S 224, 46 L ed 1137, 
22 S Ct 889 ; Goldsbv v Un i t ed Sta tes , 160 
U S 70, 40 L ed 343 . 16 S Ct 2 1 6 : M o y e r v 
Un i t ed States ( C A 4 W V a ) 206 F2d 57 39 
A L R 2 d 1098; Un i t ed States v Pacific Fru i t 
& P roduce Co ( C A 9 W a s h ) 138 F2d 3 6 7 ; 
Ncuileld v U n i t e d States , 73 A p p D C 174, 
118 F2d 375, cert den 315 U S 798, 86 L ed 
11Q9. 62 S Ct 5 8 0 : Amer ican R u b b e r C o r p . 
v follev, 260 Ala 600. 72 So 2d 102. 67 A L R 
2d -189: H u n t e r v Sta te 43 Ariz 269, 30 P2d 
4 9 9 ; Silas v S ta le . 232 Ark 248 . 337 S W 2 d 
61 U cert den 365 U S 8 2 1 , 5 L ed 2d 698 . 81 
S Ct 705 ; People v N o r t h c o t t . 209 Cal 639, 
289 P 634. 70 ALR 8 0 6 : Rval l v Sears . 155 
Cal A p p 2d 3b, 317 P2d 100. 67 A L R 2 d 
4 72: State v M c L a u g h l i n , 126 C o n n 257 , 10 
A2d 758 : Cl in ton v State . 53 Fla 98 , 43 So 
312: Shephe rd v Sta te ' F l a A p p ) 108 So 2d 
191: Bird v Sta te , 1-12 G a 596 , 83 SE 2 3 8 ; 
Finch v Wal lberg D r e d g i n g Co . 76 I d a h o 
246. 281 P2d 136. 48 A L R 2 d 1150; C h i c a g o 
L a n d C lea rance Cum v D a r r o w 12 111 2d 
363 . 146 N E 2 d 1. 68 A L R 2 d 5 3 2 : People 
v C r u m p , 5 111 2d 2 3 1 . 125 N E 2 d 615 . 52 
A L R 2 d 8 3 1 : Mack v Sta te , 203 Ind 355 , 
100 N E 279. 8 i ALR 1319: Sta te v O n e 
Cc i t a in Automobi le , 237 Iowa 1021 , 23 N W 
2d 817 ; L e i n b a ' h v Pickw ic k - G r e \ h o u n d 
Lines. 138 K a n 50. 23 P2d 4 19, 92 A L R 1; 
St M a t t h e w s v Smith f K y ) 266 S\V2d 317 ; 
State \ J a c k s o i , 134 La 599 , 6 1 So 4 8 1 ; 
L kine v Biown (La App) 125 So 2d 6 8 4 ; 
C u n n i n g h a m v Loner, } lr) M e 494 , 135 A 
198. Peddersen \ State 223 M d 329. 164 
A2u 539; C o m m o n w e a l t h v l U n l e y , 337 Mass 
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principle that the court must not abuse lis discretion in thi^ respect, it has bet n 
frequently pointed out that the court's discretionary power must be exercised 
in a sound and legal manner, and not arbitrarily or capriciously,4 and a couit 
may not, therefore, refuse a continuance, if properly requested, where the ends 
of justice clearly require it to be granted * If an abuse of discretion < 1< arlv 
appears, the ruling will be reversed € 
384, 149 NE2d 608, 66 ALR2d 222, cert 
den 358 US 850, 3 L ed 2d 85, 79 S Ct 79, 
Tierney v Coolidge, 308 Mass 255, 32 NE2d 
198, 132 ALR 1349, Baker v Connolly Cart-
age Corp 239 Minn 72, 57 NW2d 657, 
Funderburk v State, 219 Miss 596, 69 So 2d 
496, 42 ALR2d 1221; State v Temple, 194 
Mo 237, 92 SW 869, Harms v Simkin (Mo 
App) 322 SW2d 930, Dean v Carter, 131 
Mont 304, 309 P2d 1032, Cox v State, 159 
Neb 811, 68 NW2d 497, 66 ALR2d 293, 
Phillips v State, 157 Neb 419, 59 NW2d 598, 
58 ALR2d 1141; Fidelity & Casualty Co 
v Angier, 59 N M 191, 281 P2d 149, Re 
Smith, 69 ND 437, 288 NW 235, Burdick 
/ Mann, 60 ND 710, 236 NW 340, 82 ALR 
1443, Davis v Shigley, 88 Ohio App 423, 45 
Ohio Ops 217, 100 NE2d 261, Beck v Peard, 
183 Okla 195, 80 P2d 614, Shetsky v State 
(Okla Cnm) 290 P2d 149, Benson v Mad-
len, 206 Or 427, 293 P2d 733, State v Blount, 
200 Or 35, 264 P2d 419 44 ALR2d 711, 
ert den 347 US 962, 98 L ed 1105 74 
> Ct 711, Anderson v Guerrein Sky Way 
\musement Co 346 Pa 80, 29 A2d 682 144 
M.R 1258, Commonwealth v Snow, 1 y B Pa 
>uper 319, 116 A2d 283, Strzebinska v lary, 
>8 RI 496, 193 A 747, 112 ALR $91, State 
t Lytchfield, 230 SC 405, 95 SE2d 857 66 
ULR2d 263, State v Pirkey, 22 SD 550, 
118 NW 1042, Barrett v State 190 T(nn 
J66, 229 SW2d 516, 18 ALR2d 789, A>ers 
r Duprey, 27 Tex 593, Hammett v State, 
J4 Tex Cnm 635, 209 SW 661, 4 ALR 317, 
L^ acks v Commonwealth, 182 Va 318 28 
>E2d 713, Chamberhn v Chamberhn, 44 Wash 
>d 689, 270 P2d 464, 68 ALR2d 457 Mul-
ens v Frazer, 134 W Va 409, 59 SE2d 694, 
>4 ALR2d 380, Gunnison v Kaufman, 271 
fVis 113, 72 NW2d 706, 56 ALR2d 642, 
dcKmney v State, 3 Wyo 719, 30 P 293 
innovation: 39 ALR2d 1321, § 4, 42 ALR 
>d 1230, § 2, 47 ALR2d 1059, § 2, 48 ALR 
>d 1158, § 2 , 49 ALR2d 1076, § 2 [b] , 56 
VLR2d 650, 66 ALR2d 235, § 3, 66 ALR2d 
70, § 3 , 66 ALR2d 300, § 2 , 67 AIR2d 
79, §2 [ a ] , 67 ALR2d 500, § 3 , 68 ALR2d 
89, § 5, 68 ALR2d 540, 112 ALR 594, 610 
31 ALR 323, 324, 10 L ed 2d 1289 
^ Since the lower court is apprised of the 
irenmstances ot the case and the previous 
•roceedings, it is therefore in a better posi 
ion to decide on the propriety of granting 
he application than the appellate court 
Jeven v Neven, 38 Nev 541, 148 P 354, 
5 4 P 7 8 
t t he rule that continuances rest in the sound 
wcrction. of the trial judge, subject to review 
n
*y for abuse of discretion, upon appeal, 
^ been held not applicable to courts oi j is 
tices of the peace ior the n i I tl upon 
appeal to the Circuit Court, m h t «es are 
Ined there de novo Cirdri" I c, 199 
Miss 809, 25 So 2d 459, Gen 
erally as to continuance i J j in lent of 
proceedings before a justice of the peace, see 
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (Rev ed § 82) 
As to reviewability of a ruling on a motion 
for continuance, ste 4 Am Jur 2d, APPEAL 
AND ERROR § 84 
As to an appellate courts discrrtim in 
continuing or suspending a hearing on appeal 
or error see 5 Am Jur 2d, APPFAI AND 
I PROR § 682 
4 People v Dalton A)l Gal 4pp 2d J%, 20 
Gal Rptr 51 95 ALR2d 628 (stating that 
continuance is addressed to a trial court's 
sound discretion), Chicago Land Clearance 
Gom v Darrow, 12 III 2d 365, 146 NE2d 
1 68 ALR2d 532, Adcock v Adro< I 319 
III App 513 91 NE2d99 
I he granting of a continuance is a matter 
within the discretion of the trial court, and 
mandamus will not lie to compel the trial 
court to proceed to trial of an action unless 
the order granting continuance is so arbitrary 
and capricious as to constitute a clear abuse 
of discretion Baker v Connolly Cartage Corp 
239 Minn 72 57 NW2d 657 
5 Ryder v State, 100 Ga 528 >rt I ..It 
Maddoxv State 32 Ga D81 Acl o k \d(ock 
339 111 App 543, 91 NE2d 99, People v 
Schell, 240 III \ p p 254 Chamberhn v Cham 
berlin, 44 Wash 2d 689, 270 P2d 461 68 
ALR2d 457 
The rule that the granting of a continuant* 
is a matter for the trial judge alone cannot 
be invoked to deny, pending judicial settle 
ment of a guardian's account, the trial of 
a suit brought by the ward for restitution 
against one who received from the guardian 
securities known by him to belong to the 
guardianship Tierney v Coolidge, 308 Mis* 
255, 32 NE2d 198, 132 ALR 1349 
6 Clinton v State 53 Fla 98 43 So 312, 
People v Schell, 240 III App 254, Allen v 
Com 134 Ky 110, 119 SW 795, Lacks v 
Commonwealth, 182 Va 318, 28 SE2d 713 
Annotation: 66 ALR2d 279 287 § § 6 [ b ] , 
8 66 M Rid 321, § 8, 67 ALR2d 518 et seq , 
s 11 68 M R2d 521, et seq § 12 
Where a first application for continuant* 
fully complies with an applicable statute or 
rule there is no presumption that a denial of 
such request was not an abuse of discretion 
Piedmont Fire Ins Co v Dunlap (Tex Civ 
App) 19) SW2d 853 trior icf n 
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entered, in some cinumstanccs, to effect the purpose of justice.18 On the other 
hand, a court's arbitrary postponement of a trial, over the protests of an 
accused, may entitle the latter to a dismissal of the indictments against him, 
on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been denied 
him.19 And a court which may not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction may not 
accomplish the same result by granting an indefinite continuance.20 More-
over, public policy demands that in the interest of the prompt and efficient 
administration of justice a trial once entered upon should be proceeded with 
from day to day until it is concluded, unless the exigencies of the cause or the 
public interest imperatively require a reasonable adjournment,1 
§ 3. Discretion of court. 
By statute, a continuance when requested upon certain specified grounds 
may be a matter of right.2 But m the absence of such a statutory provision 
or such a statutory construction, the rule is universally recognized that the 
granting or refusal of a continuance rests in the discretion of the court to which 
the application is made, and its ruling thereon, in the absence of an abuse of 
discretion, will be upheld on review.3 On the other hand, and in line with the 
Where the court, in effect, invited a motion 
for continuance to allow time for taking cer-
tain depositions, but no such motion was made, 
there was no abuse of discretion in proceed-
ing to trial on the merits. Zapon Co. v Bry-
ant, 156 Wash 161, 206 P 282. 
18. Sheppard v Wilson, b How (US) 260, 
12 L ed 430. 
19. See CRIMINAL L \ W (1st ed § 13b). 
20. Leet v Union P R Co 25 Cal 2d 605. 
155 P2d 42, 158 ALR 1008, cert den 325 
US 866, 89 L ed 1986, 65 S Ct 1403, hold-
ing that a state court in which an ac tion un-
der the Federal Employers* Liability Act has 
been brought against a railioad company in 
respect of an accident in another state is with-
out discretion to grant an indefinite continu-
ance, on the ground that prolonged absences 
of defendant's employees from their duties 
while testifying as witnesses in a distant state 
will impede the war effort. 
1. The Plow Citv (CA3 Pa) 122 F2d 816, 
cert den 315 US 798, 86 L ed 1199, 62 S Ct 
579, holding that it was an abuse of judicial 
discretion on the part of the trial court to 
subject the trial of a case to no less than 
four adjournments, one for 3 months and 
one for 5 months, thereby consuming some 
9 months in a trial which ought not to ha\e 
required 10 days, where none of the ad-
journments were requested by counsel and wit-
nesses were available for a speedy hearing of 
the case. 
However, the action of a trial judge in try-
ing a divorce case en three successive Satur-
days was upheld, the reviewing court stating 
that it was regrettable that the ca«e was tried 
on separate Saturdays, and that trials, ii pos-
sible, should be conducted in continuous se-
quence from day to day; but that such nut-
ters, under the law, were distinctly within 
the sound discretion of the pr' aiding judge. 
and unless the record disclosed that the par-
120 
tv complaining was prejudiced thereby, a 
reviewing court would not disturb the judg-
ment. Dursa v Dursa (App) 78 Ohio L Ahs 
498, 150 NE2d 306. 
2. § 2, supra. 
3. Aveiy v Alabama, 308 US 444, 84 L ed 
377. 60 S Ct 321; Frohwerk v United States, 
249 US 204, 63 L ed 561, 39 S Ct 249: Hardy 
v United States, 186 US 224, 46 L ed 1137, 
22 S Ct 889; Goldsbv v United States, 160 
US 70. 40 L ed 343, 16 S Ct 216; Moyer v 
United States (CA4 W Va) 206 F2d 57. 39 
ALR2d 1098: United States v Pacific Fruit 
& Produce Co. (CA9 Wash) 138 F2d 367; 
Ncufield v United States, 73 App DC 174, 
118 F2d 375. cert den 315 US 798, 86 L ed 
1199. 62 S Ct 580: American Rubber Corp. 
v Jollcv, 260 Ala 600, 72 So 2d 102, 67 ALR 
2d 489: Hunter v State, 43 Ariz 269, 30 P2d 
499; Silas v State. 232 Ark 248. 337 SW2d 
644, cert den 365 US 821, 5 L ed 2d 698. 81 
S Ct 705: People v Northcott. 209 Cal 639, 
289 P 634. 70 M.R 806: Rvall v Sears. 155 
Cal App 2d 3b, 317 P2d 100. 67 ALR2d 
472; State v McLaughlin, 126 Conn 257, 10 
A2d 758: Clinton v State. 53 Fla 98, 43 So 
312: Shepherd v State (Fla App) 108 So 2d 
494- Bird v State, 142 Ga 596, 83 SE 23.'!; 
Finch v Wallberg Dredging C>o. 76 Idaho 
246. 281 P2d 136, 48 ALR2d 1150; Chicago 
Land Clearance Com v Darrow. 12 111 2d 
365, 146 NE2d 1. 68 ALR2d 532: People 
v Crump. 5 111 2d 251. 125 NE2d 615, 52 
ALR2d 831: Mack v State, 201 Ind 355, 
180 NE 279. 8 4 ALR 1349; State v One 
Certain Automobile, 237 Iowa 1024, 23 NW 
2d 84 7: Lembach v Pickw ic k-Crevhound 
Lines. 138 Kan 50, 23 P2d 449, 92 ALR 1; 
St Matth.ws v Smith (Ky) 266 SW2d 317; 
State v Jackson, 134 La 599, 64 So 481; 
Ei.kine v Brown (La App) 125 So 2d 684; 
Cunningham v Long, 125 Me 494, 135 A 
198: Pfdderst \ State, 223 Md 329, 164 
A 'd 539, Conn lonwealth v Hanlr1 , 337 Maw 
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principle that the court must not abuse its discretion in this respect, it has been 
frequently pointed out that the court's discretionary power must be exen ised 
in a sound and legal manner, and not arbitrarily or capriciously;4 and a couit 
may not, therefore, refuse a continuance, if properly requested, where the ends 
of justice clearly require it to be granted1 If an -ibusr of discretion clearly 
appears, the ruling will be reversed.11 
S 8 4 j 1 4 9 N E 2 ( i 5 0 ^ 6 6 ALR2d 222, cert 
den 358 US 850, 3 L cd 2d 85, 79 S Gt 79, 
Ticrncy v Coolidge, 308 Mass 255, 32 NE2d 
198, 132 ALR 1349; Baker v Connolly Cart-
age Corp. 239 Minn 72, 57 NW2d 657; 
Funderburk v State, 219 Miss 596, 69 So 2d 
496, 42 ALR2d 1221; State v Temple, 194 
Mo 237, 92 SW 869; Harms v Simkin (Mo 
App) 322 SW2d 930; Dean v Carter, 131 
Mont 304, 309 P2d 1032; Cox v State, 159 
Neb 811, 68 NW2d 497, 66 ALR2d 293; 
Phillips v State, 157 Neb 419, 59 NW2d 598, 
58 ALR2d 1141; Fidelity & Casualty Co. 
v Angier, 59 NM 191, 281 P2d 149; Re 
Smith, 69 ND 437, 288 NW 235; Burdick 
v Mann, 60 ND 710, 236 NW 340, 82 ALR 
1443; Davis v Shigley, 88 Ohio App 423, 45 
Ohio Ops 217, 100 NE2d 261; Beck v Peard, 
183 Okla 195, 80 P2d 614; Shetsky v State 
(Okla Grim) 290 P2d 149; Benson v Mad-
den, 206 Or 427, 293 P2d 733; State v Blount, 
200 Or 35, 264 P2d 419, 44 ALR2d 711, 
cert den 347 US 962, 98 L ed 1105, 74 
S Ct 711; Anderson v Guerrein Sky-Way 
Amusement Co. 346 Pa 80, 29 A2d 682, 144 
ALR 1258; Commonwealth v Snow, 178 Pa 
Super 319, 116 A2d 283; Strzebinska v Jary, 
58 RI 496, 193 A 747, 112 ALR 391; State 
v Lytchfield, 230 SC 405, 95 SE2d 857, 66 
ALR2d 263; State v Pirkey, 22 SD 550, 
118 NW 1042; Barrett v State, 190 Tcnn 
366, 229 SW2d 516, 18 ALR2d 789; Aycrs 
v Duprey, 27 Tex 593; Hammett v State, 
84 Tex Crim 635, 209 SW 661, 4 ALR 347; 
Lacks v Commonwealth, 182 Va 318, 28 
SE2d 713; Chamberhn v Chamberlin, 44 Wash 
2d 689, 270 P2d 464, 68 ALR2d 457; Mul-
lens v Frazer, 134 W Va 409, 59 SE2d 694, 
24 ALR2d 380; Gunnison v Kaufman, 271 
Wis 113, 72 NW2d 706, 56 ALR2d 642; 
McKinney v State, 3 Wyo 719, 30 P 293. 
Annotation: 39 ALR2d 1321, § 4; 42 ALR 
2d 1230, § 2; 47 ALR2d 1059, § 2; 48 ALR 
2d 1158, § 2 ; 49 ALR2d 1076, § 2 [b] ; 56 
ALR2d 650; 66 ALR2d 235, § 3; 66 ALR2d 
270, § 3 ; 66 ALR2d 300, § 2 ; 67 ALR2d 
479, § 2 [ a ] ; 67 ALR2d 500, § 3; 68 ALR2d 
489, § 5; 68 ALR2d 540; 112 ALR 59*, 610; 
131 ALR 323, 324; 10 L ed 2d 1289. 
Since the lower court is apprised of the 
circumstances ot the case and the previous 
proceedings, it is therefore in a better posi-
tion to decide on the propriety of granting 
t n e application than the appellate court 
Neven v Neven, 38 Nev 511, 118 P 3 5 K 
154 P 78. 
I he rule that continuances rest in the sound 
discretion of the trial judge, subject to review 
for abuse of discretion, upon appeal, 
' bern held not applicable to courts of jus-
tices of the peace for the reason that upon 
appeal to the Circuit Court, such cases are 
tried there de novo. Gardner v Price, 199 
Miss 809, 25 So 2d 459, 164 ALR 532. Gen-
erally as to continuance and adjournment of 
proceedings before a justice of the peace, see 
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (Rev ed § 82) . 
As to reviewability of a ruling on a motion 
for continuance, see 4 Am Jur 'M, APPEAL 
AND ERROR § 84. 
As to an appellate court's discretion in 
continuing or suspending a hearing on appeal 
or error, see 5 Am Jur 2d, APPEAI n i 
ERROR § 682. 
4. People v Dalton, 201 Cal App 2d 396, ?0 
Cal Rptr 51, 95 ALR2d 628 (stating that 
continuance is addressed to a trial court's 
sound discretion); Chicago Land Clearance 
Com. v Darrow, 12 III 2d 365, 146 NE2d 
1, 68 ALR2d 532; Adcock v Adcock, 339 
HI App 543, 91 NE2d99. 
The granting of a continuance is a nutter 
within the discretion of the trial court, and 
mandamus will not lie to compel the trial 
court to proceed to trial of an action unless 
the order granting continuance is so arbitrary 
and capricious as to constitute a clear abuse 
of discretion. Baker v Connolly Cartage Corp. 
239 Minn 72, 57 NW2d 657. 
5. Ryder v State, 100 Ga 528, 28 SE 246; 
Maddox v State, 32 Ga 581; Adcock v Adcock, 
339 111 App 543, 91 NE2d 99; People v 
Schell, 240 111 App 254; Chamberlin v Cham-
berlin, 44 Wash 2d 689, 270 P2d 464, 68 
ALR2d 457. 
The rule that the granting of a continuance 
is a matter for the trial judge alone cannot 
be invoked to deny, pending judicial settle-
ment of a guardian's account, the trial of 
a suit brought by the ward for restitution 
against one who received from the guardian 
securities known by him to belong to the 
guardianship. Tierney v Coolidge, 308 Mass 
255, 32 NE2d 198, 132 ALR 1349. 
6. Clinton v State, 53 Fla 98, 43 So 112, 
People v Schell, 240 111 App 254; Allen v 
Com. 134 Ky 110, 119 SW 795; Lacks v 
Commonwealth, 182 Va 318, 28 SE2d 713. 
Annotation: 66 ALR2d 279, 207, § § 6 [ b ] , 
8; 66 ALR2d 321, § 8, 67 ALR2d 518 et seq , 
§ 1 1 ; 68 ALR2d 521, et seq., § 12. 
Where a hist application for continuance 
fully complies with an applicable statute or 
rule, there is no presumption that a denial of 
such request was not an abuse of discretion 
Piedmont Fire Ins. Co. v Dunlap (Tex Civ 
App) 1(H SWA1 8S3, error ref n r c. 
VVI I 'NKSSKS ih 24 i 
78-24-5, Subpoena defined. 
The process by which the attendance of a witness is required is a subpoena. 
It is a writ or order directed to a person and requiring his attendance at a 
particular time and place to testify as a witness. It may also require him to 
bring with him any books, documents or other things under his control which 
ho is bound by law to produce in evidence. 
Hi stony i L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1, V 1!II,I I in I indent defendant's witnesses subpoenaed 
Supp., 104-24-5. at public expense, § 21-5-14. 
Cross-References. - Criminal investiga- Subpoenas in civil cases generally, Rules of 
tions, power of prosecuting officers to issue Civil Procedure, Rule 45 
subpoenas, § 77-22-2, 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jin will <»1 am ,IUJ. 2d Witnesses eorpoiale hooks or iecuids lor pmqioscs oi order" 
§ 9. to produtT 47 A.L.R.3d 676. 
C.J.S. - 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 19 et seq. Right of member, officer, agent, or director of 
A.L.R. - Privilege against self-incrimina- private corporation or unincorporated associa-
tion as ground for refusal to produce tion to assert personal privilege against self-
noncorporate documents in possession of per- incrimination with respect to production of cor-
son asserting privilege but owned by another,
 p o rate books or records, 52 A.L.R.3d 636. 
37 A.L.R.3d 1373.
 K e y N u m b e r s # _ Witnesses <®=» 8. 
Who has possession, custody, or control of 
78-24-6. Duty of witness served with subpoena. 
A witness served with a subpoena must attend at the time appointed with 
any papers under his control required by the subpoena, and answer all 
pertinent and legal questions; and unless snnnpr discharged, mnsl remain 
until the testimony is closed. 
Historyi L, L951, cli. 58, b 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-24-6. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses C.J.S. - 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 2 et seq. 
§^ 68, 75-78. Key Numbers. - Witnesses <&=> 8. 
78-24 "7 Liability to forfeiture and damages. 
A witness disobeying a subpoena shall, in addition to any penalty imposed 
for contempt, be liable to the party aggrieved in the sum of $100, and all 
damages which he may sustain by the failure of the witness to attend, which 
forfeiture and damages may be recovered in a civil action. 
History: L, 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1944, Cross-References. - Acts and omissions 
S UPPM 104-24-7. constituting contempt, $ 78-IJ2 1 
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person in contempt for violating a restraining order it is not neccss i r \ th t IK 
have knowledge of the t \ u t words used in the order hiowled^e of its Mil) 
st ince and meaning is sufficient \nd it h is been \u Id ihit the <a\m of i 
restraining order upon i p n t\ charges him with knoul id^ i <f its p n A h n n^ 
sufficienth to hold him m < ontempt for violating tin i n 3 \ pt i on n i\ bt 
adjudicated in contempt of court for vie 1 it in ^ m rdt i < 1 \ hi< h In Ii t tu il 
notice, notwithstanding t in t tt tin time <f M 1 ti n il M I i I 1 i t \ t t 
be c n forn ill\ drawn up i 
I here ib an exception to the general nil* th t i [HI II n t p u t v t m 
injunction cannot be chained with contempt f i \ i h n n ^ tin w jum ti n in 
the absence of service ujx n hint of tin limine t n 1 < nit i or h< \ n th i 
he had actual knowledge thcieof Whcie the decree of m|unet ien is not onh 
in person im against the defendants in the injunction suit but iko ope rites 
m rem against specific p iopci t \ or r i the r against t ^i\en ill* il i n if u h 
propertv, the decree is a limitation upon the use of the j H p its { win h ill 
subsequent owners, lessees or occuptn t s nni^t tike n ti c in ue h i c \se 
the decree, ii broad enough in its t< ims to enjoin ill persons is sulhcient as 
a public record to i m p u t constructive notice to all [)crsons b j hus, ac tu i l 
knowledge or notice of tin injunction o i d u i n< t nee ess uv to eonviet for 
contempt a subsequent t m i i i t or occupmt v ho dthou»h he is n >t t p irtv in 
tlit injunetion suit, violites in nijuntt ion r t s t i u m n ^ tn< d e h n d m t s mel all 
other persons whomsoever fie in m m u i i n m r i hepn i m M U K in i eeitain 
building SIIKC the m j u m t u n I i l t n t i oc n^ < f it id I i it i n o m n in the 
nature of .m ( i unilii inu ujx n the i e < f the bi i ld in < f w hi h ill ub < <jue nt 
owners, ten mt^ or occ up mts thcrc(jf must t i l t notice it then | ) en l 6 \No 
no person with knowledge of the terms ef an miunt t i en even if r t i p i tv to 
th' suit c m ud or co operate with i | utv in tic in the pi< 1 i I t w tl 
c tit bee ommsr cmiltv of contempt if the mjunu i ri is so dr iwn i fo resti un not 
oiih tnc p a i t u s to the icti n but ako then attoinevs, i^ents or emplovccs 
Is 12 I fleet of error or in\ ihdil \ . 
\ centei pt p rexeedn^ b r e d i t h Itti n ct i e * r h i ! cc i , 
said not to open to reconsideration the le^il or f u t u i l 1 i i i th* < ielii s 
as to result in a re tn il of the origin i e<ntro\c is \ J he b i i f this ml< 
is s vc\ to be the f i< t t h it t h< piex e ciuie to e nforce a com t s oi th i mm mehn 
or forbidding in ict should not be so inconclusive as to foster e \pc i imentation 
w ith chs(>bcdience 8 Nevertheless it is fn quentlv deel trcd th it the clis( bedienc e 
of m « rd( i i i ide w it hot it oi in e\ce s^ of jurisdn IHI I I n t pu i h 1 '» is cor 
t emp* 9 In o'he t 1 m« u l y it is s ud t i n e ite mpt te ii be v i \< )d 
3 H i r r u t ( C M on Mills % 1 » Mih W or l r*s \ p n \ i t r n t i CM iho i L h nM i p i m t ) i 
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the i of Si ite e \ n 1 e oh u n n v 
6 S K e r s c * r u ' ^ c t\ Ic t I \ W s u , r l 
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order.10 { )nc toint has declared th. 1 if a court should go so i ieaily and so far 
outside it^ jurisdiction as to act, not as a court, but as a usurper, its order 
would be void, would bind no one, and could be disregarded by anyone with 
impunit\. l i The fact that an order goes beyond the findings on which, alone, 
it is based has been said to constitute an excuse in contempt proceedings based 
on its violation.12 
A charge of voidness of the allegedly violated order, as distinguished from a 
mere charge of erroneousness, may be raised in a collateral proceding for con-
tcmot.13 Thus, there is authority that if a party to whom an order is addressed 
wishes to contest its validity, he may refuse to obey and, in a prosecution for 
contempt, show, in defense, that the court had no authority to make the order.14 
And it appears that lack of jurisdiction or power of the court to make the 
order allegedly violated mnv be raised on appeal from n judgment of urn-
viction for contempt.15 
It seems that an absence of jurisdiction may be shown not oul\ when1 the 
court rendering the judgment or order on which the contempt proceeding is 
based had no jurisdiction of the kind or class of action, as where a court of 
law attempts to render a decree of specific performance, or of the subject 
matter or res or the parties involved in the particular suit or action, but also, 
at least under many circumstances, where the court, though enjoying all the 
foregoing jurisdictional prerequisites, attempts to make a particular order that 
transcends its power or authority, as where a court in an action on a mone\ 
demand attempts to commit the defendant to prison.16 
Sometimes it is said that an order issued by a court with juiisdiction over 
the subject matter and over the person must be obeyed until it is reversed, 
modified, or set aside by orderly and proper proceedings,17 and that a court's 
power to decide includes the power to decide wrongly.18 Consequently, where 
the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties and h, the 
218, 104 NE 387; McHenry v State, 91 Miss 
562, 44 So 831; St. Louis, K. & S. R Co. v 
Wear, 135 Mo 230, 36 SW 357, 658; Robert-
son v Commonwealth, 181 Va 520, 25 SE2d 
352, 146 ALR 966 (stating that there is 
vast difference between judgment that is void 
and one that is merely erroneous). 
10. Hernreich v Quinn, 150 Mo 770, 168 
SW2d 1054. 
Annotation; 12 ALU M 106 \ \ 'I 
A divorced husband could not be held in 
contempt for not complying with orders that 
were void as constituting attempted modifica-
tion of interlocutory judgment that had be-
come final Grant v Superior Court of San 
Francisco, 214 Cal App 2d 15, 29 Cal Rptr 
125. 
11. VUddin Industries, Inc. v Associated 
Transport, Tnc 45 Term App 329, 323 SW2d 
222, cert den 361 US 865, 4 L ed 2d 104, 
80S Ct 117. 
»2. Oulirk i Hamilton °fH III i '6, 1?'T NT 
™*, 9 ALR 1629. 
13. State v Lew, 25 Hash 
289. M «' »1, 1 / / I 'M 
I he question of the validity of an original 
order may be raised in a collateral proceeding 
for contempt where the question relates to the 
jurisdiction of the court. McHenry v State, 
91 Miss 562, 44 So 831: Simon Piano Co v 
Fairfield, 103 Wash 206, 174 P 457 
A person charged with contempt is at lib-
erty to defend his disregard of the courts 
order by showing that it was void for lack of 
jurisdiction. Mayer v Mayer (Sup) 36 Del 
Ch 457, 132 A2d 617 
14. Carden v Ensminger, 329 HI h! , M>] 
NE 137, 58 ALR 1256 
15. Re Kramer (ND) 75 NW'id / i i 
16. See Brougham v Oceanic Steam Xavi 
gation Co. (CA2) 205 F 857; Bradv v Su-
perior Ct. 200 Cal App 2d 69, 19 Cal Rptr 
212, Rudd v Rudd, 184 Ky 400, 211 SW 791 
Annotation: 12 ALR2d 1074, § 1 
17. Goetz v Goetz, 181 Kan 128, 309 P2ci 
655. 
18. Nicholas v Commonwealth, ]M \ i 
'13, 42 SE2d 306. 
A court that has jurisdiction over thf 
subject matter and the parties, and the power 
to render a particular order or decree mav 
expect obedience Saenz v Sanders T r \ 
Civ App) 241 S\V2d 316. 
I l 
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auihuMi • to i ci ldci a par t icular 01 dei 01 deci cc, the fact tl lat such order or 
decree, violation or disobedience of which is made the basis of the contempt 
charge, is erroneous or irregular or improvidently rendered does not jus-
tify a person in failing to abide by its terms. His conduct in failing to do 
so may be punished as for contempt despite the error or irregularity.1 9 
Where the court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject mat ter , and 
the legal authori ty to make an order, the order, even though erroneous, has 
been described as "lawful," within the meaning of a contempt statute.1 
The mere fact that an order whose violation is the basis for a contempt pro-
ceeding is not valid in all respects has been said not to preclude putlishmerit 
for contempt based on violation of valid parts of the order.2 
Courts may distinguish between civil ;ind criminal contempts with respect 
to the invalidity of the. allegedly violated order. Thus , it has been stated by 
a federal court tha t in criminal contempt proceedings based on the violation 
of a court order, the validity of that order is not open to question in the 
slightest degree, and that disobedience constitutes a contempt, even though 
the order is set aside on appeal or otherwise becomes ineffective. In contrast, 
a charge of civil contempt is said to fall with the violated order, if it is deter-
mined that the order was erroneously or wrongfully issued.3 
There is authori ty indicating that it is contempt to disobey an order made by 
a court with jurisdiction of the subject mat ter and person regardless of the 
constitutionality of the legislation under which the order was made.4 
Prohibition has been said to be proper to restrain a judge from punishing for 
contempt, where he is proceeding beyond the c o u r t s jurisdiction or is pro-
ceeding erroneously within its jurisdiction.5 
§ 4 3 . - Injunction 
11 is a g e i i e i a 1 i u 1 c 11 I a t a p c i sc i i c : I 11 I :> t b e p iI i I i ;; 1 i c d i i i c o i 11 e i i i p t p roc c e d -
1 9 . Douds v Reta i l Wholesale Dept . Store 
Un ion ( C A 2 N Y ) 173 F2d 764, 9 A L R 
2d 6 8 5 ; Securi t ies & Exch . Com. v Ok in 
( C A 2 N Y ) 137 F2d 862, 148 A L R 1019; 
Pi tcock v Sta te , 91 Ark 527, 121 SVV 742; 
People v M c W e e n e y , 259 111 161, 102 N E 
233 ; Bur tch v Zeuch , 200 Iowa 49, 202 N W 
542, 39 A L R 1349; Re Morr i s , 39 K a n 28, 
18 P 171 ; Re K n a u p , 144 M o 653 , 46 SW 
1 5 1 ; People ex rel. ChaufTman v V a n Buren, 
136 NY 252, 32 N E 7 7 5 ; Re K r a m e r ( N D ) 
75 N W 2 d 753. 
Annotation: 12 AI .R2d 1107, § 4 1 
A c o n t e m p t p roceed ing does not open to 
recons idera t ion the legal or factual basis of 
the o rde r al leged to have been disobeyed and 
thus become a retr ial of the original con t ro -
versy. M a g g i o v Zeitz, 333 U S 56, 92 L ed 
476 , 68 S Ct 4 0 1 . 
A p a r t y to whom is di rec ted an er roneous 
o rde r of a cour t hav ing jur isdict ion of the 
subject m a t t e r and the par t ies is u n d e r a d u t y 
to obey the o rde r unti l it is set aside by the 
cour t or on appea l . Hodous v Hodous . 76 
N D 392, 36 N W 2 d 554, 12 A L R 2 d 1051. 
1. Linked M a r i n e Div. of I. L. A. etc . v 
C o m m o n w e a l t h . 193 V a 773 , 71 SE2d 159, 
cert den M 4 U S 893 , 97 L cd 690, 73 S Ct 
212. 
2 . K n a u p , 144 M o 653 . 46 SW 151 : H o d o u s 
v Hodous , 76 N D 392. 36 N W 2 d 554 . 12 
A L R 2 d 1051 (ho ld ing that husband ' s failure 
to comply with any por t ion of o rde r for 
paymen t of t e m p o r a r y a l imony in th ree differ-
ent a m o u n t s const i tu ted punishab le civil con-
tempt , a l though order was e r roneous as to one 
a m o u n t , it being valid as to o the r two, and 
cour t hav ing jur isdict ion of par t ies and of 
subject m a t t e r ) ; L iquo r Con t ro l C o m . v M c -
Gillis, 91 U t a h 586, 65 P2d 1136; U n i t e d 
M a r i n e Div of I. L. A. etc. v C o m m o n w e a l t h , 
193 V a 773. 71 SE2d 159. cer t den 344 U S 
893. 97 L cd 690, 73 S Ct 212. 
But see Bowman Da i ry Co. v L'ni ted Sta tes , 
341 U S 214, 95 L ed 879. 71 S Ct 6 7 5 , 
ind ica t ing tha t a person should not be held in 
con tempt of cour t for failure to comply wi th 
a subpoena duces tecum that is bad in par t . 
3 . Cliet t v Han—onci- ' C A 5 T-v " ' . ' . F 
2d 565. 
Annotation: 1.. A L P d 1('7" $ • 
4 . I Jnited States v I ruled Mir** W O T K I ' S 
of America , 330 US 2V-'. <); I r H84, o'' S 
Ct 677. 
Annotation: 12 AL1- _M :<-~l) * 
5. Hcrr v H u m p h r e v V *V 
2d 809, 121 A L R 954^ 
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courts to punish for contempt for disobedience of its order, a distinction may be 
made between the violation of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining 
order preserving the status quo of the subject matter of the litigation during 
the pendency thereof, and final decrees of courts requiring the parties to do 
or not to do the things enjoined upon them by such decrees. It is held that in 
the latter class of cases, if the decree was rendered without jurisdiction, it can 
be disobe\cd with impunity, for no one owes obedience to a void decree, as 
it is without any force whatever.14 On the other hand it is said that a court 
possesses the power of hearing and determining the question of its jurisdiction, 
and ma\ while so doing, require the parties to preserve the status of the sub-
ject matter, and may punish for contempt disobedience of its temporary re-
straining order.15 
It seems that the mere fact that a temporary injunction could be dissolved 
on motion will not prevent a person from being held in contempt for violating 
the injunction, where no such motion is made. Thus, a person has been held 
in contempt for a violation allegedly occurring about two years after issuance 
of the temporary injunction and while it was subject to dissolution on motion.16 
§ 44. — Subpoena. 
The mere fact that an order, command, or direction of the court in the 
course of a trial, such as its direction to a witness then testifying to produce 
a document in his possession, is erroneous, is no excuse for his not complying 
with the order, and will not relieve him of a charge of contempt.17 Similarly, 
where a justice of the peace has jurisdiction, a commitment for contempt in 
refusing to make an affidavit on being subpoenaed is proper, even where the 
affidavit could not be used in the proceeding in which it was intended to be 
used, since a person subpoenaed cannot refuse to answer on the ground that 
his evidence is not admissible.18 However, it is only where a judge is in the 
proper exercise of his judicial functions that the power of contempt can be 
exercised; there can be no contempt, technically speaking, where there is no 
authority. Thus, where a magistrate purported to try a cause over which he 
had no jurisdiction, he was held to be without power to hold a person in 
contempt for refusing to testify in the cause.19 So too, it has been held that if 
the subpoena or the service thereof is so defective or irregular as to impose 
on the proposed witness no duty to obey it, he cannot be punished for con-
tempt for not complying with it.20 And it has been said that a person should 
not be held in contempt for failure to comply with a subpoena that is bad 
in part.1 
14. See United States v United Mine 
Workers of America, 330 US 258, 91 L ed 
804, 67 S Ct 677, relying on United States 
v Shipp, 203 US 563, 51 L ed 319, 27 S Ct 
165 (temporary restraining order); Pitcock 
v State, 91 Ark 527, 121 SW 742 (tempo-
rary restraining order). 
Annotation: 12 ALR2d 1078, § 6. 
15. Pitcock v State, 91 Ark 527, 121 SW 
742. 
Annotation: 12 ALR2d 1078, § 6. 
16. Stringer v State, 228 Miss 387, 87 So 2d 
691. 
5 0 
17. Robertson v Commonwealth, 181 Va 
520, 25 SE2d 352, 146 ALR 966. 
18. Robb v McDonald, 29 Iowa 330. 
19. Piper v Pearson, 68 Mass (2 Gray) 120. 
20. State v Mills, 235 La 479, 104 So 2d 
428. 
1. Bo\sman Dairy Co v United States, 341 
US 214 95 L ed 879. 71 S Ct 675. 
Annotation: 130 ALR 332. 
But see the decisions cited in § 42. supra, 
indicating that a person may be subject to 
contempt proceedings for violating valid pa rts 
of an order which has invalid parts. 
[17 Am Jur 2d] 
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B. AMENDMENT; AIDER BY PLEADINGS 
§ 21. Generally. 
Defective process is of two kinds, void and voidable. 3* When voidable^ 
merely, the defect may generally be^remedied by an amendment! but when 
the defect is of such nature as to render the process void, it is not amendable,6 
for the reason that it is a nullity and there is nothing to amend.7 Process 
which is amendable will support a judgment.8 
Voidable process includes all defective process where the defect is of an,ft 
amendable nature, and it is valid until attacked f and an amendment is 
allowable where the process, although irregular, is sufficient to give jurisdic-
tion—where there is enough to amend, that is, where it can be clearly deter-
mined, from the process and pleadings or papers served therewith, what was 
intended.9 A void process may be divided into two classes, namely, (1) 
process which issues in violation of a statute prohibiting it, and (2) process 
which is not in substantial compliance with statutory requirements, although 
not prohibited by law.10 A defect of the former kind not only cannot be 
amended, but cannot be cured by waiver, consent, or agreement, but a defect 
of the latter kind may be waived,11 although it cannot be cured by amend-
ment.12 
Courts have inherent and comprehensive power over their process, and, 
subject to the rule that there must be something by which to amend, nearly# 
all formal defects and clerical errors may be cured by amendment^ even 
after presentation of a plea in abatement or motion to quash.14 However, in 
6. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v Watts, 68 Ga App 
786, 24 SE2d 213; Durham v Heaton, 28 111 
264; Johnson v State, 202 Miss 233, 31 So 
2d 127; Labbitt v Bunston, 80 Mont 293, 260 
P 727; Sharman v Huot, 20 Mont 555, 52 P 
558; Patrick v Brago, 4 NJ Super 226, 66 
A2d 749; Jacobs v Queens Ins. Co. 51 SD 
249, 213 NW 14; Houston Oil Co. v Randolph 
(Tex Com App) 251 SW 794, 28 ALR 926; 
Barton v Sutton, 93 Vt 102, 106 A 583; 
Miller v Zeigler, 44 W Va 484, 29 SE 981. 
48 Mich L Rev 719 et seq. 
Annotation: 154 ALR 1019, 1020. 
Practice Aids.—Notice and proceedings for 
amendment of process. 16 AM JUR PL & PR 
FORMS, PROCESS, Forms 16:371 et seq. 
7. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v Watts, 68 Ga App 
786, 24 SE2d 213; Texas Title Guaranty Co. 
v Mardis, 186 Okla 433, 98 P2d 593. 
Annotation: 154 ALR 1019, 1020. 
8. Ex parte Howard-Harrison Iron Co. 119 
Ala 484, 24 So 516; Houston Oil Co. v 
Randolph (Tex Com App) 251 SW 794, 28 
ALR 926. 
9. Chamberlain v Bittersohn (CC SC) 48 
F 42 (where, in an action for trespass on 
land, the notice was that the plaintiff would 
take ludgment for the relief demanded in the 
complaint, and the summons and complaint 
were served together, it was held that the 
process might be amended); Richmond & D. 
R. Co. v Benson, 86 Ga 203, 12 SE 357; 
Kostrob v Riley. 105 NJL 37, 143 A 863; 
James River Nat. Bank v Haas, 73 ND 374, 
15 NW2d 442, 154 ALR 1005; Howe v 
Lisbon Saw Bank & T. Co. 111 Vt 201, 14 
A2d 3 (apparently holding, however, that in 
order for a court to allow an amendment of 
process, the court must be able to determine 
from the process itself, without the aid of 
any pleadings or papers served therewith, 
what was intended). 
As to aider by complaint, petition, or 
declaration served with defective summons 
generally, see § 26, infra. 
10. Howe v Lisbon Sav. Bank & T. Co., 
supra; Caldbeck v Simanton, 82 Vt 69, 71 A 
881. 
11. As to waiver of defects, see §§161 et 
seq., infra. 
12. Howe v Lisbon Sav. Bank & T. Co. I l l 
Vt 201, 14 A2d 3. 
13. Ridenbaugh v Sandlin, 14 Idaho 472, 94 
P 827; Crafts v Sikes, 4 Gray (Mass) 194; 
Citizens' Nat. Bank v Wiswell, 88 Okla 194, 
212 P 583; Cartwright v Chabert, 3 Tex 261; 
Brown v Cook, 77 W Va 356, 87 SE 454; 
Miller v Zeigler, 44 W Va 484, 29 SE 981. 
The discretion of the court to permit 
amendment of a summons should be guided 
by whether the defendant was misled by the 
defect therein. James River Nat. Bank v i/"T\ 
Haas, 73 ND 374, 15 NW2d 442, 154 ALR VrJT 
14. Parsons v Swett, 32 NH 87. 
8 0 4 
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the absence of statutorx authorizat ion, process i innot IK amended in sub-
stant ial par t icular^ 1 5 In most jurisdictions, and paitie ul irl\ m the code 
states, t lert arc broad general pio\iMons authorizing tlu court m furthci-
ancc of justice and upon such terms as it ma\ deem proper to amend an\ 
process 1 6 1 he courts will not pei nut an amendment which is purch technical 
«md which v\ould tend to thwart substantial justice 17 
O n motion to amend t writ, it must be shown cither on the f i< ts or face 
of the w i n and return, that the amended form would be piopci 18 Xchancin^ 
the case to trial, after denunt ; a motion challenging i piocess because of an 
i r regular i t \ , has been regarded »s the cqui\ ilent of correcting ihc defect 19 
§ 22. What defects or omissions may be cuied b) amendment 
T h e pr imary test whether a par t icular defect in process max be cured by 
an amendmen t is whether that defect renders the piocess \o id or merely 
voidable, the latter beino an amendable defect md the former n< t 20 Xccord 
m » l \ , the effect of the omission of the signature of the clerk or his deputv 
from the summons which he issues, or of the plaintiff o\ hi^ ut<wru\ when 
such signature is iequired is ascertained b\ deteimining w h u l . t under the 
rule established in the jurisdiction such defect is a defect m i m uu I of sub^iaiu i 
rendering the process \oid or whether it meieh renders die process xcui ibh l 
and the s une test <ipplies with regard to the elf ec t of the omi^mn of tin seil 
of the court from the s u m m o n s 2 There is likewise much d i fhKmc of opinion 
regarding; the question whether defects m respect of the re m m d i\ of th( 
summons max be imendcd depending upon whether the (ourt i c ^ n d s the 
defect as one which makes the process a nulhtx oi is defect conMn" I'liii, 
mereh an n re<mlant\ 3 
\ mere n i e ^ u h n U m process as to form or misprision m i\ be m e n d e d 4 
T h e fact that no mention is made in i summons of the h h i u f ilu < ompl inv 
as prescribed b\ statute h i s been held curable b\ i m c n d n c n t 5 It h ^ been 
ruled that a writ in an iction in debt which cloe^ net M itt the minimi o{ 
1 5 Fisher \ C r w h 17 \ \ \ a >12 >0 
SI 422 
\ statute p rov id ing t i n t a cour t m i \ f)cinnt 
a m e n d m e n t s o( a p leading process or proceed 
in to before or a l t e r j u d g m e n t m fur ther met 
of justice and on sucl t t i m s is m a \ be p rope r 
should be o n s t r w d libcralK in n e w <f 
code pro iMons t i n t the court sh ill in c \ c r \ 
s t a u of an u tion disi< ard a n \ e r n r < r 
defect in the p l e i d i r u s e r p ioeecd incs which 
sh dl not affect the Mil s' mti il n h 's ol the 
id\erse p a i t \ ind t i n t ill pr ceediriL. u n d e r 
the c e-»de ire tf) hr 111 < r ills ( on t rued with a 
view t ) effect it <bie<' m d t pr mo'e jus 
tuc f in cs R n c r N i t B ink \ f l i t ~3 N D 
7 1 h N U i d 1 4 ' 1 )4 Nf R 100) 
16 T h e Federal Rule rf Civil Procedure 
1< r e x a m p l e au th n/e il< rt d r \\ eou i t s at 
n\ time in the n dis< re t n up n uc h t en 1 s 
is in i\ be deemed u ( t i ll \ m \ pr( e e s 
i > l>r» a m e n d e d u n h ^ it r'» irK ipp l i s t i n t 
u n l T i i l prejudice w uld < ill t the suhstan 
t u ! n i rhts of the p i r t \ i m wtumi the 
process issued Rule \ h f» el Rule < f Ci \ 
Pi C this rule is pointed n i t in the notes 
f
*l the a d \ i s o r \ ( f i n n i i i t n Mil st inti ill\ o n 
tmues the piovisw n n u d i m ° I SC v 76 7 ^ 
B \ r d v P i w l u k C Nl \C h ' f>d >00 > 
\ [ R Ya\ >•>' Ni i u , i Nl R F d >i 
"il i ilfi v ~* 7 N ( n m i r md 
app lu m o n e t! R111 • < > I iM i 
Tor st tte s acioptu iul< l i i i ' u t t l < Ted 
t r d Rules if \ M J f F M Oi ->k He>OK 
Doc u em ' •» 
17 John n Pi \ m i 11 In C< 1 Mieh 
M6 
18 P . r l i 1', ik« r 1 N H 
19 [( ne 1 \ m » l \ t I ' " N 'el 
>4b 
2 0 t i 
N s t d< t t i i i e i ( ' l * nd 
n e nt it e' r i l de i i' R\ u u fi i 
1 r> , - i 
2 » 
3 • - i 
4 H.H 1 l i t (.< So M * Nf R d 
Q > 
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the debt may be amended on motion of the plaintiff to state in a sum certain 
the amount of recovery sought.6 Where a process was signed by the plaintiff's 
attorney, but below his signature there appeared the word "Clerk" rather 
than a designation as plaintiff's attorney, such defect is curable by amendment.7 
§ 23. — Error or omission regarding court, judge, or place of court's con-
vening, fcp 
As a general rule, an error or omission regarding the court or judge or 
the place of the court's convening in a summons or other process making the 
writ void cannot be amended, since, being void, it is a nullity and there is 
nothing to amend;8 but where such an error or omission makes the writ 
merely voidable and not void, the error or omission may be cured by amend-
ment.9 It has been stressed that a summons or other process which was 
voidable because of such an error or omission might be amended, provided 
the omission or error was not such as would be apt to mislead the person 
served or as would fail to give him sufficient information to enable him to 
comply with the process.10 The cases appear to be uniform in regarding an 
error or omission in a summons or other process in naming or describing the 
court or judge or the place of the court's convening as curable by amendment 
(in case the process is voidable only), provided a complaint or petition 
served with the process correctly states the facts in that regard11 
6. Camden on Gauley ex rel. Mollohan v 
O'Brien, 138 W Va 787, 79 SE2d 74. 
7. Jones v Lavanway, 123 Vt 284, 187 A2d 
346. 
8. Lowrey v Richmond & D. R. Co. 83 Ga 
504, 10 SE 123; Land v Christenson, 109 Neb 
101, 189 NW 838; Tice v Monford, 3 NJL 
633. 
Annotation: 154 ALR 1019, 1020 et seq. 
Designation in a summons of the wrong 
court has been held to be a defect that can-
not be cured by amendment. Utah Sand & 
Gravel Products Corp. v Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 
407, 402 P2d 703 (designation of city court 
in action for a judgment in amount in excess 
of its jurisdiction). 
9. Kostrob v Riley, 105 NJL 37, 143 A 863: 
James River Nat. Bank v Haas, 73 ND 374, 
15 NW2d 442, 154 ALR 1005: Galveston, H 
& S. A. R. Co. v Coker (Tex Civ App) 135 
SW 179, error ref. 
Annotation: 154 ALR 1019, 1021 et seq 
10. W T Rawleigh Co. v Watts, 68 Ga 
App 786, 24 SE2d 213; Kostrob v Riley, 105 
NJL 37, 143 A 863; James River Nat Bank 
v Haas, 73 ND 374, 15 NW2d 442, 154 ALR 
1005. 
Annotation: 154 ALR 1019, 1021 
The intervention of the statute of limitations 
a* a bar to recovery by the plaintiff, except 
for tv e allowance of an amendment * > a sum-
mons containing an error in naming the court, 
was considered in James River Nat Bank v 
Haas, supra, where the defendant, bv recourse 
to th-- complaint, could have informed him-
self as to the court in which the action was 
intended to have been brought. The court, 
pointing out that the defendant was not 
losing any right which he had at the time 
the summons was served on him, answered in 
the affirmative the question as to whether it 
would be in furtherance of justice to permit 
the amendment by the court named in the 
complaint and which should have been named 
in the summons, in view of the alleged defense 
that such statute intervened. 
1 1 . Relfe v Valentine, 45 Ala 286; Kostrob 
v Riley, 105 NJL 37, 143 A 863: Sivaslian v 
Akulian (Sup) 166 NYS 535. James River 
Nat. Bank v Haas. 73 ND 374, 15 NW2d 
442, 154 ALR 1005 (holding that where the 
naming of the court in a summons is alleged 
to have been a mistake of which amendment 
is sought, the court may, in determining in 
what court the action was commenced, have 
recourse to the complaint); Galveston, H. & 
S. A R. Co. v Coker (Tex Civ App) 13r> 
SW 1 79, error ref 
Annotation: 154 ALR 1019, 1024 et seq 
Where a declaration prayed for process re-
quiring the defendant to be and appear at 
the August term, and the process was dated 
July 16, and required the defendant "to be 
and appear at the City Court of Richmond 
County next to be holden in and for the 
county aforesaid on the first Monday in July" 
in the same year, the regular term of court 
beine the first Monday of August, it was 
held that there was no error in permitting 
the process to be amended. Richmond & D. 
R. Co. v Benson, 86 Ga 203, 12 SE 357 
As to aider b> complaint, petition, or 
declaration served >\ith defective process gen-
erallv, see § 26, infra. 
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fictitious names. Barcelo v Brown (1979, DC 
Puerto Rico) 478 F Supp 646. 
Summons delivered to each of two defen-
dants directing the other defendant rather than 
the defendant to whom delivered to appear and 
answer were fatally defective, and no jurisdic-
tion over defendants was obtained, even if both 
defendants did have actual notice of the law-
suit. Stone v Hicks, 45 NC App 66, 262 SE2d 
318. 
Service of process was defective where plain-
tiff failed to comply with the mandatory re-
quirements of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(l) for ser-
vice of process on a sole proprietorship, and 
attempted service instead on defendant as an 
association under G.S. 1A-1. Rule 4(j)(8). De-
fendant, us assumed name to the contrary not-
withstanding, was not an "unincorporated asso-
ciation" but was a sole proprietorship owned 
and operated by one person. The fact that that 
person signed the registered mail receipt and 
thereafter acquired actual notice of the lawsuit 
did not remedy the failure of plaintiff to ad-
dress the complaint and summons to the owner 
personally as required by Rule 4(j)(l). Park v 
Sleepv Creek Turkeys, Inc. (1983) 60 NC App 
545. 299 SE2d 670. 
§ 18. —Misnomer; effect of incorrect 
name where party has been served 
Case authorities: 
Where, in suit to rescind contract for pur-
chase of automobile for defects therein, confu-
sion was caused by the use of 2 similar sound-
ing corporate names in the printed warranty 
issued and service was made by certified mail 
upon an agent who was agent for both of the 
corporations, and the corporate manufacturer 
filed an answer setting up defenses and pro-
ceeded to a trial on the merits, trial court 
properly ruled that there was actual service 
upon the manufacturer. Eckstein v Cummins, 
41 Ohio App 2d 1, 70 Ohio Ops 2d 10, 321 
NE2d 897, later app 46 Ohio App 2d 192, 75 
Ohio Ops 2d 341, 347 NE2d 549. 
§ 1 9 . —Error or omiss ion in middle 
name or initial 
Case authorities: 
A sheriffs return of citation containing an 
erroneous middle initial required reversal of a 
default judgment based thereon. Zaragoza v De 
La Paz Morales (1981, Tex Civ App 11th Dist) 
616SW2d295 . 
§ 20. Defects or omiss ions in copy deliv-
ered to served party 
Case authorities: 
In actions to recover damages for personal 
injuries arising out of an explosion at a manu-
facturing plant, plaintiffs were properly permit-
ted to cure the defect in their service of pro-
cess on one foreign corporation where the only 
error was plaintiffs' failure to include a notice 
of service on the Secretary of State together 
216 
with the copy of the summons and complaint 
that was served on the foreign corporation, 
where no prejudice to the corporation was 
shown, and where the irregularity was properly 
cured nunc pro tunc by mailing the notice of 
service to the corporation. Orzechowski v War-
ner-Lambert Co. (1982, 2d Dept) 91 App Div 
2 d 6 8 1 , 4 5 7 N Y S 2 d 3 2 3 . 
§ 22. What defects or o m m i s s i o n s may 
be cured by a m e n d m e n t 
Case authorities: 
The absence of a monetary amount in a 
notice served with a summons without a com-
plaint, which summons is timely served and 
adequately informs defendant of the nature of 
the action and the relief sought, is a correctable 
irregularity as against the complete absence of 
a notice which would be a jurisdictional defect; 
the notice is merely defective and the omission 
does not prejudice a substantial right of defen-
dant; accordingly, the amendment of the sum-
mons was properly permitted. Premo v Cornell 
(1979, 3d Dept) 71 AD2d 223, 423 NYS2d 64. 
The failure of the plaintiff, through clerical 
error, to attach to its complaint several exhibits 
(which the complaint recited were annexed to 
it), does not mean that the exhibits, which were 
furnished to defendant's counsel some five 
months after the action was commenced and 
some two months prior to plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment, may not be considered 
upon plaintiffs motion; the court has the 
power to permit a mistake or omission to be 
corrected upon such terms as may be just, and, 
accordingly, the exhibits furnished to defen-
dant's counsel are deemed annexed to and 
incorporated in the complaint. Research Insti-
tute of America, Inc. v Department of Taxation 
& Finance (1979) 99 Misc 2d 243, 415 NVS2d 
928. 
§ 24. —Mistake or omis s ion in designa-
tion or descr ipt ion of party 
Case authorities: 
Under CPLR §2001, providing that at any 
stage of an action the court may permit a 
mistake, omission, defect or irregularity to be 
corrected upon such terms as may be just, and 
CPLR § 3025(b), providing that a party may 
amend his pleading at any time by leave of 
court, plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action 
would be permitted to amend both their com-
plaint and theiT summons so as to describe 
defendant as "St. Mary's Hospital of Syracuse, 
Inc." rather than as "St. Mary's Hospital of 
Syracuse" where defendant had received actual 
notice of plaintiffs' suit. Pinto v House (1981, 
1st Dept) 79 App Div 2d 361, 436 NYS2d 733. 
Complaint and summons directed to defen-
dant named as "MICHIGAN TOOL COM-
PANY, A Division of Ex-Cell-O Corporation" 
was not service on the entity Ex-Cell-O Corpo-
ration, even if the complaint and summons 
reached the hands of someone obligated to 
receive •ervice in behalf of Ex-Cell-O, since Ex-
[62 AT\ Jur Prt Supp) 
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Moreover, the Ini ieci States Supreme Court iias said that on sustaining a 
motion to dismiss MI vice of process, the court having |uria-du lion o! the 
subject mat ter will not dismiss the suit altogether, hut will only enter an 
order vacating the service and dismissing the p.utv imp! < oerlv MTVCC!.3 
B. WAIVF.R 
sj 161 - General ly; general appearance, etc. 
Waiver of objections to the process, or to the service :hereof, is not limited 
to mere irregulari t ies; it is well established that a part \ dHendant may waive 
his rii»"ht to insist upon anv defect in the issuance or ser \ i -e of process notify-
ing him of the suit against him, and bv such waix'er conic; jurisdiction upon 
the court to proceed with the adjudication of his rights.4 When one takes 
such a step in an action or seeks such relief at the hand< of the court as is 
consistent only with the hypothesis that the court \\:\< jurisdiction of his per-
son, he is bound bv its action as fully as if he had been regularly MTved with 
process.5 A stipulation of the parties that each of them v l i m t a r i b submits 
to the jurisdiction of the court without service of pro* e--. the same as if 
personal service had been obtained bv each against trie other, waives .m\ rUiu 
to assert a lack of personal jurisdiction.6 
side lhe limits o! I T own county , should nnt 
dismiss the dec la ra t ion when ii* M.iffu iencv is 
not cal led into q u e s t i o n - : He l lman v Ladd . 
5 i 5 Mich l.jO. 23 \ \ V 2 d 2 1 1 . 
3 . F i tzeera ld & Mal lo rv Con.Ntr. Co. v Fitz-
gera ld , 137 U S 93 . 34 L Fd 608 . 1 1 S Ct 35. 
4 . Kenda l l v Un i t ed States . ] _' Per U S 
524 . 9 I. Ed 1 1 " ! : St. Louis-San Francisco R. 
Co . v S ta t e . 179 Ark 1128. 20 SW2d f-;7M. 
cert den 2a 1 U S 734. 7-1 L Ed 1150. 50 
5 C t 249 : Beckwith v Bailey. 1 1() F!a 316. 
161 So 5 7 6 : People bv K e r n e r v Uni ted Med-
ical Service. 362 111 142. 200 \ L H 7 . i n ; 
ALR 1229: D e e - a n v D r e u a n . 22 Xcv ;:•.'». 
47 P 460 ; Fla/c! v facoh>. 78 \ } L IVc 7.5 
A 9 0 3 ; fames River Xat . Bank v Haas . 7 1 
N D 374. 15 \ W 2 d -142. 154 A L R ! 0 " 5 . 
D e m a n d i n g a r o p y of the complain t lias 
been held to waive the rkdit !<• ohiect to 
jur isdic t ion «>n the urnuntl that such c\^\ d\d 
not a c c o m p a n y the summons as required !•••• 
s t a tu t e . especially where the defendant made 
no reservat ion •>( r .uhts in inakinu his d e m a n d 
for a copy, and the copy was supplied by 
the plaintiff. Mi lwaukee C o u n t y v Schmid t . 
G a r d e n & F r i k - m . 35 Wis 2d 3 k 150 VW'Jd 
354. 
For agreed ea-e a- waiver o! objection^ ?.. 
service of pruo 'Sv -ec 4 Am fur 2d. A i i k i n -
C A S K S' 24. 
For submission to a rb i t ra t ion as a waiver <>[ 
defects of pnu .->s. we 5 Am J u ; _'d. A K I U I K A -
T l O \ A N D . \ \ V A k M "' 3 *. 
5 . C h i k L v- l . , : - r n ; , n . \(V\ Cal !.J',7. •'• V 
382 ; T u r n e r •> K-T« . 17:', Ga :(<w if." ^ F 
398 ; F o r r e s u r . I-". .r?-*-^ tc*r. 1 V) Ga ~22. • ] "• 
SR 373 . _<» M R 1 '.?» L Kansas C5iy. St. 1 
6 C. B. R. Co. v R o d e h a m d i . -.>; Kan U . 1 ~> 
P 899 ; Smi th •. La ton . 46 M e 298 ; Hail v 
9 4 3 
V e n n - . 3 Pick Mas> ' . F.-re.uso:.. •, Ol iver 
9r» Mich I r i l . 5:-; \ ' W i b Re Crawford . 6;: 
Ohio Si 58. 67 NT. : V. : beck v Beck. ! 3 Ohio 
App 105. ic*2 NT. "'.-'. Wood v [{ I K M I M : : . 
178 O r !':•;. ifi9 P : : ' : I. !7i ALR ">':7. 
Lou-er v Wilsors. " S[) :"._'. 6;-. \ W •'>;"> hold-
\i\K thai obiediu:-. :• a b i imp- to p ' . r . ' i e any 
- ; a tu lo r \ mode . •:' v-rvb •• i> w . b w r A one 
\i-]\n i.v ^ - i -Mo — or -. ].':•• <!,'•,;,., T,, ; : ; - „ . ] t 
•o ano m\-oKe> :•.-• 
!.•>' demanc lmc .:•: 
well as i>v intr- c: . 
of the i s s u - rai^-(l 
ies|)oncient '- repl'.- ::: 
See Resia-.eine;.:. 
T h e effect ..f :.;•.•• 
a^ a waiver of ,:-
notice iias ! ••(•»•!> !:•'c: 
c h a r a c t e r ot in- a-- * -
a tion of die co-sn. 
Iiis s tan ' in f ruv I .\ • 
Academy. r>7 \ H :'^ 
2'»M. vayinv: that • . 
service ur n o i k e ::. 
er defend.*::! has :.:. 
the nirisclic'ioti . •:' • 
de t e rmined n. >i <•• '• 
l a i rd a l l ega t i ons • 
•i«.:,s as a ul .o lc 
6. Ferrowshj x ! ! , 
•V! U S 195. io-- ! 
A defendani i:.. 
e - h v si.unmu;
 lS: 
re.vi-.fd a c \,\ • 
a. ii-.:: aua i : , ^ !.;• 
si aic-; ! hat he v. .-. 
. e r w . e . l,,::es -, f 
: • • " ] . ovrlu 'F lu . ;• •:• 
i ;». SL -U7. 
:rho:;,-
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I r w - o ; H.-ruick 
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The defendant's general appearance in an action against him in a court 
having jurisdiction of the subject matter amounts to a waixer of the issuance 
of process, or of defects in the process or notice served upon him, and such 
appearance confers jurisdiction of his person, regardless of the fact that process 
was not served upon him, or that the service thereof may have been defective.7 
A general appearance which operates as a waiver of the right to object to the 
process or the service thereof may be entered by the attorney for the defendant, 
provided he has authority to make it; the existence of this authority is pre-
sumed from the fact that he entered an appearance, but the presumption is 
rebuttable.8 
Service should not be deemed to have been waived unless waiver is clearly 
established and shown on the record.9 Defective service is not ordinarily 
waived by answering over and going to trial on the merits after objecting 
ineffectually to the jurisdiction,10 or by filing a petition for removal of the 
cause to the federal court.11 Absence of a trial court's jurisdiction over the 
person of the defendant, in view of the invalidity of an attempted service 
of process, is not waived by his petition in a higher court for a writ of pro-
hibition to prevent further proceedings in the trial court.12 
§ 162. Failure to make timely objection. 
Formal defects and irregularities in process or the service thereof must be 
taken advantage of at the first opportunity, and before any further step in 
the cause is taken, otherwise they will be held to have been waived;13 but a 
defect which totally invalidates the writ or the service thereof is not waived 
by mere delay and may be taken advantage of at any time, assuming that the 
party does not, in the meantime, voluntarily submit himself to the jurisdiction 
of the court.14 
Except where defects in the process deprive the court of the jurisdiction 
of a defendant's person, and he does not submit to the jurisdiction by appear-
7. See 5 Am Jur 2d, APPEARANCE §§ 6. 7. 
8. See 5 Am Jur 2d, APPEARANCE § 10; 7 Am 
Jur 2d ATTORNEYS AT LAW §§ 112 et seq. 
As to collateral attack upon judgment, 
based upon the ground that the attorney who 
entered appearance had no authority to do 
so, see 46 Am Jur 2d, JUDGMENTS $£661. 
662. 
9. Ex parte Cullinan. 224 Ala 263. 139 So 
255, 81 ALR 160. 
10. § 163, infra. 
11. See 32 Am Jur 2d, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 542. 
12. Victory Carriers. Inc. v Hawkins, 44 
Hawaii 250, 352 P2d 314, 92 ALR2d 239. 
13. Martin v Grav, 142 US 236, 35 L Ed 
997, 12 S Ct 186; Dew v Cunningham, 28 
Ala 466; Cason v Glass Bottle Blowers Asso. 
37 Cal 2d 134, 231 P2d 6, 21 ALR2d 1387 
(holding that motions to quash the service of 
summons and dismiss the proceedings for a 
writ of mandate are properly refused where 
the motions are not made until the close of 
the trial, and the defendants have made a 
general appearance): Bank of Orland v Dod-
son, 127 Cal 208, 59 P 58 •*; Beall v Blake, 
13 Ga 217: Athens v Ernst. 342 111 App 357. 
96 NE2d 643: State ex rel. Davis v Webster 
Parish. 120 La 163. 45 So 47: Parsons v 
Swett. 32 NH 87: North Pacific Cvcle Co. v 
Thomas, 26 Or 381, 38 P 307: Upson v Horn, 
34 SCL (3 Strobh) 108: Snvdcr v Philadel-
phia Cn. 54 W Va 149, 46 SE 366. 
Annotation: 93 ALR2d 376. 404 et seq.. 
>' 6. 
14. Beall v Blake. 13 Ga 217: Tropic Build-
ers, Ltd. v Naval Ammunition Depot Lualualri 
Quarters, Inc. 48 Hawaii 306, 402 P2d 440 
holding that lack of service on an indispen-
sable party may be asserted at the trial by 
one having an interest in the matter, though 
net raised bv a preliminary m o t i o n ; Rhodes 
v Oxlev, 212 Iowa 1018. 235 NW 919: Brady 
v Burch. 185 Minn 440. 241 NVV 393: 
Mamlin v Tener. 146 Pa Super 593, 23 A2d 
90: Frosch v Schlumpf, 2 Tex 422: Ross
 v 
Fuller, 12 Vt 265: Kelly v Paris, 10 Vt 261. 
Annotation: 93 ALR2d 376. 387-407, S£ 
3-6 (defects in designating court or place of 
appearance !. 
As to < pining or vacating a judgment be-
cause of d< fects in process or notice, see 46 
Am Jur 2d. JUDGMENTS §$ 757 ct seq. 
9 4 4 
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injjr <;enerallv or otherwise, his failure to raise questions w,;.h respect 10 the 
insufficiency of process in the tried court amounts to a waiver of such defects 
and precludes their consideration on review.15 
§ 163. Special appearance; objecting to jurisdiction. 
Object ions to the process or the service thereof are not waived by a special 
appea rance for the sole purpose of objecting to (he lack of the jurisdirtion of 
the court over the person, and of moving for the dismissal oi the a n i o n on 
that ground.1 6 The local practice may permit a defendant to at tack the juris-
diction of the court over his person because of defective servi« cs by plea in 
aba tement , or answer in the nature thereof.17 A question as to the validity 
of service of process may properlv be presented bv special appearance 1 8 .mA 
motion to quash or set aside the process or dismiss the action.19 It has been 
held that a fatal defect in the original notice of an action, in Jailing to cor-
rectly notify the defendant of the place where the court c o n v e n e , is not 
rendered a mere irregularity bv the filing, in the court where the petition 
is on file, of a special appearance to attack its jurisdiction.20 
T o test the sufficiency of the summons, the appearance imi>i he -pe< >ai. oi 
course, but it has been held not to be necessary, in a court of record, to make 
the plea or motion expressly state that the appearance is <>nl\ lor the purpn-e 
of objecting to the jurisdiction.1 According to the prac tice in some jurisdic-
tions, the defendant is permitted to assert an objection to juri<di< lion, n - j r ih r ! 
with an objection to the merits of the plaintiff's claim, in the same answer. 
without waiving the objection to jurisdiction;2 and it seems generalK agreed 
that a par ty not properly served with process, so as to give 'he conn jurisdic-
tion of his person, does not waive the objection or confer jurisdiition b\ 
answering over and going to trial on the merits after he has nhie. ted ineffec-
tually to the jurisdiction, provided he preserves an exception.3 Ordinar i ly . 
1 5 . See a Am fur 2d. APFT.AI . ANH F R R O R 
*'
 r)H3. 
16 . S«'C a Am J u r 2d. A P P K A K A V C I : .$ a. 
1 7 . ^> 1 ~>7. 1 r)9. supra . 
1 8 . M c i n t o s h v Ponder . 222 Ark 7 0 ! . j h j 
S W J d 277 : F le tcher \ Distr ict O - i r t oi fefT-r-
>nn C m m t v , l:>7 Colo 1 4 T S22 P2d % : 
S u m m e r l o t t v C.nochrar T i r e & R u h h e r C". 
_'-">'< Iowa 121 . I l l \ \ V 2 d 2~>1. 9:i A I . R J d 
' 7 1 : Brown v T a v l . . r . 171 N C 42 h 9a SF. 
W l ' : Siiwvcr v La F lamme. 121 Vt 229. I«'» 
\ 2 d -lob. 9H A L R 2 d VRh 
Annotation: 9 '« Af.R.'d wh. :-;7P,-:'.°,'i. ..2 
[l\. U) defect- in dc si^uatine. c u r t <>r place 
of a p p e a r a i u e : °<o \ I . R 2 d V* 1. f>00 ft <ec;.. 
i f> fraud or t r i cke i \ in -service of proce-- . 
19 . <i? 1 ">7. 139. supra. 
2 0 . S u m m e r l o t t \ Ci<iodwar T i r e \ Ruhhe r 
Co . 251) Iowa 121. I l l X W j d 2'>1. r '^ Al .R 
2d 171 
1. Fisher v C r o u l r v . a 7 \\" \ ' a l l J . ~«0 SF 
12 2. 
2 . See a Am J u r 2<]. \v\-\ \n.\\(\ ii ! 1. 16 
el secj. 
3 . Ha rknes s v I h d e . <>.! I S 17(». 2~> T. Fd 
2 17; Blaudin v O - u . m d e i (: \..' \ \ , j 10 F 
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however, the defendant should not, on motion attacking the jurisdiction over 
his person, seek any relief in addition to the vacation of process, beyond that 
which is consistent with the court's lack of jurisdiction over the applicant's 
person.4 
VII. RETURN; PROOF OF SERVICE 
A. IN GENERAL 
§ 164. Generally; definition, purpose, and necessity of return. H 
A return is defined as a short account in writing made by an officer in 
respect to the manner in which he has executed a writ or process;5 it is his 
official statement of the acts done by him under the writ in obedience to its 
directions and in conformity with the requirements of law.6 According to 
some decisions, the return is not simply the indorsement of the officer on the 
process, but is the actual filing of it in the office from which it was issued.7 
Frequently, however, in statutes, and usually in common speech, the word 
"return" means merely the certificate, without regard to whether it has been 
filed or not.8 However this may be, the return completes the service.9 
The return of process is essential to an effectual service thereof.10 As a 
general rule, to authorize a judgment against a person who has not appeared 
and answered or otherwise submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. 
there must be not only service on such person, but also a legal return of such 
service.11 It is not the return, however, but the service of the writ, that gives 
jurisdiction. The return is merely evidence by which the court is informed 
that the defendant has been served.12 
In a number of cases it has been held or stated that a failure to make 
return of service does not render the service invalid or afTect the court's 
jurisdiction.13 Thus, the failure to return the summon^ with the proof of 
229, 185 A2d 466, 98 ALR2d 548. Annota-
tion: 98 ALR2d 551, 616, § 11. 
4. See 5 Am Jur 2d, APPEARANCE § 2 1 . 
5. Southern Kansas Stage Lines Co. v Holt. 
192 Ark 165, 90 SW2d 473: Rowe v Hardy, 
97 Va 674, 34 SE 625. 
6. Hooper v McDade, 1 Cal App 733. 82 P 
1116: State ex rel. Montgomery Ward & Co. 
v District Ct. 115 Mont 521, 146 P2d 1012. 
7. Hogue v Corbit, 156 111 540, 41 XE 219. 
Childs, 67 Minn 242, 69 N\V 8. Easton 
903. 
9. Hanna 
1098. 
Allen, 153 Wash 485, 279 P 
10. Love v National Liberty Ins. Co. 157 
Ga 259, 121 SE 648. 
11. Love v National Liberty Ins. Co., supra: 
Albright-Pryor Co. v Pacific Selling Co. 126 
Ga 498, 55 SE 251: Hobbv v Bunch, 83 Ga 
1, 10SE 113. 
Annotation: 82 ALR2d 668-673, $S 1-3. 
12. Safeway Stores, Inc. v Ramirez. 99 Ariz 
372, 409 P2d 292- Southern Kansas Sraire 
Lines Co. v Holt, 192 Ark 165, 90 SW2d 
9 4 6 
473: Re Xeuman. 75 Cal 213, 16 P 887: 
Kloscnski v Flaherty (Fla) 116 So 2d 767. 82 
ALR2d 664. conformed to fFla App> 117 So 
2d 7: Love v Xational Libertv Inv Co 157 
Ga 259, 121 SE 618: Call v Rockv Mountain 
Bell Tel. Co. 16 Idaho 551. 102 P 146: Mintle 
v Svlvester. 197 Ioua 424, 197 XW 305. 
Boyd v Chesapeake & O. Canal Co. 17 Md 
195: Brown v Reinke. 159 Minn 458. 199 XW 
235. 35 ALR 4 13: Kahn v Mercantile Town 
Mm. Ins. Co. 228 Mo 585. 128 SW 995: 
Burleigh v Won- Soon I.eun. 83 NH 115. 139 
A 184: Bourgeious v Santa Fe Trail Stages, 43 
XM 453. 95 P2d 20 1. Hatch v Alamance 
R. Co. 183 NC 617. 112 SE 529: Rhodes v 
Valley Greyhound Lines, Inc. 98 Ohio App 
187, 57 Ohio Ops 232. 128 XE2d 824; Se-
lected Invest. Corp. v Bell, 201 Okla 408, 206 
P2d 989: First Xat Bank v Ellis, 27 Okla 
699, 114 P 620: Wade v Wade, 92 Or 642, 
176 P 192, 178 P 799. 182 P 136, 7 ALR 
1 143; Gunter's Unknown Heirs & Legal Rep-
resentatives v Lauow (Tex Civ App) 191 
SW2d 111, error ref: Denby Truck Co. v 
Thompson (Tex Civ App) 248 SW 427: Cun-
ningham v Spokane Ihdraul ic Min. Co. 20 
Wash 450, 55 P 756 
13. Re Spiers, 32 C I App 2d 124. 89 P2d 
H6; Klovenski v Flaherty (Fla) 116 So 2d 
|62 Am Jur 2d] 
PROCESS §164 
int to Rule 12(b)(2) where defendant was 
properlv served with process Brooks \ 
dson (1979, SD NY) 478 F Supp 793 
ledical malpractice complaint would not 
missed for lack of proper service where 
ony of the process server, who claimed to 
personally served the physician in his 
and who gave a precise description of 
yout of the physician's office, was more 
le than the physicians unsupported de-
f personal service and although the pro-
b e r ' s affidavit of service contained some 
racies regarding the physician's physical 
rance, those mistakes were readily ex-
ble bv the phvsician s admitted weight 
f approximately 20 pounds Kardanis v 
1982, 1st Dept) 90 App Div 2d 727, 455 
d 612 
Generally; general appearance, 
tc. 
luthorities: 
ection to process or service thereof are 
1 if the defendant does not present them 
tion or in his answer or reply Krasnosky 
noskv (Fla App) 282 So 2d 186 
riding bv a trial judge that appellant had, 
e purpose of avoiding all legal matters, 
?d himself from the world and lived in 
jn in a high security apartment, refusing 
wer the telephone or open his mail, was 
ately supported bv the evidence where 
cord showed that genuine attempts bv 
s methods were made to effect service 
him, and where appellant did not contest 
n officer attempted on one occasion to 
is residence to serve process on him, that 
lanswered telephone calls were made in 
empt to contact him, that service was 
)ted bv way of four visits to establish-
that appellant v\as believed to frequent, 
lat five attempts were made to contact 
hrough observations carried out at his 
nee. under the circumstances, there was 
e of law which required that the officers 
court be able to breach appellant's self-
ed isolation in order to inform him that a 
fas filed against him, and a judgment 
tg relief upon appellant's complaint to 
a writ of execution and lew of sale upon 
rtv formerly owned bv him would be 
?d Luckey v Smathers & f hompson (Fla 
>3) 343 So 2d 53 
?nse of inadequate service of process is 
1 where defendant presented defenses 
Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) in ongi-
otion to dismiss, but did not object to 
? of process under Rule 12(b)(5) Jordan 
-gorek (1979. ED Va) 480 F Supp 891 
efendant did not waive the right to assert 
fTs failure to effect service of process 
the long-arm statute or otherwise, by 
an anticipatory motion to dismiss in 
he unsuccessfully contended that the 
arm provision specifically invoked could 
e employed as to the claim in question 
Jur 2d Supp] 
Jackson v Cedars of Lebanon Hospital Corp 
(1981, Fla App D3) 399 So 2d 542 
The trial court had personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant and properlv denied the defen-
dant's motion to dismiss the complaint and to 
quash set vice of process for failure to serve 
required statutory notice with the summons 
since the defendant had previously served the 
plaintiff with a notice of appearance, which 
constituted a formal appearance in the action 
Schoonnmker v ford Motor Co (1981, 3d 
Dept) 79 App Div 2d 1067, 435 M S2d 393 
§ 163. Special appearance; object ing to 
jurisdict ion 
Case authorities: 
•\n order granting defendant s motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person 
was reversed and the case remanded to the trial 
court under the rule that an appearance chal-
lenging personal jurisdiction is a general ap-
pearance which waives defects in service and 
subjects the defendant to the jurisdiction of the 
court, where, although the defendant was not 
served, defendant's counsel had filed a "Notice 
of Appearance ' and had later moved to dismiss 
the complaint this was so even though the rule 
applied had been enunciated subsequent to the 
dismissal of the instant action Viator v Morgan 
Constr Co (Fla App) 344 So 2d 657 
Upon a special appearance at which defen-
dant moved to quash service of process, the 
trial court erred in failing to conduct an evi-
dentiary hearing on the sufficiency of substi-
tuted service of process, before such motion to 
quash can be granted, defendant must establish 
the invalidity of such service bv clear and con-
vincing evidence The Travelers Ins Co v Davis 
(1979, Fla App D3) 371 So 2d 702 
§ 164. Generally; definition, purpose, 
and necessity of return 
Practice aids: Return of service—On person in 
possession or change of property that is 
subject matter of action in rem—Service of 
copies of complaint and order directing ab-
sent nonresident defendant to appear or 
plead [28 USCS § 1655, FRCP 4(e)] 1 Fed 
Proc Forms § 1 781 
Case authorities: 
Where defendant had actual notice of pen-
dency of action, failure to promptly file official 
return of service did not invalidate service and 
court had personal jurisdiction Coronet Ins 
Co v Jones (1977) 45 111 App 3d 232, 3 111 Dec 
909, 359 NE2d 768 
Where there was no question as to whether 
return had to be filed, fact that preparation and 
filing of return had been entrusted to attorney 
did not operate as justification or excuse for 
failure to file Lnited States v Kroll (1977, CA7 
Wis) 547 F2d 393 
In paternity action trial court erred in dis-
missing mother's complaint due to asserted 
lack of jurisdiction bv reason of lack of return 
so?* 
OFFICE OF 
CARBON COUNTY SHERI 
PRICE, UTAH 
Febru4 ffVKTHfilHKICT COURTS 
SHERIFF'S RETURN ON SUBPOENA 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
County of Carbon ) 
ss. 
I hereby certify that on the THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2000, A.D., 
I served the within Subpoena....on the within PAUL PUGLIESE at 
PRICE by reading in HIS presence and hearing. 
JAMES CORDOVA 
Carbon County Sheriff 
Base Fees: $ 6.00 
Mileage: 1.00 
Total: 7.00 (PAID) 
Civil Number: 24462 
DEPUTY 
0 63 
RECEIVED? 
Name 
R o b e r t Flyj ia-
Bar Number F E B 1 7 2 0 0 0 
JARBONCOONTYSHERIF 
Address 
1265 Mo c a r b o n v i l l e r d C (j I F 
City, State ZIP 
P r i c e _ L l i _ 8 A 5 0 1 
Telephone 
Attorney for the d e f e n d a n t ( P r o P e r ) 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
CARBON COUNTY / 
T i r e k i n g c o r p . 
Plaintiff, 
Rohprt Flynn 
Defendant. 
SUBPOENA 
Case No. QfDD73Q/X/) 
T 0 :
 PAUL P U G L I E G E OWNER T I R E K I N G 
YOU ARE COMMANDED: 
. \pi s e v e n t h d i s t r i c t 
J\(r kr] to appear in the Court at the place, date and time specified below to testify in 
j <^ the above case. « — 
[ ] to appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the taking of a deposition in the above case. 
Ixl to Product o r permit inspection and copying of the following documents or objects at the place, date and time 
specified below (list documents or objects): 
1, Plaintiffs hill to defendant dated 9-2Q-99 
2
» Dates of payments of transmission to T R I , » 
fe[ 7 7 7 K M ^ i n , P r i r P FTT] 
3 . T h e o r i g i n a l v e r i f i e d a g r e e m e n t o f d e f e n d a n t w i t h 
T i r e K i n q I n c ( C o m p l a i n t , i t e m 5) [ ] to permit inspection 01 the following premises at the date and time specified below. 
PLACE DATE AND TIME 
__-Any organization not a party to this suit that is subpoenaed for the taking of a deposition shall designate one or more 
officers, directors, or managing agents, or other person who consent to testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for each person 
designated, the matters on which the person will testify. Rule 30(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
n,ATF-
OR ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/ DEFENDANT 
ki compliance with to Americans with Dfeabifttes Act 
O p kxftvidutis n**<fti0 special «xcfflmodaltorti (IncfudUx 
O 4 communicat^««Od»«>dtorvi<^) during ihtep<oc^<ft(X 
should call 1400-992-0172, at toast THREE worWn< 
davm odor to rfi« ftHwuiitad tvDOOAdno. 
UOT\CE TO PERSONS SERVED \MTH A, SUBPOENA pav tofc f^asfcriatAts cos\s tf piooucnon and 
copying. 
Subpoena to Aooear at Trial, at Hearing, or at Deposition 
1. If this subpoena commands you to 
aopear to give testimony at trial cr at hearing, you must 
appear m person at the place designated in the subpoena. 
2. If this subpoena commands you to 
appear to 0ive testimony at deoosition. you must appear 
m person at the Diace designated in the subpoena. If you 
are a resident or Utah, the subpoena may command you 
to aopear only in the county wnere you reside, or where 
you are employed, or where you transact business in 
person, or where the court orders you to appear. If you 
are not a resident of Utah, the suppoena may command 
you to aopear ooiv in the county wnere you are served 
with the suPPoena. or wnere the court orders 
3 if this suopoena commands vou to 
aopear 'o give testimony at trial at neanng. or at 
deposition, but does not commana v c , ro produce jr to 
permit msoection ana copying of documents or tangible 
things, or insoection of premises, you nave the right to 
object if the suoooena: 
0) imposes an undue burden or 
expense upon you: 
U\) does not allow you a reasonable 
time to comply, which mav oe «ess than 14 
03vs. oeoending on me circumstances, or 
'ml commanas vou to aooear at 
deposition at a oiace in violation of paragraph 
Z, above 
4 To ooject 'o complying with the 
subooena. you must file with the court .ssuing the 
suoooena a motion to auasn or moaify the suopoena. 
You must comoiv witn the suoooena umess you nave 
ootainea a ccur: order granting you relief from the 
suoooena 
Subpoena to Produce or to Permit Inspection of 
Documenrs or Tangiole Things or ro Per mi r Insoecnon of 
^remises 
5. f this subooena commanas you to 
produce or to oermit inspection and cooving of 
documents or Tangible things, or to permit inspection of 
oremises out does not command vou aopear to give 
testimony at :nai. at a hearing, or at a deposition: 
!i) you need not appear in person at 
the oiace of production or inspection; 
.II) you must produce documents as 
vou *eeo them »n the ordinary course of 
business or organize and label them to 
corresoond with the categories demanded in 
the suoooena; ana 
.in) you need not make any copies or 
advance 3ny costs for production, inspection or 
coovng ;f vou agree to make cooies. the oar:\ 
who has servea the suopoena - j o n you mui( 
5 You have the ngnt to object if the 
subpoena* 
(i) imposes an undue burden or 
expense upon you; 
(n) does not allow you at least 14 
days to comply, unless the party serving the 
subpoena has obtained a court order requiring 
an earlier response; 
(iii) requires you to disclose a trade 
secret or other confidential research, 
development or commercial information; 
(iv) requires you to disclose onvileged 
communication with your attorney or privileged 
trial preparation materials; or 
(v) requires you to disclose an 
unretaineo expert's ooinion or information not 
descnbing specific events or occurrences in 
dispute ana resulting from exoert's study meae 
not at the request of any oarty. 
7. To object to a suopoena for one of the 
reasons stated in paragraph 5. you must proviae notice 
in writing of your cojection to the oarty or attorney 
serving the subpoena before the date specified in the 
subpoena tor vou to respond. If your ooiection is based 
on either oaragrapn 6(m), 6(iv). or 5<v>. your wnrten 
objection must descnoe the nature or the documents, 
communications or tnmgs that you ooiect to oroducing 
with sufficient specificity to enaole rne oarty or attorney 
serving the subooena to contest your ooiection. You 
must also comply with the suopoena *o tne extent that it 
commands production or inspection or materials to wnich 
you do not object. 
3 After you ma<e t melv wnrten 
objection, tne party wno has served rr-e suoooena uoon 
you must coram a court order ro comoei vou to comply 
with the suoooena. Tne party must ^ive vou a copy of 
its motion tor a court order and notice of any neanng 
before the court. You have the ngnt to rile a response to 
the motion with the court and a ngnt to attend any 
hearing. Afte' you maKe a timeiv written ooiection. you 
nave no obligation to comply with the suoooena until the 
party serving the suoooena nas servea vou with a court 
order that compels vou to comoiy 
9 If this subpoena commands you to 
produce or to permit inspection ana copying of 
documents or tangiole things, or ro permit inspection of 
premises and to appear to give testimony at tnal. at J 
s*«,r m , or at a deposition, you mav ooiect to the 
production or msoection of documents or tangible things, 
or inspection of premises, by following fne procedure 
identified m oaragrapn 7 zven thougn you ooiect to 
production or inspection of documents or tangible things, 
or inspection of premises, you must aooear in person at 
the trial, at th» hearing or at the deoosition unless you 
obtain an order of 'he court ov following the procedures 
identified in paragraph 4. 
0 65 
NOTICE TO PERSONS SERVED WITH A SUBPOENA pay the reasonable costs of production and 
copying 
Subpoena to Appear at Trial, at Hearing, or at Oepositior 
If this subpoena commands you to 
appear toljive testimony =u trial or at hearing, you must 
appear m person at the place designated in the subpoena. 
2. If this subpoena commands you to 
appear to give testimony at deposition, you must appear 
in person at the place designated in the subpoena If you 
are a resident of Utah, the subpoena may command you 
to appear only in the county where you reside, or where 
you are employed, or where you transact business in 
person, or where the court orders you to appear If you 
are not a resident of Utah, the suopoena may command 
you to aopear oniy in the county where vou are served 
with the suopoena or where the court orders 
3 If this subpoena commands you to 
appear to give testimony at trial at neanng. or at 
deposition, but aoes not command vot, to oroduce or to 
permit inspection and copying of documents or tangible 
things, or inspection of premises, you have the right to 
obiect if the suopoena: 
0) imposes an undue burden or 
expense upon you: 
(u) does not allow you a reasonable 
time to comply, which may be less than 14 
days, ascending on the circumstances, or 
(MI) commands you to aopear at 
deposition at a place in violation of paragraph 
2. above 
- * 
tW - > © To object to complying with the subpoena, you must file with the court issuing the 
subpoena a motion to quash or modify the subpoena. 
You must comoiv with the subpoena unless you have 
obtained a court order granting you relief from the 
suoooena. f 
Subpoena to Produce or to Permit Inspection of 
Documents or Tangiole Things or to Permit Inspection of 
Premises 
5 !f this subpoena commands you to 
produce or to permit inspection and copying of 
documents or tangible things, or to permit inspection of 
oremises but does not command you appear to give 
testimony at trial at a hearing, or at a deposition 
(i) you need not appear in person at 
the place of production or inspection. 
(II) you must produce documents as 
you keeo them in the ordinary course of 
business or organize and label them to 
corresoond with the categories demanded in 
the subooena: and 
(HI) you need not make any copies or 
advance any costs for production, inspection or 
copying If you agree to make cooies. the party 
who Kas served the subpoena upon you must 
6 You have the right to object if the 
subpoena 
(i) imposes an undue burden or 
expense upon you; 
( I I ) does not allow you at least 14 
days to comply, unless the party serving the 
subpoena has obtained a court order requmng 
an earlier response: 
(in) requires you to disclose a trade 
secret or other confidential research, 
development or commercial information: 
(iv) requires you to disclose pnvileged 
communication with your attorney or pnvileged 
trial preparation materials: or 
(v) requires you to disclose an 
unretained expert's opinion or information not 
describing specific events or occurrences in 
dispute and resulting from exoert s study maae 
not at the request of any party 
7. To object to a subpoena for one of the 
reasons stated in paragraph 6. you must provide notice 
in writing of your objection to the party or attorney 
serving the subooena before the date specified in the 
subpoena for you to respond. If your obiection is based 
on either paragrapn 6(m), 6(iv), or 6(v), your wntten 
objection must describe the nature of the documents, 
communications or things that you obiect to producing 
with sufficient specificity to enable the party or attorney 
serving the subpoena to contest your oojection You 
must also comply with the subpoena to the extent that it 
commands production or inspection of materials to which 
you do not object. 
8 After you make timely written 
objection, tne party wno has served the suoooena upon 
you must ootain a court order to comoei vou to comply 
with the subooena. The party must give you a copy of 
its motion for a court order and notice of any hearing 
before the court. You have the right to file a response to 
the motion with the court and a right to attend any 
hearing. After you make a timely wntten oojection. you 
have no obligation to comply with the suoooena until the 
party serving the suoooena has served you with a court 
order that compels you to comply 
9 If this subpoena commands you to 
produce or to permit inspection ana copying of 
documents or tangible things, or to permit inspection of 
premises, and to appear to give testimony at trial, at a 
h**jnnq, or at a deposition, you may obiect to the 
production or inspection of documents or tangible things, 
or inspection of premises, by following the procedure 
identified in paragraph 7 Even though you object to 
production or inspection of documents or tangible things, 
or inspection of premises, you must appear in person at 
the trial, at the hearing or at the deposition unless you 
obtain an order of the court by following the procedures 
identified in paragrapn 4. 
. 0 
OFFICE OF 
CARBON COUNTY SHERIFF 
PRICE, UTAH 84501 
TIRE KING, INC. 
PLAINTIFF SHERIFFS RETURN ON: 
SUMMONS & COMPLAINT 
Case #: 000700120 
ROBERT FLYNN 
DEFENDANT 
I, James Cordova, Sheriff of the County of Carbon, State of Utah, 
hereby certify that I received the within SUMMONS & COMPLAINT on 
THE 9TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2000, and personally served the same upon 
ROBERT FLYNN at 1265 N CARBONVILLE RD, PRICE, in the County of 
Carbon on THE 9TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2000, by delivering to and 
leaving with said ROBERT FLYNN a copy of SUMMONS & COMPLAINT with 
my name, signature and official title endorsed thereon, together 
with, as to the defendant. 
Dated at Price, County of Carbon, State of Utah, this February 10, 
2000. 
James Cordova 
Carbon County Sheriff 
By £&<w#£ $[?£-£ 
EDWARD L ELLIS, CORRECTIONS OFFICER 
Civil #: 24315 
Service Fee: $ 6.00 
Mileage: 3.00 
Total: 9.00 
* 0 I I 
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Rule 45- Subpoena. 
(a) Form, issuance. 
(1) Every subpoena shall: 
(A) issue from the court in which the action is pending; 
(R) state the title of the action, the name of the court from which it is issued, 
the name and address of the party or attorney serving the subpoena, and its 
civil action number; 
(C) command each person to whom it is directed to appear to give testimony 
at trial, or at hearing, or at deposition, or to produce or to permit inspection 
and copying of documents or tangible things in the possession, custody or 
control of that person, or to permit inspection of premises, at a time and place 
therein specified; and 
(D) set forth the text of Notice to Persons Served with a Subpoena, in 
substantially similar form to Form 30 in the Appendix of Forms to these rules. 
(2) A command to produce or to permit inspection and copying of documents 
or tangible things, or to permit inspection of premises, may be joined with a 
command to appear at trial, or at hearing, or at deposition, or may be issued 
separately. 
(3) The clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed but otherwise in blank, to a 
party requesting it, who shall complete it before service. An attorney admitted 
to practice in the court in which the action is pending may also issue and sign 
a subpoena as an officer of the court. 
(b) Service; scope. 
(1) Generally. 
(A) A subpoena may be served by any person who is not a party and is not 
less than 18 years of age. Service of a subpoena upon a person named therein 
shall be made as provided in Rule 4(e) for the service of process and, if the 
person's appearance is commanded, by tendering to that person the fees for one 
day's attendance and the mileage allowed by law. When the subpoena is issued 
on behalf of the United States, or this state, or any officer or agency of either, 
fees and mileage need not be tendered. Prior notice of any commanded 
production or inspection of documents or tangible things or inspection of 
premises before trial shall be served on each party in the manner prescribed by 
Rule 5(b). 
(B) Proof of service when necessary shall be made by filing with the clerk of 
the court from which the subpoena is issued a statement of the date and 
manner of service and of the names of the persons served, certified by the 
person who made the service. 
(C) Service of a subpoena outside of this state, for the taking of a deposition 
or production or inspection of documents or tangible things or inspection of 
premises outside this state, shall be made in accordance with the requirements 
of the jurisdiction in which such service is made. 
(2) Subpoena for appearance at trial or hearing. A subpoena commanding a 
witness to appear at a trial or at a hearing pending in this state may be served 
at any place within the state. 
(3) Subpoena for taking deposition. 
'A) A person who resides in this state may be required to appear at 
deposition only in the county where the person resides, or is employed, or 
transacts business in person, or at such other place as the court may order. A 
person who does not reside in this state may be required to appear at 
deposition only in the county in this state where the person is served with a 
subpoena, or at such other place as the court may order. 
(B) A subpoena commanding the appearance of ,i witness at a deposition 
may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce or to perm** 
inspection and copying of documents or tangible things relating to any of the 
matters within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b), but in 
that event the subpoena will be subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b) ana 
paragraph (c) of this rule. .. r x 
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(4) Subpoena for production or inspection of documents or tangible things or 
inspection of premises. A subpoena to command a person who is not a party to 
produce or to permit inspection and copying of documents or tangible things or 
to permit inspection of premises may be served at any time after commence-
ment of the action. The scope and procedure shall comply with Rule 34, except 
that the person must be allowed at least 14 days to comply as stated in 
subparagraph (c)(2)(A) of this rule. The party serving the subpoena shall pay 
the reasonable cost of producing or copying the documents or tangible things. 
Upon the request of any other party and the payment of reasonable costs, the 
party serving the subpoena shall provide to the requesting party copies of all 
documents obtained in response to the subpoena. 
(c) Protection of persons subject to subpoenas. 
(1) A party or an attorney responsible for the issuance and service of a 
subpoena shall take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or 
expense on a person subject to that subpoena. The court from which the 
subpoena was issued shall enforce this duty and impose upon the party or 
attorney in breach of this duty an appropriate sanction, which may include, 
but is not limited to, lost earnings and a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(2) (A) A subpoena served upon a person who is not a party to produce or to 
permit inspection and copying of documents or tangible things or to permit 
inspection of premises, whether or not joined with a command to appear at 
trial, or at hearing, or at deposition, must allow the person at least 14 days 
after service to comply, unless a shorter time has been ordered by the court for 
good cause shown. 
(B) A person commanded to produce or to permit inspection and copying of 
documents or tangible things or to permit inspection of premises need not 
appear in person at the place of production or inspection unless also com-
manded to appear at trial, at hearing, or at deposition. 
(C) A person commanded to produce or to permit inspection and copying of 
documents or tangible things or inspection of premises may, before the time 
specified for compliance with the subpoena, serve upon the party or attorney 
designated in the subpoena written objection to inspection or copying of any or 
all of the documents or tangible things or inspection of the premises. If 
objection is made, the party serving the subpoena shall not be entitled to 
inspect and copy the materials or inspect the premises except pursuant to an 
order of the court. If objection has been made, the party serving the subpoena 
may, upon notice to the person commanded to produce, move at any time for an 
order to compel the production. Such an order to compel production shall 
protect any person who is not a party or an officer of a party from significant 
expense resulting from the inspection and copying commanded. 
(3) (A) On timely motion, the court from which a subpoena was issued shall 
quash or modify the subpoena if it: 
(i) fails to allow reasonable time for compliance; 
(ii) requires a resident of this state who is not a party to appear at 
deposition in a county in which the resident does not reside, or is not employed, 
or does not transact business in person; or requires a non-resident of this state 
to appear at deposition in a county other than the county in which the person 
was served; 
(iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected mat ter and no 
exception or waiver applies; 
(iv) subjects a person to undue burden. 
(B) If a subpoena: 
(i) requires disclosure of a trade secret or other confidential research, 
development, or commercial information; 
(ii) requires disclosure of an unretained expert's opinion or information not 
describing specific events or occurrences in dispute and resulting from the 
expert's study made not at the request of any party; 
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(iii) requires a resident of this state who is not a party to appear at 
deposition in a county in which the resident does not reside, or is not employed, 
or does not transact business in person; or 
(iv) requires a non-resident of this state who is not a party to appear at 
deposition in a county other than the county in which the person was served; 
the court may, to protect a person subject to or affected by the subpoena, 
quash or modify the subpoena or, if the party serving the subpoena shows a 
substantial need for the testimony or material tha t cannot otherwise be met 
without undue hardship and assures that the person to whom the subpoena is 
addressed will be reasonably compensated, the court may order appearance or 
production only upon specified conditions. 
(d) Duties in responding to subpoena. 
( 1 ) A person responding to a subpoena to produce documents shall produce 
them as they are kept in the usual course of business or shall organize and 
label them to correspond with the categories in the demand. 
(2) When information subject to a subpoena is withheld on a claim that it is 
privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation materials, the claim 
shall be made expressly and shall be supported by a description of the nature 
of the documents, communications, or things not produced that is sufficient to 
enjajije the demanding party to contest the claim. 
tr{e)jpontempt. Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a 
sultfSoena served upon that person may be deemed a contempt of the court from 
which the subpoena issued. An adequate cause for failure to obey exists when 
a subpoena purports to require a nonparty to appear or produce at a place not 
within the limits provided by subparagraph (c)(3)(A)(ii). ~ 
(f) Procedure where witness conceals himself or fails to attend. If a witness 
evades service of a subpoena, or fails to attend after service of a subpoena, the 
court may issue a warrant to the sheriff of the county to arrest the witness and 
bring the witness before the court. 
(g) Procedure when witness is confined in jail. If the witness is a prisoner 
confined in a jail or prison within the state, an order for examination in the 
prison upon deposition or, in the discretion of the court, for temporary removal 
and production before the court or officer for the purpose of being orally 
examined, may be made upon motion, with or without notice, by a justice of the 
Supreme Court, or by the district court of the county in which the action is 
pending. 
(h) Subpoena unnecessary; when. A person present in court, or before a 
judicial officer, may be required to testify in the same manner as if the person 
were in attendance upon a subpoena. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Purposes of 
Amendment. The 1994 amendments repre-
sent a substantial change from prior practice. 
Patterned on the 1991 amendments to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 45, these amendments expedite and 
facilitate procedures for serving subpoenas, 
modify procedures relating to persons who are 
not parties to correspond to procedures relating 
to parties under Utah R. Civ. P. 34, and specify 
the rights and obligations of persons served 
with a subpoena. 
Paragraph (a). This paragraph amends 
former Rule 45 in the following important re-
spects: 
First, subparagraph (a)(6)(3) authorizes an 
attorney to issue and sign a subpoena as an 
officer of the court. The subparagraph i -limi-
nates the requirement that an attorney obtain 
a subpoena from the clerk of the court, and the 
requirement that a subpoena be issued under 
seal of the court. An attorney who is not a 
member of the Utah State Bar but who has 
been admitted to practice pro hac vice in the 
court in which the action is pending is autho-
rized to issue a subpoena. Consistent with the 
authority of an attorney to issue a subpoena, 
subparagraph (a)(1)(B) requires every sub-
poena to identify the attorney serving it. Sub-
paragraph (a)(1)(A) requires every subpoena to 
issue from the court in which the action is 
pending, amending former Rule 45(d)(1), which 
authorized a deposition to be issued from the 
court where the deposition is to take place, as 
well as the court where the action is pending. 
Second, subparagraph (a)(2) authorizes a 
party to serve upon a person who is not a party 
a subpoena to produce or to permit inspection 
and copying of documents or tangible things, or 
to permit inspection of premises. A party no 
longer must serve a subpoena duces tecum to 
discover documents or langible things from a 
person who is not a party, although the 
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nded rule preserves tha t option, ^nd no 
er must bring an independent action for 
y onto land. Subparagraph (a)(2) also re-
es a person who is not a party to produce 
er iak within tha t person's control, which 
ects that person to the same scope of dis-
ry as if tha t person were a party served 
L a discovery request under Rule 34 
lird, subparagraph (a)(1)(D) requires every 
x>ena to state the rights and duties of a 
on served in a form substantially similar to 
form in the Appendix to these rules. 
iragraph (b) also amends former Rule 45 
everal important respects. Subparagraph 
)(A) requires prior notice of each com-
ded production or inspection of documents 
ingible things, or inspection of premises, to 
served as prescribed by Rule 5(b). This 
>aragraph ensures tha t other parties will 
i notice enabling them to object to or par-
ate in discovery, or to serve a demand for 
tional materials. No similar provision is 
ided for depositions, because depositions 
governed by Rule 30 or 31. Subparagraph 
)(A) specifies tha t the subpoena may be 
ed as required by Rule 4(e), amending 
.graph (c) of the former rule, 
ibparagraph (b)(4) authorizes a subpoena 
production or inspection of documents or 
ible things or inspection of premises to be 
ed upon a person who is not a party at any 
after commencement of the action. A sub-
ta served upon a person who is not a party 
the same scope specified in Rule 34(a) for a 
est served upon a party, and is subject to 
same procedures specified in Rule 34(b). A 
on who is not a party is not required to file 
itten response to the subpoena, unless the 
y objects to the subpoena pursuant to sub-
graph (cX2XD). 
Lbparagraph (b)(4) also requires each party 
ing a subpoena for- the production of docu-
ts to provide to other parties copies of 
ments obtained in response to the sub-
a. No comparable provision appears in the 
^al rule, but the Committee determined 
such a provision would alleviate some of 
>urden imposed upon persons who are not 
Les and shift it to parties, 
her subparagraphs make minor amend-
ts to the former Rule 45. Subparagraph 
)(C) amends former paragraph (d)(3) to 
ide a subpoena for document production or 
action, as well as a deposition subpoena. 
>aragraph (bX2) is the former paragraph 
vith minor modifications. Subparagraph 
)(A) requires a nonresident to attend dep-
)n only in the county where the nonresi-
is served, amending former paragraph 
) to eliminate the requirement that a non-
ient attend a deposition within forty miles 
e place of service. 
ragraph (c). Paragraph (c) states the 
s of witnesses or other persons served with 
oenas. The paragraph does not diminish 
s conferred by any other rule or any other 
ority. Subparagraph (c)(1) states the duty 
l attorney to minimize the burden on a 
2ss who is not a party, and specifies that 
a witness may recover lost earnings that 
t from the misuse of a subpoena. Subpara-
graph (c)(1) expands he responsibility of an 
attorney stated in Rule 26(g); this responsibil-
ity is correlative to the expanded power of an 
attorney to issue a subnoena. 
Subparagraph (c)(2xA) specifies that a per-
son who is not a party served with a subpoena 
for the production or inspection of documents or 
tangible things or inspection of premises must 
have at least 14 days to respond. A subpoena to 
appear at trial, at hearing, or at deposition 
must be served within a reasonable time, un-
less it also requires the production of docu-
ments. 
Subparagraph (c)(2)(C) states that a person 
who is not a party has no obligation to make 
copies or to advance costs, and has no counter-
part in either the federal rule or the former 
state rule. The Committee included this state-
ment in the rule so that it would become part of 
the notice provided to each person served with 
a subpoena. 
Subparagraph (c)(2)(D) specifies that a per-
son served with a subpoena for the production 
or inspection of documents or tangible things or 
inspection of premises may serve written objec-
tion upon the party serving the subpoena. The 
party serving the subpoena bears the burden to 
obtain an order to compel production, and must 
provide prior notice to the person served of the 
motion to compel. A person served with a sub-
poena to appear at trial, at hearing, or at 
deposition, must appear unless the person ob-
tains a court order to quash or modify the 
subpoena; a written objection to the serving 
party is insufficient. A person served with a 
subpoena duces tecum may object to providing 
documents by notifying the party serving the 
subpoena, but still must appear to testify at 
trial, at hearing, or at deposition, unless the 
person obtains an order to quash or modify the 
subpoena 
Subparagraph (c)(3) identifies the circum-
stances in which a subpoena may be modified or 
quashed. It follows paragraph (c)(3) of the 1991 
amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, but is modi-
fied to specify the locations where residents or 
nonresidents of the State may be compelled to 
attend deposition 
Paragraph (d). This paragraph follows the 
1991 amendments to Fed R. Civ. P. 45. Sub-
paragraph (d)(2)(D) applies to privileged attor-
ney-client communications, and to all attorney 
work product protected under the doctrine of 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S. Ct. 385, 
91 L. Ed. 451 (1947), and progeny. 
Paragraph (e). This paragraph specifies 
that an adequate cause for failure to obey exists 
when a subpoena purports to require a party to 
respond at a place bevond the geographic 
boundaries imposed by the rule, amending 
former paragraph (f) 
Paragraph (0. This is the former paragraph 
(g), amended to eliminate references to the 
masculine pronoun 
Paragraph (g) This is the former paragraph 
(h). 
Paragraph (h) This is the former paragraph 
(i), amended to eliminate references to the 
masculine pronoun. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds 
to Rule 45, FR.C.P. 
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Cross-References. — Civil penalty and 
damages recoverable, § 78-24-7 
Contempt, $ 78-32-1 et seq 
Definition of subpoena, § 78-24-5 
Duty of witness served with subpoena, sj 78-
24-6 
Contempt 
— Refusal to give testimony 
Denial of witness fees. 
Production of documentary evidence 
— Amount of material. 
Service 
— Mileage and attendance fees 
Distance between home and court 
Several pending cases. 
— Waiver. 
Effect on witness. 
Taking of deposition. 
— Command to appear in notice 
Cited 
Contempt. 
— Refusal to give testimony. 
Denial of wi tness fees. 
Litigants who were before court and wrho 
were personally ordered to appear before no-
tary and give testimony for depositions, but 
whu refused to obey because witness and mile-
age fees were denied them in advance, although 
seasonably requested, were guilty of contempt, 
notwithstanding that court may have erred in 
concluding that they were not entitled to the 
fees. Crowther v. District Court, 93 Utah 586, 
54 P.2d 243 (1936) 
Product ion of documentary evidence. 
—Amount of material . 
Even though former law authorized the issu-
ance of a subpoena duces tecum, if the number 
of books specified was so great as to be unrea-
sonably burdensome to produce them all in 
court or before the officer, the witness might 
justify his failure to produce them, until such 
time as he or others might be examined to 
determine which contained relevant matter 
Evans v Evans. 98 Utah 189. 98 P.2d 703 
(1940). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 81 Am. Jur 2d W i t n e s s 
$$ 5. 7, 9 to 22 
C.J.S. — 97 C.J S. W i t n e s s e s ^ 19 to 34 45 
A.L.R. — Privilege against self-incrimina-
tion as ground for refusal to product 
noncorporate documents in possession of per 
son asserting privilege but owned b\ am.thei. 
37 <\.L.R.3d 1373 
Right of independent expert to refuse to te^ 
tif\ as to expert opinion. 50 A.L.R 4th 6tf0 
Compelling testimoiv of opponent's expert in 
state court, 66 A L.R.4th 213 
Adveise preMimptior, or inferi nee ban-d un 
Fees and mileage of witnesses, § 21-5-4. 
Municipality, rules may govern subpoena is-
sued by, § 10-3-610 
Service. 
—Mileage and attendance fees. 
Distance between home and court. 
Mileage was allowed subpoenaed witness for 
entire distance between home of witness and 
place where court was held, or where he was 
required to attend, and not merely from place 
where he was served with subpoena. Holt v. 
Nielson, 37 Utah 566, 109 P. 470 (1910). 
Several pending cases . 
Witnesses subpoenaed and in actual atten-
dance in several cases at the instance of the 
same plaintiff were entitled to their fees in each 
case, though the suits were pending at the 
same time and place. Smith v. Nelson, 23 Utah 
512, 65 P. 485 (1901). 
—Waiver. 
Effect on witness . 
Witness could waive s tnct compliance with 
respect to service of subpoena and still be 
required to attend court, and be entitled to 
mileage fees from home to place of trial. Holt v. 
Nielson, 37 Utah 566, 109 P. 470 (1910) 
Taking of deposit ion. 
—Command to appear in not ice . 
To obtain presence of witness for purpose of 
taking his deposition, notice and affidavit pre-
scribed by former statute had to be served on 
adverse party's attorney, and then if witness 
would not voluntarily appear, the officer before 
whom the deposition was to be taken had to 
l.ssue subpoena for his appearance; a command 
to witness to appear contained in notice or 
affidavit would be ineffective. Olson v. District 
Court, 93 Utah 145. 112A.LR 438(1937). 
Cited in Schultz v. Conger 755 P2d 165 
• Utah 1988) 
state's failure to produce or examine law en-
forcement personnel — modern cases, 81 
A L.R 1th 872 
Adverse presumption or inference based on 
oarty'- failure to produce or examine trans-
feror, transferee, broker, or other person alleg-
edly involved in transaction at issue — modern 
case-. 81 A.L R.lth 939 
Requirement-, under Rule 45(c* of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 17(d) of 
Fed ral Rules of Criminal Procedi. e, relating 
to s« rvice of subpoena and tender of witness 
fee^ and mileage allowance, 77 A L R Fed. 863 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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'udice resulted,16 they ordinaril) do not require him to show that but for 
P
 c r r 0 r a different result would have obtained,17 and it has been held that 
, statutes and rules cannot be invoked unless the cause preponderates so 
, avily on the side of the prevailing party that the error could not have 
contributed to or resulted in a miscarriage of justice.18 
"Technical error" statutes or rules have been held not to necessarily af-
fect the application of the rule that prejudice will be presumed from a show-
ing of material error.19 
3. GENERAL T E S T S OF PREJUDICIAL EFFECT 
1783. Generally. 
The determination whether or not a particular error is prejudicial raises 
many complex problems. While the rule that only prejudicial error is rever-
sible is well recognized, there is a range for a variety of views as to its appli-
cation to specific errors, and what one court may consider an error of abso-
lutely no consequence, another court may treat as one whose prejudicial 
character is incapable of estimate.20 Appellate courts generally take the view 
that where the right to present in full a party's view of the case, including 
interrogation of all witnesses, is denied, the error cannot be held to be harm-
less.1 The test is said to be whether, upon a review of the record, it sufficiently 
appears that the rights of the complaining party have been injuriously affected 
by the error, or that he has suffered a miscarriage of justice.2 The fact that 
16. Santina v General Petroleum Corp. 41 
Ctl App 2d 74, 106 P2d 60. 
17. McCarty v Gappelberg (Tex Civ App) 
273 SW2d 943, 46 ALR2d 93, error ref 
n r e . 
Such provisions may not be invoked for 
the purpose of declaring an erroneous admis-
•ion of evidence harmless when the issue is 
dote and the erroneous admission may have 
been the weight that tipped the scales against 
the appellant. Krulewitch v United States, 
336 US 440, 93 L ed 790, 69 S Ct 716. 
18. United States v River Rouge Improv. 
Co. 269 US 411, 70 L ed 339, 46 S Ct 144; 
220 V L a n k e r s h i m > 9 C a l 2 d 409> 7 1 p 2d 
Under the federal harmless error statute 
(now Rule 52, Federal Rules of Crim Proc) 
Sm' r?n?°uS m l i n g w h i c h r e I a t e s t o t h e sub" WAniial rights of a party is ground for reversal 
i S v ^ , a f f i r m a t i vely appears from the whole 
woro that it was not prejudicial. Thus, 
' Si*. ; m au- V^uction given in a criminal 
™« in which the question of defendant's 
tl K.J1V a c l o s e o n e c a n n o t be regarded 
• j w m i e s s and so one which may be dis-
^ w a e a because guilt may be deduced from 
128 lK°ieQore^ord- B i h n v U m t e d States, 
*'*
 U S 633> 90 L ed 1485, 66 S Ct 1172. 
AiU ^ L * 6 w h i c h Provides that reversals 
Jg*»P0t be ordered for errors which do not 
•ckMv lk y a p p e a r t o h a ve affected preju-
WniDliin- ^ t e n t i a l rights of the party 
W e e hSu C n 'lt a PP e a r s t h a* substantial 
tSmuui!*? b « e n done, does not authorize the 
o f a
 judgment upon the ground 
" ^mJurZd] — 1 5 
that it is in accordance with the view of the 
facts which the reviewing court itself might 
derive from the conflicting evidence, where 
it is based on a verdict rendered under the 
apparent influence of a materially erroneous 
instruction, or by a jury made up in part of 
persons disqualified on account of interest. 
Broadway Mfg. Co. v Leavenworth Terminal 
R. & Bridge Co 81 Kan 616, 106 P 1034. 
19. The constitutional provision of the state 
of Arizona forbidding a reversal for technical 
error where on the whole record substantial 
justice has been done could not be properly 
applied by claiming that error in admitting 
hearsay testimony was merely "technical." 
Elmer v State, 20 Ariz 170, 178 P 28, 2 ALR 
1519. 
The "technical errors or defects" mentioned 
in the provision of the state's code of crim-
inal procedure refer only to such errors or 
defects as do not affect a substantial right 
and cannot be reasonably believed to have 
changed the result, and despite that statutory 
provision, a presumption of prejudicial effect 
arises if it is apparent that the erroneous 
ruling may have affected the verdict Peo-
ple v Bonier, 179 NY 315, 72 NE 226. 
20. Kotteakos v United States, 328 US 750, 
90 L ed 1557, 66 S Ct 1239. 
Invited error, see §§713 et seq., supra. 
1. Wisdon v Stegall, 219 Miss 776, 70 So 
2d 43. 
2. Hays v Viscome, 122 Cal App 2d 135, 
264 P2d 173, 39 ALR2d 1435; Parker v 
Roberts, 99 Vt 219, 131 A 21, 49 ALR 1382. 
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the record as it stands may show that the evidence preponderated heavily i 
favor of the appellee does not foreclose consideration on the part of the rcvicv 
ing court of any error or irregularity committed at the trial,3 and for th 
purpose of determining whether or not the appellant has been injured, it 
proper to look to the whole record, and not to that part only which precede 
and includes the particular exception under consideration.4 
§ 784. Error favorable to appellant. 
If error which does not harm the party appealing is not ground for reversa 
it would seem, a fortiori, that no harm results from error which operates in hi 
favor.5 So, it has usually been held that the party is not entitled to complai 
where the judgment against him is for a smaller amount than should ha\ 
been awarded,6 although the view has sometimes been taken that the part 
subjected to a verdict for less than the amount required by a specific instriu 
tion,7 or fixed by an express contract,8 may justifiably complain of error, an( 
that error may lie in tort actions, where the circumstances indicate that th 
jury brought in a verdict for less than any amount justified by the evidence 
as a compromise on the issue of liability.9 
An appellant in a criminal case may not take advantage of error in the coin 
below that operated to his benefit,10 and in numerous cases it has been hek 
3. Pilgeram v Haas, 118 Mont 431, 167 P2d 
339. 
4. Bates v Rentz. 262 Ala 681, 81 So 2d 
349; Pease v Golightlv, 168 Okla 582, 35 P 
2d 469, 94 ALR 956; State v Britton, 27 
Wash 2d 336, 178 P2d 341. 
It has been held that Rule 52 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure (formerly 
28 USC § 391) means that a criminal appeal 
should not be turned into a quest for error, 
but does not mean that portions of a charge 
to the jury relied on as curing error in other 
portions must be read in isolation to the 
full charge and magnified out of all proportion 
to their likely importance at the trial. Bihn 
v United States, 328 US 633, 90 L ed 1485, 
66 S C t 1172. 
It becomes our duty, whenever the question 
is raised, to scrutinize the entire record in 
each particular case, and determine whether 
or not the error was harmless or prejudicial. 
State v Reardon, 245 Minn 509, 73 NW2d 
192. 
Such matters as the final amount deter-
mined by the court and a remittitur required 
of the plaintiff must be considered in deter-
mining whether error is prejudicial. Austro-
American S. S. Co. v Thomas (CA2) 248 F 
231. 
5. Re Monaghan's Estate, 71 Ariz 334, 227 
P2d 227; Pullman Co. v Schaffncr, 126 Ga 
609. 55 SE 933; Miner v Western Casualty 
& Surety Co. 241 Iowa 530, 41 N\V2d 557, 
14 ALR2d 1358; Creditors' Nat. Clearing 
House v Bannwart, 227 Mass 579. 116 NE 
8H6. Re Forsvthe. 221 Minn 303, 22 NW2c! 
19, 167 ALR 1: Vaughn v Booker. 217 NC 
479. 8 SE2d 603, 132 \LR 977: Cromeenes 
v San Pedro. L. A. & S L R. Co. 37 Utah 
475. 109 P 10. 
Where the appellant was not entitled to 
226 
any damages at all, he cannot successful!' 
complain on appeal that the court be!o\ 
awarded him only nominal damages. Bou 
quet v Hackensac'k Water Co. 90 NJL 203 
101 A 379. 
Although an appeal from a final decre* 
in equity brings up the whole case, on< 
enjoined from infringing another's tradenam< 
may not complain that the decree is to* 
favorable to him. and that it should hav 
been rendered without geographical limita 
tions within the United States. Cohen ' 
Naelc. 190 Mass 4, 76 XE 276. 
Application to evidence questions, see 
804, infra. 
6. Payne v Commercial Nat. Bank. 177 Ca 
68, 169 P 1007: Johns v League, Duvall & 
Powell. 202 Ga 868, 45 SE2d 211, 174 ALI 
757; Ullman v Bee Hive Dept. Store, 19 
Wis 350. 214 NW 349, 53 ALR 281: Petei 
son v Johnson, 16 Wyo 473, 28 P2d 487, 9 
ALR 723. 
Annotation: 31 ALR 1090, s. 174 ALR 76! 
7. Winston v McKnab, 134 Kan 75, 4 P2 
4'U; Ton Yelle v Farm Bureau Co-op. £> 
change, 112 Or 476, 229 P 83, 1103. 
Annotation: 31 ALR 1099, s. 174 ALR 771 
8. Jensen v Nail, 53 Colo 212, 124 P 47 
Samuels v Schiller, 205 App Div 5, 199 NY 
53. 
Annotation: 31 ALR 1102, s. 174 ALR 78 
9. Spain v Griffith. 42 Ariz 30 L 25 P2 
551: (iiindrv v Auhison, T. & " 
104 Cal App 753, 286 P 718; 
162 Va 572, 175 SE 230. 
Annotation: 31 ALR 1106, 
ALR 805, 809. 
10. Williams v United States, 
[5 Am 
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for a little more or a little less than it should have been will not, because of 
such error, be reversed or corrected.2 The appellate courts will generally not 
reverse an order of the trial court that has already granted a new trial, even 
though it may appear to them that only nominal damages may be recovered.3 
However, there are instances where the error in the amount of the judgment, 
although small, has been held sufficient to require a reversal,4 and a failure to 
award even nominal damages may be held reversible error where their recovery 
would determine and adjudicate valuable rights, as rights in real property.5 
§791. Infringement on constitutional and statutory rights. 
It is sometimes stated that an assignment of error must either show resulting 
injurx to the appellant or that some of his constitutional or statutory rights 
ha\e been violated, and unless one of these matters can be shown, the error 
is harmless.6 Thus it is generally held to be no excuse for the violation of a 
mandatory rule or statute to say that no harm has resulted from the violation 
because of the error.7 And an error complained of may be ground for re-
versing the judgment where a constitutional or statutory right has been 
violated, although the error may appear to be otherwise harmless.8 But 
otherwise harmless error may not be changed to reversible error by reason 
of alleged infringement on due process if the error does not impair the es-
sential elements of due process, which are notice and an opportunity to be 
heard in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case.9 Thus, 
whether there has been a real infringement on the rights of the appellant 
is a factor in applying the principle, as where communication between the 
court and jury, in the absence of the defendant, has been considered harm-
less error if the communication was in no manner prejudicial,10 although it 
has also been ruled that a statement in the prosecuting attorney's summation 
showing a withdrawn plea of guilty is reversible error, although the case was 
exceedingly strong against the defendant, since the infraction violated the 
due process clause of the federal and state constitutions.11 
Error of the lower court in refusing to consider the constitutionality of a 
statute upon which the action was based is harmless if the statute is determined 
to be valid upon appeal.12 
On the other hand, error, however substantial or prejudicial it may be, is 
immaterial if the cause is based on an unconstitutional statute, since there 
is no valid basis for the action.13 
2. Broun v Coates, 102 App DC 300, 253 
F2d 36, 67 ALR2d 943. 
Annotation: 44 ALR 183. 
3. Kramer v Perkins, 102 Minn 455, 113 
NW 1062. 
4. Annotation: 44 ALR 181. 
5. Harvey v Mason City & Ft. D. R. Co 
129 Iowa 465, 105 NW 950; Clark v Mason, 
264 Ky 683, 95 SW2d 292. 
6. Pease v Golightly, 168 Okla 582, 35 
P2d 469, 94 ALR 956. 
7. Poultryland, Inc. v Anderson, 200 Ga 
549, 37 SE2d 785; Ferderer v Northern Pac 
R. Co. 75 ND 139, 26 NW2d 236. 
8. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co v Waldo, 90 
Okla 185, 216 P 911, 32 ALR 638. 
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Where the demurrer to a complaint in 
an equitable action is sustained and the plain-
tiff is allowed to plead over in a legal action, 
it is reversible error to deny either party a 
trial by jury, although the court was seeking 
to dispose of the issues justly and in such 
manner as to avoid a multiplicity of suits. 
Pugh v Tidwell, 52 NM 386, 199 P2d 1001. 
9. Chicago Land Clearance Com v Darrow, 
12 III 2d 365, 146 NE2d 1, 68 ALR2d 532. 
10. State v Schifsky, 243 Minn 533, 69 
NW2d 89 
11 . State v Reardon, 245 Minn 509, 73 
NW2d 192. 
12. Porter v Charleston & S. R. 
SC 169,41 SE 108. 
13. Minnear v Minnear, 131 Colo 31 
P2d 517. 
* 
21-7-3 FEES 
brief on appeal, but not for fees payable to able for payment of filing fees and costs, and 
clerk. Salt Lake City v. Robmson, 39 Utah 260, placing limitations on the amounts that may be 
116 P. 442, 35 L.R.A. (n.s ) 610, 1913E Ann. assessed, does not conflict with statutory pro-
Cas. 61 (1911) visions regarding filings by impecunious liti-
Prisoners. 
Section 64-13-23(5), directing a court to de-
termine the amount of a prisoner's funds avail-
gants. Hansen v. Wilkinson, 889 R2d 927 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). 
21-7-3. Impecunious litigants — Affidavit. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Convicted" means a conviction by entry of a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, and conviction of any crime 
or offense. 
(b) "Prisoner" means a person who has been convicted of a crime and is 
incarcerated for that crime or is being held in custody for trial or 
sentencing. 
(2) As provided in this chapter, any person may institute, prosecute, defend, 
and appeal any cause in any court in this state without prepayment of fees and 
costs or security, by taking and subscribing, before any officer authorized to 
administer an oath, an affidavit of impecuniosity demonstrating financial 
inability to pay fees and costs or give security. 
(3) The affidavit shall contain complete information on the party's: 
(a) identity and residence; 
(b) amount of income, including government financial support, alimony, 
child support; 
(c) assets owned, including real and personal property; 
(d) business interests; 
(e) accounts receivable; 
(f) securities, checking and savings account balances; 
(g) debts; and 
(h) monthly expenses. 
(4) If the party is a prisoner, he shall also disclose the amount of money held 
in his prisoner t rust account at the time the affidavit is executed as provided 
in Section 21-7-4.5. 
(5) In addition to the financial disclosures, the affidavit shall state the 
following: 
I, A B, do solemnly swear or affirm that due to my poverty I am unable to 
bear the expenses of the action or legal proceedings which I am about to 
commence or the appeal which I am about to take, and that I believe I am 
entitled to the relief sought by the action, legal proceedings, or appeal. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1017; Courts to be open at all times, Utah Const., 
C.L. 1917, § 2577; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 28- Art. I, Sec 11 
7-3; 1996, ch. 161, § 1. Right of appeal guaranteed, Utah C ' * x 
Amendment Notes . — The 1996 amend- VIII, Sec. 5 
ment, effective April 29, 1996, rewrote this Witnesses called at state expense f. 
section. nious criminal defendants, § 21-5-14 , i 
Cross -Refe rences . — Indigent defense act, _ HT** 
Title 77, Chapter 32. jfr * l 
V1 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 21-7-3 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Appeal fees. S 
Brief on appeal. </ 
Construction and appl ica t ion .^ 
Indigency. J 
Joint appeal.! 
Jury fees. / 
Prisoners. T N V 
Receivers. J 
Constitutionality. 
This section is constitutional. Eddington v. 
Union Portland Cement Co., 42 Utah 274, 130 
P. 243 (1913). 
Appeal fees. 
An impecunious criminal defendant does not 
lose the constitutional right to appeal a convic-
tion as a result of his inability to pay filing fees. 
State v. Johnson, 700 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1985). 
Brief on appeal . 
If one appealing from conviction does not 
show himself unable to pay costs by reason of 
his impecuniosity, he is liable for costs of print-
ving~appollato brief but not for fees payable to 
"clerk. Salt Lake City v. Robinson, 39 Utah 260, 
116 P. 442, 35 L.R.A. (n.s.) 610, 1913E Ann. 
Cas. 61 (1911). 
Construction and application. 
All that was contained in R.S. 1898, §§ 1016 
to 1019 (now §§ 21-7-2 to 21-7-4, 21-7-6) relat-
ing to the matter of costs was held to be there 
by authority of the Legislature. Whatever 
change of phraseology or omission of words 
there might have been between those sections 
as they then stood and the original acts from 
which they were taken was clearly authorized 
by Laws 1896, ch. 85, § 4. Moreover, even if 
that were insufficient, the matter was never-
theless settled by Laws, 1899, ch. 7, in which 
R.S. 1898, as printed, was approved and 
adopted by a special legislative act. Eddington 
v. Union Portland Cement Co., 42 Utah 274, 
130 P. 243(1913). 
Indigency. 
In determining whether a particular defen-
dant is indigent, the trial court must consider 
the defendant's entire financial situation, bal-
ancing assets against liabilities and income 
agains t l iy ing expenses. Several factors are . 
considered in determining whether petitioner 
is impecunious, such as: petitioner's employ-
mejijt status aPjj-fi^rr>^ng **flp^ty; financial aid 
from family or friends; financial assistance 
from state and federal programs; petitioner's ' 
necessary living exppnsps and Hahi'li'tips; peti-
tioner's \nnpnriinihprpd p^^ets.jor any disposi-'i 
tion thereof, ancKpetitioner's borrowing capac-1 
ity; and the relative amount of court costs to be I 
waivecLState v. Vincent, 845 P.2d 254 (Utah Gt J 
App. 1992). 
Joint appeal. 
Where a joint appeal, and not a joint and 
several appeal, is taken by several defendants 
from a joint judgment, and upon a joint rather 
than a joint and several assignment of errors, 
and appeal is not perfected by all of them, 
either by all giving or executing a joint or a 
separate undertaking, unless waived or all fil-
ing an affidavit of impecuniosity, appeal must 
be dismissed, the filing of an affidavit of impe-
cuniosity by only one of the appellants being 
insufficient. Johnston v. Geary, 84 Utah 47, 33 
P.2d 757 (1934). 
Jury fees. 
Defendant requesting jury trial is not re-
quired to advance jury fees, in order to be 
entitled to such trial, if defendant files affidavit 
of impecuniosity. Toltec Ranch Co. v. Babcock, 
24 Utah 183, 66 P. 876 (1901), afT'd, 191 U.S. 
542, 48 L. Ed. 294, 24 S. Ct. 169 (1903). 
Prisoners. 
Section 64-13-23(5), directing a court to de-
termine the amount of a prisoner's funds avail-
able for payment of filing fees and costs, and 
placing limitations on the amounts that may be 
assessed, does not conflict with statutory pro-
visions regarding filings by impecunious liti- y 
gants. Hansen v. Wilkinson, 889 P.2d 927 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). 
Receivers. 
When receiver appeals, he must either com-
ply with this section by filing the affidavit 
prescribed hereby or file an undertaking. 
Buttrey v. Guaranteed Sees. Co., 78 Utah 39, 
300 P. 1040(1931). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §$ 47 
to 51. 
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S Costs §§ 87 to 93; 24 
CJ.S. Criminal Law §§ 1738 to 1758. 
AX.R. — Marital action, right of indigent to 
proceed without payment of costs, 52 A.L.R.3d 
844. 
Determination of indigency of accused enti-
tling him to transcript or similar record for 
purposes of appeal, 66 A.L.R.3d 954. 
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Robert Flynn, III 
1265 N. Carbonville Rd. #24 
Price, Ut. 84501 
DEFENDANT (PRO SE) 
UTAH APPEAL NUMBER: 
F\O.0 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH I 
TIRE KING INC., 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
VS. 
ROBERT FLYNN, III, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY 
CASE NO: 000700120 
The Defendant (Pro Se) in the above entitled case, appealed to 
The Utah Court of Appeals, submit the attached Affidavit of 
Impecuniosity for my Apeal, to go to the Utah Court of Appeal. 
Executed This 21st day of February, 2001 
DEFENDANT (PRO SE) 
* < W rf CKVMO 
Robert Flynn, III 
1265 N. Carbonville Rd. #24 
Price, UT. 84501 
DEFENDANT (PRO SE) 
AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY 
I, ROBERT FLYNN, III, do solemnly swear that owing to my 
low income(poverty) based solely on Social Security 
Disability Payments, am unable to bear the expenses of the 
appeal which I am about to take, and that I believe that 
I am entitled to the relief sought by such an appeal. 
Subscribed to and Sworn 
before me this day, on 
February 21, 2001 WE? 
AFFIANT 
P^hiuM p 
IN THE COUNTY OF CARBON, STATE OF UTAH, ON THIS 21ST DAY 
OF FEBRUARY 2001, BEFORE ME, THE UNDERSIGNED NOTARY, 
PERSONALLY APPEARED ROBERT FLYNN,III WHO PROVED TO ME 
HIS IDENTITY THROUGH DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OF 
A UTAH DRIVERS LICENSE #151553146, TO BE THE PERSON WHO 
SIGNED THE PRECEDING DOCUMENT IN MY PRESENCE AND WHO SWORE 
OR AFFIRMED TO ME THAT THE SIGNATURE IS VOLUNTARY AND THE 
DOCUMENT TRUTHFUL. 
NOTARY SIGNATURE AND SEAL 
CONNIE CASE 
mTWPUBLIC'STATEofllTAH 
120 EAST MAIN 
PRICE, UT 84501 
COMM. EXP. 9-28-2003 
IN THK UTAH SUPREME COURT 
TIRE KING INC 
Plai: tbTaiid A p p e l l e e 
vs. 
ROBERT FLYNN III 
Dele i.Milt and A p p e l l a n t 
AFFIDAVIT OF tMFECUNIOSITY 
20010172-SC 
Case No. 
Petite ner r o b e r t f l y n n i i i ("Affiant") provides the following information as 
required by UMJI Code Section 21-7-3: S u p p l e m e n t a l t o t i m e l y f i l e d a f f i d a v i t 
AFFIANT: 
Name 
Address 
(If inmate, 
include prison A\Q) 
Telephone 
ROBERT FLYNN I I I (SSN 475 46 8855 ) 
1265 N. CARBONVILLE RD #24 
PRICE UTAH 84501 
NONE 
A F F I A N T ' S (N.VNCIAL I N F O R M A T I O N 
Fill out the following table completely. 
Employer's 
Name & Addresj 
NONE 
Monthly Net Income 
Alimony recci'. i NONE 
Child Support received 
NONE 0 
Income in the p^i 12 montlis from any oilier non-goveiiunental source including business, profession or other 
self-employmem, >mt payments; interest or dividends; pensions, annuities, or life-insurance navments; gift*
 0r 
inheritance
 1 ? ^ i n h p r - ( a l l u s e d i n 2000 move/repairs) 
Income from gc Tranent financial support including sdciarsecurity"oelielits, AJbUC/wDrker's compensation, 
veterans noneduvational benefits, housing, food, or other living allowances paid to members of the military, 
clergy, and OUK.S. 
.qpn 
Monthly Gross Income 
1200.00/jn 
*had to move to meet codes: Not cost effective to upgrade 
my 
f Affiant is current,) not employed Date & state of last employment l a s t 1980 
D i s a b i l i t y S u p r . S c h o o l s LA C o u n t y 
$ 6 2 5 . 0 0 i n 1980 Salary/wages per month when last employed 
$ 2 5 0 0 . 0 0 / m o 1979 
Amounts in cash or in ny bank accounts including savings and checking 0 
Amounts owing to AH u t including accounts receivable 
ist ofhomejaiyi H^tiiSiJcaJUHiyj^' and vcliiclcs ot otheujigisonal uiopeity owned in whole or in part by 
affiant, its location and its appioxinmte value. 
Property 
P u r c h a s e / R e p a i d o f 
1978 u s ^ d m o b i l e home 2000 
£ r e v . 1Q7Q nn.vP.hi-.P P r i m a r y v e h . 
3 mi s r . o Ir lpr na r . s ( 1 w o r k i n g 
Location 
#24 
J 
P r i c e Ut 84501 
same 
— g a m e 1 
Value 
p u r c h a s e $ 
1 1 . 5 K e s t . 
9.OK e s t 
3.OK e s t J 
ist of Affiant's del .. 
To t (toin owed 
Dr W i n k e l 
Central Park 
Amount To whom owed 
noncurrent _ 
visa card! 1999 on) 
Amount 
-1000.00 
-15.OK d st left 
(*8vrs fin. ) in 2000 ((-10. OK) down and in repair to m o v e '* 
ist of Affiant's niunLiIy expenses. 
7ood v a r 
Clothing 
Transportation 
vlortgage/rent 
ilectricity 
' Amount 
t o 3 5 0 . 0 0 
5 0 . 0 0 
1 0 0 . 0 0 
( * ) 1 4 6 . 0 0 
4 5 . 0 0 
Gas 
Water 
Sevvci 
Car Payments 
McdicaDegl^l 
Payments 
Amount 
1 2 5 . 0 0 
3 0 . 0 0 
5 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
8 0 . 0 0 
Other (list) 
S p a c e 
p a s t v i s a 
i n s / c a r home 
Rxs 
Amount 
190.00 I 
50 .00 I 
1 0 0 . 0 0 
5 0 . 0 0 
23 UTAH RULES OK CIVIL PROCEDURK Rule 8 
the prayer docs not limit the relic! which the tion, court could resiure jury findings under 
court may grant. Bchrens v. Raleigh Hills authority of this Rule, since plaintiff filed mo-
Hosp.. 67f> P.2d 1179 <lTtah 1983». tion to set aside conditional order for new trial 
. within ten da vs. National Farmers1 Union 
— New trial. Propenv & ( 'as. Co. v. Thompson. 4 Utah 2d 7, 
Particulan/ .at ion. ^ 6 ^ 249. 61 A.LR.2d 63a « 19o5). 
Only purpose for requiring partic uianzation 
of grounds for motion for new trial is to inform Orders. 
court and other party of theories upon which 
new trial is sought; where defendant filed a Hi- —Correction. 
davit with motions setting forth theories, and Where judge made perfunctory or clerical 
judgment had been on pleadings, court and mistake resulting from erroneous assumption 
parties were sufficiently advised as to grounds that order prepared by counsel correctly re-
for motion. Howard v Howard. 11 Utah 2d 149, fleeted judgment of Supreme Court and trial 
356 P2d 275 (I960), court, judge could correct order on his own 
motion. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 
— Set t ing aside condit ional order. |o,£ 299 P2d 827 ( 1956) 
Where court on own initiative lowered from 
$2,000 to $1,000 value of building as found by Cited in Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123 
jury and entered conditional order granting Utah 387. 259 P.2d 885 < 1953): Thomas v. Heirs 
new trial unless plaintiff consented to reduc- of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d 57. 305 P2d 507 (1956). 
COLLATKRAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. -- 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions. as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8 
Rules, and Orders * 1 et seq.; 61A Am. Jur. 2d A.L.R.3d 1361. 
Pleading ^ 31 et seq., 665. Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action as 
C.J.S. — 60 (.'.. IS . Motions and Orders $ l e t affected by opponent's motion for summary 
seq.; 71 C.-J.S. Pleading ^ 63 to 210. 140 et judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
seq.. 211 et seq. reeled verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. 
A.L.R. — Proceeding tor summary judgment 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether 
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain 
(Da short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief; and (2> a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems 
himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be 
demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his 
defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon 
which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and 
this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the 
averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or 
a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and 
material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good 
faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make 
his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he 
may generally deny ali the averments except such designated averments or 
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert 
all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set 
forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall 
set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assump-
tion of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, 
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, 
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, 
waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. 
When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a 
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat 
the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
76-6-404 5 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
COLLATERAI REFERENCES 
Am. Jur 2d — 50 Am Jur 2d Larcenv ^ 2 sen ice store as criminal offense 60 A L R 3d 
C J S — 5 2 A C J S Larceny § 1(3) 1293 
A L R — Larceny entrapment or consent Embezzlement larcenv false pretenses or 
1 0 A L R 3 d 1121 allied criminal fraud bv partner 82 A L R 3d 
Criminal offenses in connection with rental 822 
of motor vehicles 38 A L R 3d 949 Criminal liability for theft of interference 
Criminal piosecution based upon breaking with or unauthorized use of computer pro 
into or taking mone\ or goods from \ ending grams files or systems 51 A L R 4th 971 
machine or other com operated machine 4o Participation in larceny or theft as preclud 
A L R 3d 1286 mg conviction for receiving or concealing the 
Changing of price tags b\ patron in self stolen property 29 A L R 5th 59 
76-6-404.5. Wrongful appropriation — Penalties. 
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another, without the consent of the 
owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, 
or use the property or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of 
possession of the property 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of the property to its control 
by the actor is not presumed or implied because of the owner's or legal 
custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the control of the property by any 
person 
(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower than theft, as 
provided in Section 76-6-412, so that a violation which would have been 
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76 6-412 if it had been theft is 
a third degree felony if it is wrongful appropriation, 
(b) a third degree felony under Section 76 6 412 if it had been theft is a 
class A misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation, 
(c) a class A misdemeanor under Section 76 6-412 if it had been theft is 
a class B misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation, and 
(d) a class B misdemeanor under Section 76 6 412 if it had been theft is 
a class C misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation 
History C 1953, 76-6-404 5, enacted by L semitrailers which does not constitute theft is 
1998, ch 138, § 1, 1999, ch 21, § 100 punishable under Section 41 l a 1311 " making 
Amendment Notes — The 1999 amend a related change 
ment effective May 3 1999 deleted former Effective Dates — Laws 1998 ch 138 
Subsection (3)(e) which read "an act of unau became effective on May 4 1998 pursuant to 
thonzed control of motor \ehicles trailers or Utah Const Art VI Sec 25 
76-6-405. Theft by deception. 
( D A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as 
to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely 
to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed "Puffing" means an 
exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addresse 
the public or to a class or group 
History C 1953 76 6-405, enacted by L 
1973, ch 196, * 76 6 405 
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•#ot 
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